Abstract
We study the steady-state Nash equilibrium-seeking problem for sampled-data games with LTI dynamics and quadratic costs. The key challenge is to guarantee the robust stability and convergence properties of the closed-loop system in the presence of local individual sampling mechanisms assigned to each of the players in the game. This problem is non-trivial due to the unstable behaviors that can arise when sequential control updates (rather than parallel) emerge in the closed-loop system because of the existence of local control triggering mechanisms in each node of the network. To address this issue, we introduce a controls framework based on tools from hybrid dynamical systems theory. Our results are illustrated via numerical examples.
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