A drop in the ocean: photographic witnessing and the Fukushima wastewater release

On April 13, 2021, the Japanese government officially issued a statement saying that it will discharge the nuclear waste water stored in the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the sea around the spring of 2023 for a period of 30 years. Despite almost overwhelming opposition domestic and abroad, the Japanese government has not withdrawn or delayed the plan. Based on the six stakeholders and the PEST analysis method, this paper deeply discusses the reasons for the Japanese government's unilateral decision to discharge nuclear waste water into the sea. Research shows that Japan's discharge of nuclear waste water is not just an environmental protection issue, it is a consequence of Japan's political, economic, technological, cultural and even historical factors. The purpose of this paper is to provide a reference for effective measures in the future, in the hope of better protecting the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders by introducing international environmental law to prevent and postpone the discharge of nuclear wastewater from Japan.

This paper considers the damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and the meaning of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, and reflects on the evacuees' experiences over past 12 years. During this time, several lawsuits demanding the clarification of responsibility for the accident and compensation for damages have been filed against TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) and the Japanese Government. The “loss and transformation of hometowns (furusato in Japanese)” has become one of the key issues in these lawsuits. While the casees were being litigated, the mandated “evacuation designated zones” were gradually lifted. Even in the “Difficult‐to‐Return Areas” where annual integrated doses of radioactive substances are over 50 mSv and evacuation orders are still in effect, efforts are being made to lift the evacuation orders. Because they were forced to leave their places of residence, evacuees have claimed, “we lost oue furusato [hometown].” However, because they are able to return after evacuation orders are lifted, both TEPCO and the Japanese Government have insisted that “their furusato has not been lost” and “they cannot claim compensation for furusato damages.” In this paper, I call the irreversible and absolute damage caused by the nuclear power plant accident “the deprivation of furusato.” I look at furusato from three aspects: the relationship between people and nature, the connection between people, and notions of persistence and sustainability. Then, I discuss what kind of reconstruction is being promoted to respond to the deprivation of furusato and for whom.

<p indent="0mm">Ten years after the Fukushima nuclear accident (FNA), Japan announced the planned discharge of over one million tons of Fukushima radioactive wastewater (FRW) into the Pacific Ocean in two years. This decision regarding FRW disposal has aroused worldwide concerns and public fears, which may be exacerbated by reputational damage and the lack of a clear public understanding of the possible adverse impacts of the FRW. As one of the countries surrounding the Pacific Ocean, China is a stakeholder in this decision regarding the FRW disposal. In this study, we compared the FRW source and its associated radionuclide components with the liquid effluent from routine operation of the nuclear power plant and its associated radionuclides. The activity concentrations of 13 radionuclides in the pre- and post-treated FRW by the Advanced Liquid Processing Systems (ALPS) were quantitatively compared with limits for radionuclide concentrations required by Japan law, guidance levels for radionuclides in drinking water provided by the World Health Organization (WHO), and baseline concentrations of radionuclides in surface seawater from the Pacific Ocean before the FNA. Sediment-seawater distribution coefficients and bioconcentration factors are also shown to provide insights into the mobility and biological availability of radionuclides derived from the FRW in the marine environment. Although 62 radionuclides can be recovered from the FRW by ALPS according to a report from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), a large amount of ³H remains in the ALPS-treated FRW. The total amount of ³H in the ALPS-treated FRW was approximately <sc>8.6×10¹⁴ Bq</sc> (by October 31, 2019), with an average concentration of <sc>7.3×10⁵ Bq/L,</sc> higher than the concentration limit <sc>(6×10⁴ Bq/L)</sc> required by Japan law and guidance level <sc>(10⁴ Bq/L)</sc> provided by the WHO. The amount of ³H in the ALPS-treated FRW <sc>(8.6×10¹⁴ Bq</sc> by October 31, 2019) is continually increasing, and is already higher than the amount of ³H (3×10¹⁴<sc>‒7×10¹⁴ Bq)</sc> released into the Pacific Ocean immediately after the FNA. Additionally, other radionuclides (e.g., ¹⁴C, ⁹⁰Sr, ¹²⁹I, etc.) in the ALPS-treated FRW with high bioconcentration factors and high activity-dose conversion factors relative to ³H should also be carefully monitored and evaluated. The measured results provided by the TEPCO indicated that ~70% of the current ALPS-treated FRW should be repurified to reduce concentrations of other radionuclides to meet Japan’s legal requirements. Despite several unresolved factors (e.g., the FRW source terms, discharging plan, hydrodynamic and biogeochemical processes, etc.) simultaneously influencing the fate of FRW in the marine environment, we qualitatively described the hydrodynamically driven passive transport pathway and the biologically driven active transport pathway of the FRW. The transport of the FRW should be comprehensively investigated from the perspective of physical-biogeochemical processes at multiple scales (e.g., large-scale wind-driven circulation, mesoscale eddies, small-scale turbulence) and three-dimensional (e.g., vertical and horizontal vectors) oceans. Key gateways and transport pathways relevant to the FRW entry into the China seas have been suggested to include the Luzon Strait, the outer continental shelf and cross-shelf penetrating fronts in the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea Warm Current, and the Korean Coastal Current. Under specific conditions, the neglected biologically driven active transport pathway may significantly accelerate transport speed for the FRW-derived radionuclides via migratory animals (e.g., Pacific bluefin tuna) and may impose relatively high radiological risk to humans via seafood consumption. Finally, the consequences of marine ecological environment and our preparedness for the FRW release were discussed from the perspectives of total radioactivity, radionuclide components in the FRW, transport pathways of the FRW, and enhancing capacity to meet radiological risk assessment needs. Nuclear power plants located near the coastal seas are gradually developing in China and play a significant role in China’s national strategy of “Carbon Neutrality”. Technical systems of measurement, tracer, and assessment of radionuclides in the marine environments should be given more attention and be continually enhanced in line with the development of nuclear power plants. Several directions including extremely low minimum detection activity for the analytical methods of radionuclides, buoy-based online and real-time measurement technology for marine radioactivity, construction and validation of numerical models for marine radioactivity, key marine biogeochemical processes for radionuclides, radiation dose-effect for marine biotas, radiological assessment models, and remediation technology for radionuclides in marine environments are emphasized as key technologies in nuclear emergency preparedness to protect marine environment security.

Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan, managing contaminated water became a long-term challenge. In August 2023, Japan began discharging treated atomic wastewater into the Pacific Ocean, sparking global concern. Since nuclear wastewater discharge involves environmental safety, public health, and international relations, understanding various perspectives and presenting scientific data is crucial for formulating reasonable policies. This study aims to analyse the attitudes of different countries towards the Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge, assess its scientific basis, and explore its economic impact on Japan's fishing industry. The results show that Japan's wastewater discharge complies with international safety standards, based on an evaluation of publicly available data from the Tokyo Electric Power Company and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The analysis encompassed both safety measures and environmental impacts of this specific nuclear wastewater release. Despite scientific studies confirming that the treated nuclear wastewater meets safety standards, ongoing public concerns and geopolitical tensions have caused significant economic impacts on Japan's fishing industry. Therefore, enhanced scientific dialogue and research are needed to effectively address the potential long-term challenges that nuclear wastewater discharge may pose to marine ecosystems and global food safety

Reinvigorating radioactive wastewater to the ocean: Investigate the effect of board diversity on environmental corporate social responsibility in the context of Japan

Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) introduced the Lightning Position and Tracking System (LPATS) Version III in 1990. The system uses the time-of-arrival technique for lightning location. TEPCO had studied the operating characteristics of the system, and had confirmed its effectiveness. However, further improvement of the functions and performance was necessary from the viewpoint of utilities. TEPCO, therefore, began development of the LPATS-T in cooperation with the Global Atmospherics, Inc. and formally put the system into operation in 1996.Performance of LPATS-T at TEPCO was evaluated based on comparison with actual lightning current measurement data at transmission towers. Sixty-one lightning locations at transmission towers were detected by LPATS-T from 1996 to 2000. Location error was estimated to be about 650 m on average. TEPCO corrected the lightning locations by the geographical propaga-tion path. As a result, location error was effectively improved when the lightning wavelength was set at 2, 000 m. The precision of lightning location by LPATS-T reduced the average error from 650 m to 330 m. Also, the standard deviation was 180 m from 390 m.

ABSTRACTIn January 2014, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) learned that the committed effective dose (CED) for nine emergency workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident had been assessed by a method other than the standard assessment methods, established by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) in a secondary evaluation conducted in July 2013. The MHLW requested that the TEPCO and primary contractors review all CED data for 6,245 workers who engaged in emergency work in March and April 2011 except those previously reviewed in the 2013 secondary evaluation. This tertiary evaluation revealed that the recorded CED for 1,536 workers had more than 0.1 mSv discrepancy with the CED evaluated by the standard method. The MHLW requested that TEPCO and primary contractors revise CED data for 142 workers whose CED was 2 mSv or greater that required a CED revision of 1 mSv or greater. The average CED revision was 5.86 mSv. The revised effective dose ranged from 2.17–180.10 mSv. In addition, the number of workers whose CED exceeded 100 mSv increased by one. New issues addressed during the tertiary evaluation included the following: (a) setting of calibration coefficients to convert the CED value from whole body counters equipped with NaI scintillator (WBC(NaI)) to a CED value from WBCs with Ge semiconductor detector; (b) estimation methods for the cases where 131I was not detectable by WBC (NaI) and where 137Cs was not detectable but 134Cs was detected; (c) effects of stable iodine (KI) tablets to block the uptake of 131I by thyroid gland; and (d) complications in determining additional doses during stand-by in the seismically isolated building. To prevent the future use of non-uniform CED assessment methods in the dose assessment for workers, the MHLW issued administrative guidance documents to TEPCO and primary contractors on March 25, 2014.

This case study examines the postcrisis discourse of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and its executives following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant crisis of Spring 2011. Using organizational renewal as a framework, we argue TEPCO communicated a desire to rebuild its reputation by being prospective and focusing on the future, emphasizing rebuilding and growth, providing an optimistic message, and communicating information through its leaders. Although TEPCO's postcrisis communication adhered to the tenets of renewal, stakeholders remained skeptical of the organization—likely the result of an inability to foster a strong precrisis relationship with the Japanese public and its government. This study shows how a company can fail to establish renewal among its stakeholders when renewal discourse is not framed successfully.

Divestiture of TEPCO for reparation for the Fukushima nuclear accident–A path to vertical unbundling

This study examines the performance of Japanese electric power companies from 2003 to 2020. We use an observed data set from 2003 to 2015 and a forecasted data set from 2016 to 2020. The Japanese deregulation of the industry needs to be completed by April 2020. As a method, this study uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) environmental assessment, which measures performance from a holistic perspective. This research adds a new analytical capability to the DEA-based assessment by including an analytical ability to handle an “imprecise” data set. We apply the proposed approach to investigate the performance of these companies before and after the disaster of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (11 March 2011). All electric power companies have suffered from business damage due to the nuclear disaster. The Japanese government has developed a policy scheme on how to recover from the huge handling costs resulting from the disaster. Nuclear energy has been long considered the most useful approach to handle climate change. However, many industrial nations have changed policy direction since the nuclear disaster. The Japanese government allocates the costs to not only Tokyo Electric Power Company, which produced the nuclear disaster, but also the other incumbent electric power companies that own nuclear power plants. Under the current Japanese scheme, financial conditions have been gradually recovering from the damage due to the managerial efforts and by indirectly allocating the expenditure to consumers and tax payers.

During the emergency work at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant (APP), the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government experienced various problems in medical and health care management issues, including special medical examinations, on-site triage and initial treatment, patient transportation, lodging and food, and long-term health care for emergency workers. To resolve these problems, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) issued a series of compulsory directives and provided administrative guidance to TEPCO. Based on the experiences and lessons learned, the MHLW recognized that the proper management and implementation of medical and health care management in response to a similar accident would require sufficient measures and systematic preparation, including the following:1. In case of large-scale nuclear accidents, the government needs to assist in dispatching medical staff to the affected plants.2. Nuclear facility operators, medical facilities and fire departments should make an agreement to clarify the division of the roles played prior to the accident and should conduct emergency drills periodically with the full attendance of related personnel to identify and resolve the problems.3. Operators need to develop a support base at a safe distance from the plant and to prepare to develop makeshift lodgings in case of emergency.4. Operators need to come to an agreement to share food stocks among closely located nuclear plants and prepare cooking equipment that can be used in case of blackout to provide warm foods and drinks to as many workers as possible.5. It is necessary to conduct long-term follow-up for emergency workers, including health care system, medical examinations and mental health consultations.

Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) in March 2011, large quantities of radioactive materials were released into the atmosphere and ocean. Since the FDNPP nuclear accident, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) operators have been implementing measures to reduce groundwater inflow into the FDNPP damaged reactor buildings while pumping water to cool the&amp;#160;nuclear reactors and fuel debris. The resulting huge water volume began the discharge into the ocean from August 2023, after being treated by an Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) to remove radionuclides for acceptable discharge levels except tritium. Tritium releases from the FDNPP accident and the ALPS treated water raise questions about the impact on tritium in precipitation in Japan, the removal time of anthropogenic tritium in groundwater and the oceanic transport of tritium from released ALPS treated water.&amp;#160;In this two-part study, we present (1) the modeling of tritium in precipitation during the FDNPP accident using an atmosphere general circulation model (AGCM), and (2) a sensitivity simulation of tritium concentration in the ocean due to planned ALPS treated water release in the next decades by TEPCO using an ocean general circulation model (OGCM).&amp;#160;For the atmospheric part, we used the isotope-enabled AGCM MIROC5-iso, in which tritium has been implemented [1], and adapted an estimated atmospheric release of iodine-131 [2] for the anthropogenic tritium source. We found good agreement with the tritium in precipitation observations in Japan for 2011 and subsequent years, despite MIROC5-iso&amp;#8217;s rather coarse horizontal resolution (approximately 2.8&amp;#176;). Together with measured tritium data in Japan, our modeled results can be used to interpret mean transit times of Fukushima surface and groundwater systems and in other Asian systems (see abstract of Gusyev et al. in the same session).For the oceanic part, we used the OGCM COCO4.9, which is the ocean component of the Model for Interdisciplinary Research on Climate, version 6 (MIROC6 [3]), and the tritium discharge scenario from TEPCO. Tritium concentration at the ocean surface reaches approximately 3 Bq/m3 near the release site and varies between 0.01 and 0.25 Bq/m3 in the North Pacific Ocean, well below the natural tritium level (approximately 50 Bq/m3 [4]). For this kind of projection simulation, the use of a fully coupled atmosphere-ocean model would make it possible to model tritium concentration in both the atmosphere and the ocean, as well as the dynamics of exchanges within and between these water cycle reservoirs.&amp;#160;[1] Cauquoin et al.: Modeling natural tritium in precipitation and its dependence on decadal variations of solar activity using the atmospheric general circulation model MIROC5-iso, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos., in review (minor revisions).[2] Katata et al., Atmos. Chem. Phys., 15, 1029&amp;#8211;1070, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-15-1029-2015, 2015.[3] Tatebe et al., Geosci. Model Dev., 12, 2727&amp;#8211;2765, https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-12-2727-2019, 2019.[4] Jenkins et al., Earth Syst. Sci. Data, 11, 441&amp;#8211;454, https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-11-441-2019, 2019.

Now a word Japanese, is date when earth's tectonic forces physically reconfigured Japan. Nearly three years since March 11, 2011, nightmare began, Japanese government has confirmed deaths of 16,000 people; addition, several thousand more remain missing and presumed killed by devastation unleashed from 9.0-magnitude earthquake and monstrous tsunami ensued. Three of six reactors at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant experienced meltdowns, and according to official statistics, 282,000 people are still refugees within Japan, unable to return home. Many have moved from country's northeastern Tohoku region because of infrastructure damage, while many more have dispersed because radiation levels their houses and villages exceed acceptable norms. Fear and mistrust concerning what Japanese government and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) deem safe levels of radiation propel them as well.With characteristic clarity, intellect, and scholarly rigor, Richard Samuels has engaged this unfolding maelstrom head-on to produce 3.11: Disaster and Change Japan. Moving categorically through three areas-security, energy, and local public administration-Samuels argues thus far fallout from this unimaginable trifecta of disasters has been not only imaginable but also predictable. Samuels explains of post-3.11 Japan political actors spun stories to help make sense of disaster, always ways consistent with what they already 'knew' to be true (p. 184). His elaboration brings him to conclude was simply continuation of normal politics by additional means (p. 185). Throughout book, Samuels thoughtfully explicates his thesis of continuity over rupture: Japan which who thought utilities were villains before 3.11 insisted 3.11 proved their point. Those who believed DJP [Democratic Party of Japan] was a collection of incompetent parvenus...now had additional evidence...[and] supporters of Japan-U.S. and of Japanese military renewed their claim they were right all along (p. 184-85). Writing most specifically about security, he emphasizes that, in short, there was no major Tohoku dividend-either for war-fighting capacity of Japanese troops or for U.S.-Japan alliance (p. 109).All this notwithstanding-and what will likely be his pathbreaking contribution to assessments of 3.11-Samuels's own detailed examination of rescue and relief operations conducted by Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) suggests if we wait just a little bit longer, dividend for SDF may be rather lucrative indeed. In short, Samuels describes how during 3.11 a discursive shift took place alongside troops' actions, one has continued to secure widespread buy-in for SDF throughout Japanese society ways that-if not entirely new-have greatly expanded level of support beyond anything seen before 2011 post-1945 era.The SDF's moment 3.11 spotlight shapes book's fourth chapter, Dueling Security Narratives, which Samuels establishes three categories of responses to what took place: wake-up call (comments from those largely on right who urged nation to get in gear and prepare for its real enemies), proof of concept (views held by centrists who saw the deterrent power of alliance SDF's performance working together with U.S. troops), and disarm (the largely leftist perspective that Japan's soldiers get more shovels than guns) (p. 83-86). Next, Samuels views these categories through secondary prisms interrogate what we might glean for future place and function of SDF Japanese society. Taken as a whole, analysis ties well with his previous work on Japanese military, as well as with other analyses of soft changes were already afoot within SDF long before March 11, 2011, order to make its existence more palatable to Japanese society general. …

In a report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Japanese government stated that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was caused not by the Tohoku earthquake but by the tsunami it generated, resulting in a loss of power for the station’s cooling systems and, consequently, three core meltdowns. The tsunami countermeasures taken when Fukushima Daiichi was designed in the 1960s were, arguably, marginally acceptable considering the scientific data then available. But, between the 1970s and the 2011 disaster, new scientific knowledge emerged about the likelihood of a large earthquake and resulting tsunami; however, this was ignored by both the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company, and government regulators. The regulatory authorities failed to properly review the tsunami countermeasures in accordance with IAEA guidelines and continued to allow the Fukushima plant to operate without sufficient countermeasures, despite having received clear warnings from at least one member of a government advisory committee. The lack of independence of government regulators appears to have contributed to this inaction. The anzen shinwa (“safety myth”) image portrayed by the Japanese government and electric power companies tended to stifle honest and open discussion of the risks. Japan’s seismological agencies are locked into outdated and unsuccessful paradigms that lead them to focus on the hazard of a supposedly imminent earthquake in the Tokai district, located between Tokyo and Nagoya, while downplaying earthquake hazards elsewhere in Japan. Consequently, regulators and the plant operator missed many opportunities to avert the calamity at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

High concentrations of several radionuclides were reported in the sea near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) in Japan due to the nuclear accident that occurred on 11 March 2011. The main source of these concentrations was leakage of highly radioactive liquid effluent from a pit in the turbine building near the intake canal of Unit-2 of FDNPS through a crack in the concrete wall. In the immediate vicinity of the plant, seawater concentrations reached 68 MBq m−3 for 134Cs and 137Cs, and exceeded 100 MBq m−3 for 131I in early April 2011. These concentrations began to fall as of 11 April 2011 and, at the end of April, had reached a value close to 0.1 MBq m−3 for 137Cs. Following the nuclear accident, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) had initiated intense monitoring of the environment including the Pacific Ocean. Seawater samples were collected and the concentrations of few radionuclides were measured on a wide spatial and temporal scale. In this study, the measured concentrations of different radionuclides near the south discharge canal of the FDNPS were used to estimate their leakages into the Pacific Ocean. The method is based on estimating the release rates that reproduce the concentration of radionuclides in seawater at a chosen location using a two-dimensional advection–dispersion model in an iterative manner. The radioactive leakages were estimated as 5.68 PBq for 131I, 2.24 PBq for 134Cs and 2.25 PBq for 137Cs. Leakages were also estimated for 99mTc, 136Cs, 140Ba and 140La and they range between 0.02 PBq (99mTc) and 0.53 PBq (140Ba). It was estimated that about 11.28 PBq of radioactivity in total was leaked into the Pacific Ocean from the damaged FDNPS. Out of this, 131I constitutes 50.3 %; 134Cs 20 %; 137Cs 20 %; 140Ba 4.6 %; 136Cs 2.6 %; 140La 2.3 % and 99mTc 0.2 % of the total radioactive leakage. Such quantitative estimates of radioactive leakages are essential prerequisites for short-term and local-scale as well as long-term and large-scale radiological impact assessment of the nuclear accident.