A Failure to Implement: Analyzing State Responses to the Supreme Court's Directives in Atkins v. Virginia and Suggestions for a National Standard

Abstract

In the seminal 2002 case of Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court held that executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Court did not set forth guidelines for defining mentally retarded and instead left it to the states to define the issue individually. State definitions for mental retardation or intellectual disability were examined, including documentation of procedures for Atkins claims. Results indicated significant differences between states in definitions and procedures. Not all states had a statutory ban on executing the mentally retarded, and while most states subscribed to a three-pronged definition modeled after clinical psychiatric definitions, most failed to operationalize the prongs. Additionally, states differed on the burden of proof required to show mental retardation, which party bears that burden, the timing of the showing, who makes the determination of mental retardation, and the standard used to review the determination. In addition to documenting definitions of mental retardation and criminal procedures for Atkins claims in states with the death penalty, this study sought to identify an ideal definition for intellectual disability in capital cases. While aspirational, a single definition would better satisfy the mandate of the Atkins decision by providing consistent protection to criminal defendants across states.