Abstract
ABSTRACT By constructing a dynamic game model, this article explores the ‘optimal regulation’ and the food safety regulatory mechanism to be adopted when the food safety regulatory authority has to implement a certain level of regulation. In the short term, the actual quality of food can be improved by increasing the probability of sampling or the intensity of punishment. However, in the long term, the optimal path is to improve the production technology of sellers. A moderate level of supervision makes regulation more effective, while a threshold level of regulation can reduce welfare.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
