A felsőoktatás és a szabad mozgáshoz való jog az európai unió Bíróságának ítélkezési gyakorlatában

Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in the Freedom of Movement of Persons within the EU in the Light of Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Editorial: Governing the EU's climate and energy transition through the 2030 Framework

Brüstle Decision Is Unhelpful, but Not Catastrophic

The article analyzes the normative-legal analysis of public policy in the field of higher education. It is justified that higher education is an integral part of the entire education system in Ukraine. It is stated that the existence, effective functioning and gradual development of the higher education system is directly dependent on the state policy in the field of higher education, in connection with which its research is updated. It is proved that the general principles of the formation and implementation of public policy in the field of higher education are enshrined in legislation, but the legislation does not contain a definition of the concept of “state policy in the field of higher education”. The content of similar concepts (“state policy in the field of higher education”, “state educational policy”, “national educational policy”, etc.) is analyzed and it is noted that they are synonymous in content, however, it should be used “state policy in the field of higher education” with taking into account the application of such concept in the legislation. An author’s version of the corresponding definition is proposed. The composition of the subjects that ensure the effective implementation of public policy in the field of higher education is analyzed. It is noted that the legislation defines a list of principles, that is, basic fundamental principles, taking into account various aspects of educational policy. In addition, attention was paid to the main directions of the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of higher education, which are stipulated in the legislation. Taking into account the conducted research, it is proposed to distinguish the peculiarities of the state policy in the field of higher education (among which the following is one of the directions of the general policy of the state; principles that are defined in the legislation; it is determined by the legislative power, and is implemented by the executive power, etc.).

As of today, the European Union and the Council of Europe play a key role in establishing standards for human rights protection. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) share a common fundamental goal – the protection of human rights. While they occasionally refer to each other’s case law, resulting in «mutual cross-fertilization», a closer analysis reveals significant differences between these institutions. Among the 46 member states of the Council of Europe, 27 are part of the European Union, granting their citizens access to the protection of their rights within both judicial systems. This article examines the interaction between the ECtHR and the CJEU within the context of Belgium’s legal system. The author analyzes the impact of these two key judicial institutions on the development of national legislation and jurisprudence in Belgium, with a focus on harmonizing European and national legal standards. Particular attention is given to the mechanisms of jurisdictional interplay between The ECtHR and the CJEU and their influence on ensuring human rights protection in Belgium’s multi-layered legal system. The article explores the historical aspects of Belgium’s integration into the EU legal order, notably the landmark decision of the Court of Cassation in Le Ski (1971), which marked a turning point in recognizing the supremacy of EU law over national legislation. It also addresses the principles of equivalence and effectiveness introduced by the CJEU to unify procedural norms across member states. Additionally, the relationship between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is discussed, as well as the role of the «margin of appreciation» doctrine in balancing international obligations with national legal autonomy. The scientific novelty lies in analyzing the modern practice of judicial dialogue between the ECtHR and the CJEU and examining its influence on legal processes in Belgium. The author concludes that the synergy between the jurisdictions of the ECtHR and the CJEU strengthens human rights protection in EU member states, although challenges related to legal autonomy and norm interpretation persist.

This chapter focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which comprises two courts: the CJEU and the General Court. It first provides an overview of the CJEU’s structure and functions, and then discusses some of its main rulings and their significance. It further considers rulings on the powers of the institutions, some key legal judgments made in response to questions referred to the CJEU by national courts, the impact of CJEU rulings on EU policy, and post-Maastricht trends in the CJEU and EU law. It also assesses the evolving political reactions towards the judgments of the Court, along with the debate over whether the member states have been able to effectively curb the CJEU’s radical jurisprudence.

The Politics and Economics of Comparison

Investor to State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Mechanisms: A Comparison of Evolving Legal Approaches in Brazilian and Latin American with the European Union

Background Before the United Kingdom joined the European Union, the jurisdiction of the courts of England depended on English law. Now things have changed. Union law provides the main foundation for their jurisdiction: it is only where Union law does not operate that the traditional English rules still apply. In discussing the jurisdiction of English courts, therefore, we must begin with Union law. (The traditional English rules will be considered in a later chapter.) The European Union began more than sixty years ago when six European nations came together to form the European Coal and Steel Community. From these small beginnings, it has grown to a continent-wide organization with twenty-eight Member States. It has three political organs: the Council, which represents the Member States (its members are the delegates of the national governments); the European Parliament, representing the peoples of Europe (its members are elected by the voters of Europe); and the Commission, a sort of executive, whose members are appointed by the Council but must be approved by the Parliament. There is also a court, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which consists of one judge from each Member State. Most cases before the CJEU fall into one or other of two categories. The first category consists of cases that begin (and end) before the CJEU. These are cases concerning the Union itself – for example, actions to annul Union acts, actions in tort against the Union, or actions by the Union against Member States. The second category consists of cases involving Union law that are referred to the CJEU by a court in a Member State. Here, the role of the CJEU is limited to interpreting the provision of Union law in question and, in some cases, ruling on its validity. After the CJEU has given its judgment, the case goes back to the Member-State court. Our interest in the CJEU will be confined to these latter cases, which are normally called ‘preliminary references’ or ‘references for preliminary rulings’. The CJEU gives a single judgment of the court: there are no concurring or dissenting judgments. The style is abstract and general. The close reasoning and analysis found in English judgments is absent. In the early days, case law was not cited, though whole passages in a judgment would sometimes be taken, without acknowledgment, from a previous case.

Recent Decisions of the European Court of Justice of the European Union on Supplementary Protection Certificates: A Few Answers-Many Questions.

A short few days in September 2020 saw an extraordinary turn of events. The Member States of the European Union used the withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union (EU) as a pretext to dismiss a sitting Advocate General (AG) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) before the expiration of the duration of her mandate provided for in primary law. The Member States replaced her with another nominee in the absence of a vacancy. This occurred in direct violation of EU primary law, including the cardinal principles of security of tenure and judicial independence. The CJEU had the opportunity to prevent this from occurring; yet did absolutely nothing to prevent it. Instead, the CJEU went out of its way to facilitate the appointment of Mr. Athanasios Rantos in place of AG Eleanor Sharpston. The drama in Three Acts, involving numerous elements – hints of lawlessness; signs of complicity between the Member States and the CJEU; confirmation of the lack of structural independence of the CJEU – has ultimately raised doubts whether the CJEU is legally composed. These September 2020 developments resulted in the dismissal of a member of the Court that the Member States did not want, no matter what the law said. In this article, these cumulative events are analyzed systematically through a legal lens, regrettably confirming a startling omission in the EU legal order – that the EU lacks a structurally independent court of law sitting at its apex, and that the EU legal system is not immune to ultra vires Member State interventions. Notwithstanding these developments and a severe pounding to the credibility of the CJEU, there remains a possibility for this deficiency in the EU legal order to be rectified. The CJEU will have to state at some future juncture that decisions within the sphere of Article 253 TFEU are subject to judicial review for procedural irregularities, thus ensuring that the EU is truly a complete system of legal remedies and procedures. In the meantime, questions do linger about the lawful composition of the CJEU with the position of ‘AG’ Rantos in situ, which the CJEU should and must address.

Several studies and scientific workshops have considered the member states’ rules – within the framework of EU law – on the ownership and use of agricultural and forest property, considering that this area is significant not only for the member states that acceded after 2004, such as Hungary but also for the founding members. These examinations have focused on the public interests acknowledged by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), such as the preservation of the rural population, the promotion of small- and middle-sized, livable properties, and the easing of speculative pressure on the land market, which should be achieved in practice without compromising EU law – especially its fundamental freedoms. This characteristic of the CJEU’s relevant case law primarily led to the application of the free movement of capital; nevertheless, the CJEU’s judgment in the KOB Sia case resulted in a significant change in this area, the main subject of the current examination. This article will consider how the CJEU was altered. Moreover, we examine whether this change could be consistent. We find that the judgments referred by the CJEU in the KOB Sia case and Directive 123/2006's relevant provisions can serve as a starting point in deciding how the member states' margin of appreciation was altered.

The trends of globalisation have had unavoidable impacts in steering and guiding the decisions of national policy-makers and the direction of national education policies. In the obscuring processes of supranational homogenisation of education and educational policy, supranational regimes, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU), play a significant role. The traditional idea of meritocratic competition is challenged by globalisation and by the new standard setting of the supranational organisations, and nation-states are losing their power to define standards and to control the key features of educational selection. The process is proceeding particularly in the field of higher education, where the stakes to win reputational capital are at their highest. The message, objectives and language of those organisations are cast in the same mould. They have started to speak in the same words with the same stress, repeating the same phrases about globalisation, economic efficiency and productivity, and swearing that globalisation is inevitable in the name of progress. In this article, historical change in the educational policies of the OECD and the EU and the implication of these policies for national education policies are studied. Special emphasis is laid on the field of higher education and the national case of Finland.

The Rule of Law principle has recently appeared in the EU legal order in the context of the different procedures that are used to induce the Member States to change their course of action. It applies in particular to the procedure under Article 7 TEU, where the state is subject to a political assessment. However, this also applies to judicial procedures; in particular, preliminary ruling procedures or infringement procedures initiated by the Commission against violations of Treaty obligations by a state. While in case of Article 7 TEU, Member States may influence the decision of the European Council that ultimately decides on these matters, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is an independent body, and its decisions may be of major importance for states, not only politically or legally, but also financially. At present, the CJEU is conducting several parallel proceedings in which – based on the interpretation of Article 2 TEU – the actions of the Polish government are the subject of in-depth analysis, which may, it is hoped, have a measurable impact on further developments in Poland. The proposed link between the EU budget and respect for the Rule of Law, where the European Parliament plays a significant role, should also be added to this picture. Can we say, therefore, that the Member States are at present still masters of the Treaties, controlling the competences of the organisation they created, or does the autonomy of EU law and the created independence of the CJEU mean that – perhaps against the will of some governments – the power of the Member States to act independently is restricted?

Research purpose. The EU Customs Law is a significant branch of the EU substantive law. On the basis of the Union Customs Code (UCC; Regulation [EU] No. 952/2013) and the Combined Nomenclature of the European Union (Regulation [EU] No. 2658/87 and its Annexes), it regulates the international trade of the European Union and its Member States with the third countries, in particular the taxation of the international trade operations by applying the customs duties/tariffs. However, after the adoption of the UCC, which imperatively requires all the customs administrations of the EU Member States to work as one, the problem of the uniform application of the EU customs law remains very important. Therefore, the authors analyse the practice of the Baltic States (i.e. Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in this area, based on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in cases involving references to the CJEU by the national courts of different Baltic States. Design/Methodology/Approach. The authors used the thematic analysis method and the method of generalisation of professional (judicial) practice as the basis of the chosen methodology and its design. Therefore, first of all, the authors have selected the judicial cases of the CJEU (in the period from 2010 to 2018) related to a certain theme – customs duties. Second, the authors compared the practice of the CJEU in such cases, which are attributable to the relevant EU Member State in order to identify the problems of uniformity in the application of the EU customs law (specific to the different Baltic States). Finally, by using comparative insights and comparative method, the authors present proposals for the improvement of legal regulation to ensure the compatibility of national rules and practices with the EU law. Findings. During the investigation, the authors established that the problems of the uniform application of the EU customs law in the Baltic States arose in specific areas. Such areas were tariff classification of goods, determination of the origin and value of goods (in the case of Latvia), regulation of customs procedures (in the case of Estonia), customs duties and other import taxes preferences (in the case of Lithuania). At the same time, it was established that the national courts of the Republic of Lithuania were the least active in ensuring co-operation with the CJEU this area, which could have been caused by the improper national legal regulations. Originality/Value/Practical implications. The authors present (after the assessment of the experience of the Baltic States) the proposals for the improvement of both the legal regulations of the EU customs law as well as national legal regulations (in particular – in the Republic of Lithuania) to improve the areas that cause systemic irregularities of the uniform regulation of the international trade regulatory measures of the European Union. Whilst some of the similar studies were completed in the recent years (e.g. Limbach 2015), they do not provide a detailed comparative analysis of the issues that were investigated, specifically considering the situation in the Baltic States.