Abstract
It is shown that the set of sequential equilibria of an infinitely repeated incomplete information game coincides with a family of markov chains (with a state space of player type distributions and payoffs). Corresponding to each markov chain in the family there is a sequential equilibrium strategy pair, characterized as a pair of functions from the state space to the action spaces. These functions may be chosen independent of the given markov chain. In an equilibrium of this form, players at any point in time condition their actions only on the current value of the state variable.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
