Abstract
ABSTRACTA central theme in the philosophy of sport literature is the definability of games. According to Thomas Hurka, and others, the argument presented by Bernard Suits in The Grasshopper (1978) refutes Wittgenstein’s claim that there is no aspect common to all games. We challenge Suits’s understanding of Wittgenstein’s views about definition, showing that Wittgenstein is not anti-definitional. Instead, we argue, Wittgenstein is against thinking that all definitions must be essentialist. We also argue that Suits fails to find a feature common to all games. We conclude, then, that Suits has failed to refute Wittgenstein’s views on the definability of games.
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