Abstract
Do international organizations (IOs) have an independent effect on state preferences? Despite the importance of this question in the international relations literature, isolating the causal effect of IO membership has proved difficult because of endogeneity concerns. This article offers a novel empirical approach to identifying the causal effect of shared membership in IOs on member state preferences. We exploit the fact that states joining the European Union obtain automatic membership in several other IOs through the European Union’s membership in these organizations. We then use a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the effect of automatic membership in IOs on preference similarity with other members versus preference similarity with nonmembers. We demonstrate that shared IO membership leads to an increase in preference similarity. This approach offers a useful way to disentangle the effect of IO membership from selection effects that lead states to join IOs.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
