4. eesti jalaväepolk (1917–18)

Conditions of Democracy in German Austria and Hungary, 1918–1919

The article examines the activities of the censorship of dramatic works in the Russian Empire during the First World War. The article examines the features of the work of dramatic censorship in 1914 - February 1917, its structure, and personnel. During the war, both the number and the subject matter of plays submitted to censorship changed. Based on the instructions of the leadership and their own ideas and views, the censors did not allow many subjects to be staged: the horrors of war, criticism of the allies, ridicule of monarchs (including monarchs of states hostile to Russia), the presentation of Russian officers and soldiers in an "inappropriate" form, anti-war sentiments in the rear. Over time, many domestic political subjects were also added, for example, the unspoken ban on portraying Rasputin on stage. Although formally dramatic censorship existed only in the capital, in fact, local authorities could also act as censors, primarily governors and police chiefs, who could ban any productions by their orders. The old pre-war problems remained: contradictory decisions of censors, their high workload, personnel shortage. The Main Administration for Press Affairs tried to solve these problems, but it was not possible to qualitatively change the situation before the February Revolution.

After the USSR collapse, coming out of October Revolution shadow, the problem of the surrounding reality perception by the First World War soldiers attracts an increasing number of researchers, because it allows a deeper understanding of social and political processes’ nature, which took place in the Russian Empire. And in this regard, the soldiers’ letters are a unique source that allows us synchronizing events at the front with the participants’ attitude towards them. The aim of our study was to reveal the peculiarities of front-line soldiers’ perception of political processes taking place in Russia during February revolution. The work was carried out from the social history point of view and on the basis of microhistorical approach, which involves the study of particular phenomena occurring in the lives of definite individuals of the past, in order to identify the dominant ideas and trends of the society in general. It allowed us realizing the research goals. The «February Report» analysis distinguishes calm moods in the troops and the authors’ of letters confidence in the need to continue the war. There is no doubt that the major culprit for the soldiers’ disasters was the main Russian opponent – Germany. As for the soldiers’ attitude to the socio-political situation change in the country, it is reflected in the report section – The army’s attitude to internal political events. Its materials testify that the main part of soldiers didn’t realize events, which took place at that time. However, the sprouts of revolutionary moods have already given their first shoots. The following March 1917 summary presents us a completely different picture, not like the previous month: high spirits, patriotism, belief in own actions rightness, i.e. the revolution, which took place, had a positive effect on the army’s mood. One can notice confidence in a quick victory over the enemy in soldiers’ letters. At the same time, the number of dramatic changes has being already recorded in the section – «The officer corps’ characteristics» and they were caused by political reforms introduced into the military environment by a new government. The April 1917 summary gives us an opportunity to get acquainted with the soldiers’ perception of reality surrounding them during a period of some emotional sobering, when initial revolutionary passions were somehow declined. And although there still was a large number of letters testifying the soldiers’ conscious awareness of their duty to a motherland, as it could be seen from the Report, the anti-war sentiments were obviously reflected in the military environment. This, in its turn, led to a discipline drop and to an increase of conflicts with the commanders. The authors come to a conclusion that the front-line soldiers’ positive perception of the «new authority» and the political transformations, which were carried out by them, were quickly replaced by a negative attitude towards it, and political reforms led to a decline in discipline and to an increase of anti-war attitudes.

This thesis examines Anglo-Russian rivalry in Transcaucasia in general - and Azerbaijan in particular - focusing on the years 1918-1920. The first part of the thesis provides a general review of the history of the Great Game - the geopolitical rivalry between the British and Russian Empires fought in the remote areas of central Asia - before going on to examine the growing investment by British firms in the oil industry of Baku. It also discusses how the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 changed the texture of AngloRussian relations without resolving the tensions altogether, which lasted until the February Revolution of 1917, despite the wartime alliance between Britain and Russia. The thesis then goes on to examine British policy towards Transcaucasia after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The thesis argues that the political turmoil in Russia provided the British government with an opportunity to exert greater political control over the south of the country, securing its access to oil and control of the Caspian Sea region, thereby reducing any potential threat to India. The allied victory in the First World War, and the weakening of Turkey in particular, meant that British policy in central Asia after November 1918 increasingly focused on advancing British economic and strategic interests in the area. Although the British government did not seek to exert direct long-term political control over Azerbaijan, its policy in 1919 was designed both to support the local government in Baku against possible Bolshevik attack, whilst simultaneously exerting control over Baku oil. The thesis shows that the British military authorities who controlled Azerbaijan in the first part of 1919 typically acted as an occupying force, manipulating the local government, and behaving in ways that alienated large sections of the local population. This pattern of quasi-imperial rule, which was designed to secure the economic benefits of controlling Baku oil while avoiding the costs of large-scale military occupation, eventually proved fruitless. The final part of the thesis then examines how the British sought to defend their economic interests in Azerbaijan even as they removed their military forces. The government in London supported the local Musavat government in its attempt to gain international recognition, hoping that this would bolster its position both abroad and at home. Yet this policy failed to recognise the radical mood on the ‘streets’ of Baku and the appeal of Bolshevism to the many of the local population. When the Bolsheviks finally took control of Azerbaijan in 1920 they did so with the support of significant sections of the population. This thesis suggests that developments in Azerbaijan during this period can be analysed by using a Marxist framework that emphasises how imperialism creates divisions between imperial powers - divisions that endure over time even as they take new forms. It also examines how British policy towards Azerbaijan can be seen as an attempt to establish a form of colonial control that promoted the economic and political interests of key economic and political groups in Britain at the cost of the local Azeri population. In order to develop this argument and avoid the dangers of over-simplification, the thesis draws on a massive array of archive and published sources in English, Russian, Azeri and Turkish. In doing this it offers perspectives and arguments that are absent from the existing scholarly literature whilst introducing the reader to new material unfamiliar to most English-language readers.

Insufficient coverage of the history of Poles in Ukraine during the war and the revolution is largely due to a narrow source base. The Polish press is an important source for studying the history of the Polish community in Ukraine at the beginning of the twentieth century. The aim of the study is to clarify the importance, ideological orientation, thematic informativeness, representativeness and characteristics of the functioning of the Polish press in Ukraine. The research methodology is based on the analysis of the existing Polish press in Ukraine on the basis of the criteria of popularity and publication period, their genre, thematic and ideological orientation, audience, editorial policy, authors, and content. System-analytical and comparative-historical methods have been applied, thanks to which the characteristics of certain periods of the Polish press functioning have been determined. The scientific novelty lies in the disclosure of the source aspect of the study of the Polish press in Ukraine. It was found out that the Polish press in Ukraine in the first decades of the twentieth century is a significant, often unique source of reliable information about the events of Poles' socio-political, socio-economic, and cultural life. Conclusions. The emergence, development and functioning of the Polish press can be divided into three periods: 1905-1914, 1914-1916, and 1917-1921, which are defined by the beginning of its existence, the significance of the events that influenced the development of society – World War I, the Russian February Revolution and the Ukrainian National Revolution. This influenced the content, character and ideological orientation of materials, and the formation of the editorial staff.

For a soldier in the Russian army during World War I, desertion was one of the most active means he could use to influence his often miserable fate, which makes desertion in its way interesting as an extreme kind of war experience. For Russian military and civil authorities, on the other hand, desertion was one of the major problems to the detriment of the war effort, and the fight against it was ultimately unsuccessful or even backfired, such as was the case with the reintroduction of corporal punishment of soldiers. Ultimately, widespread desertion contributed significantly towards the dissolution of the Russian Army and the Russian state itself. This article focuses on a small and somewhat unusual category of Russian deserters: the ethnically Estonian soldiers who served in the Russian border guard regiments in Finland and deserted (as did many of their Russian comrades) over the Finnish border to Sweden. For neutral Sweden, this way of escaping from Russian military service created an unexpected problem, since there were initially no regulations in place as to what to do with caught deserters. In this article I consider how the Swedish authorities – the Civil Ministry and the General Staff – dealt with this challenge and how the deserters were treated in their new country of residence. At the same time, I focus on the deserters themselves: their individual backgrounds and the reasons for desertion, which also casts light on the circumstances prevailing in the Russian Army. Russian deserters started arriving in Sweden in larger numbers from the spring of 1916 onwards. The border guard outposts in Finland were strengthened with new soldiers, many of whom sensed a good opportunity for easy escape over the border. Originally, deserters who had been caught were allowed to stay close to the border on the Swedish side. From November 1916 onwards, however, when desertions became more frequent, it was deemed a security risk and the deserters were thereafter sent to the south of Sweden and interned in the Malmo area. This system functioned well until about the Russian February Revolution. After that, the number of new deserters was reduced to almost nothing, and the deserters already interned in Malmo started leaving their allocated places of residence and work, probably with the intention of returning to Russia, where amnesty had been declared for deserters and shirkers. In most cases, the men were caught again and deported to Finland or Russia with the help of Swedish authorities. The ethnically Estonian deserters who managed to escape to Sweden were treated the same way as their comrades of Russian and other nationalities who had also deserted. The stories of their escape or other background information that can be discerned from interrogation protocols are not particularly different from those of other deserters. Their relatively large percentage among all Russian Army deserters, however, must mean that the number of Estonians in the regiments in Finland must have been significant. An analysis of the motivations behind the Estonians’ decision to desert shows that by far the most important factor was harsh conditions in the army: low pay, bad and insufficient food, hard exercise and especially corporal punishment of soldiers by officers. National conflicts between Estonians and Russians probably also played a certain role, making military service even more unbearable for Estonians. A major indirect influence was certainly the location of the outposts close to the border, which probably made the idea of deserting much more attractive. The Swedish approach to the problem of deserters was characterised by relative mildness and, at least in the beginning, somewhat ad hoc solutions. As time went by, however, Swedish policy became stricter and a form of internment was instituted. At the same time, the General Staff’s intelligence department tried to take advantage of the deserters’ knowledge about Russian forces in Finland. Local Swedish authorities, however, could be much more lacklustre in their attitude towards the deserters. The men themselves who had escaped to Sweden seem to have been relatively satisfied with their treatment, at least until the Russian February Revolution. The story of the Estonian deserters in Sweden makes a small contribution to our still relatively poor knowledge of the fate and war experience of Estonian soldiers in World War I. However, research in this field must continue to be enriched with other case studies and eventually also generalisations. From the perspective of the Swedish authorities, the situation was handled quite successfully, even though the fears of espionage were likely exaggerated and the internment of deserters in Malmo probably made no real difference. At the same time, however, the case is symptomatic as an example of the kind of entirely unexpected problems that a state that had remained neutral in the war had to handle and come to terms with.

Unfinished Trials and Sentences

Over the last century the pattern of diseases and injuries among military combatants has shifted dramatically due, in large part, to advances in medical technology and disease prevention. Respiratory and infectious maladies were the top reasons for hospital admission during World Wars I and II, and the Korean War. During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, musculoskeletal disorders and combat injuries have emerged as the leading causes of medical evacuation (1). Neurological disorders, including headache, rank third (1). Existing data indicate that the impact of headache disorders on the US military is substantial. Annually, 2.5% of males and 9.5% of females in the military will have a medical encounter for headache (2). An estimated 19% of US soldiers experience migraine headaches while deployed to a combat zone, impairing their ability to perform duties and contributing to sick call visits (3). Headaches are especially common among returning soldiers who have had a deployment-related concussion, with up to 97% reporting headaches and 37% having headaches that meet criteria for chronic post-traumatic headache (4). An observational study by Cohen et al. in this issue provides valuable new information about headaches as a cause of medical evacuation among US military personnel deployed to a combat zone. The medical records of 958 personnel who were medically evacuated for headaches from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany between 2004 and 2009 were reviewed to determine the prevalence of various headache subtypes, demographics, treatment patterns, and return to duty rates. This is the first study specifically examining headache as a cause of medical evacuation from a war zone. A majority of study subjects were males (87%) and members of the Army (78%), with a mean age of 29.6 years. The most common headache disorders among military medical evacuees were post-concussive headache (34%) and migraine (30%). This is not surprising given the high prevalence of migraine and concussion in military personnel involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results of the study confirm migraine and post-concussive headache as causes of unit attrition in the modern era of military conflict. The outcome of each study subject was based on their disposition from Germany, which usually occurred within 2 weeks of arrival. A positive outcome occurred if the individual returned to duty (RTD) in the combat zone. RTD is a meaningful outcome and the investigators should be commended for assessing it. Overall, 34% of those evacuated for headaches subsequently returned to duty. Nearly 40% of migraineurs returned to duty whereas only 19% of personnel with post-concussive headache returned. The authors identified multiple features associated with a lower likelihood of returning to duty to include continuous headache (as opposed to episodic), traumatic brain injury, physical trauma, and psychiatric comorbidity. The identification of prognostic factors in this study will help to inform decisions regarding medical evacuation of military service personnel with headache disorders. Moreover, the findings highlight the importance of both physical and emotional trauma as factors influencing the prognosis of headache in deployed military personnel. Notably, the study by Cohen et al. was conducted prior to the implementation of current US military policy which mandates immediate evaluation of all US military personnel exposed to potentially concussive events. Personnel with persistent symptoms after concussion and those with three or more concussions in a 12-month period are sent to higher centers of care within the combat zone for further evaluation and treatment by multidisciplinary teams that include neurologists, neuropsychologists, behavioral health specialists, and rehabilitative specialists. Early identification and

The article analyzes the social and political prerequisites of the organization of the Ukrainian army during the period of restoration of national statehood at the beginning of the 20th century. It is shown that after the events of the First World War and on the verge of the collapse of the Russian Empire, Ukrainians made another attempt to restore national statehood. From the first days of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921, the question of organizing military units composed of Ukrainians arose. Revolutionary processes in Russia in February 1917 became a prerequisite for the need to create Ukrainian military committees as elected national military bodies. The Ukrainian military has developed an interest in national statehood, a sincere desire to defend Ukraine's independence with weapons in hand. The growth of the Ukrainian military movement required the creation of a single command center. Such a center was formed in Kyiv. The leading role in it belonged to the former founder of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, lieutenant M. Mikhnovskyi, who was an active initiator and organizer of the Ukrainian military movement. It is noted that on May 18-25, 1917, the first All-Ukrainian Military Congress was held in Kyiv, which elected the Ukrainian General Military Committee headed by S. Petliura and made a decision to create the Ukrainian National Army. Among other issues discussed during the Military Congress, the issues of war, discipline, desertion, maintaining order in the ranks of the army deserve attention. The congress elected the 18-person Ukrainian General Military Committee from among its members. In June, the second congress was held, which elected the All-Ukrainian Council of Military Deputies in the number of 130 people, who entered the Central Rada in full. At the Ukrainian Central Council, a special Military Board was formed for the Ukrainianization of units of the Ukrainian army. It is noted that the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress, at which the Statute of the Ukrainian General Military Committee was approved, was a significant success in the development of the army. Therefore, the committee was to consist of ten departments: 1) campaigning, educational and organizational; 2) inspector's office; 3) mobilization and military communication; 4) offices; 5) commandant's office; 6) consular lawyer; 7) military schools; 8) special services; 9) sanitary and medical; 10) military engineering. In addition, the second AllUkrainian Military Congress decided that the orders of the UGVK are binding for all Ukrainian military personnel. It is substantiated that after the announcement of the III Universal of the Central Rada, attention to the military increased, the previously initiated measures to ukrainize military units in the former imperial army became more active. The General Secretariat of Military Affairs issued an order on the further Ukrainianization of the Kyiv Military District, appointed Colonel V. Pavlenko as its commander, and later – Captain Mykola Shynkar. On November 29, 1917, it was decided to create the Ukrainian General Military Staff to coordinate the actions of all Ukrainian units on the territory of Ukraine. It is emphasized that as a result of the Ukrainian revolution, which began in March 1917, among other things, the task of creating Ukrainianized military units was declared. However, a sufficient legal basis for the creation of the Ukrainian army was not established, and its formation was sporadic and by no means systematic. The establishment of the General Secretariat of Military Affairs (Military Ministry), the approval of draft laws on the formation of branches of the "Free Cossacks" and the People's Army (People's Militia) can be considered an absolute achievement. The war with Bolshevik Russia proved the inadequacy of such steps by the Central Rada. In general, the situation surrounding the development of the Ukrainian army at the initial stage of the revolution, in particular the lack of understanding on the part of the political elites of the importance of forming an effective national army in the shortest possible time, is instructive in today's conditions. Keywords: army, military bodies, statehood, legal regulation, Ukraine.

This article examines the main narratives that have dominated scholarly and political writings on the “Galicia” Division, the Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division that at the end of the Second World War was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army. Dominant narratives have focused on accusations of criminality, the hope that the formation would serve as the core of a national army at the war’s end, survival as a motivation for signing up, the experience of the soldiers after their surrender to the British, and the decision to transfer former soldiers to the UK and then to give them civilian status. Only the first of these narratives has been explored in depth as a result of the 1986 Deschиnes Commission of Enquiry into War Crimes in Canada and the 1989 Hetherington-Chalmers Report in the UK. Far less attention has been devoted to other narratives, and some lines of enquiry suggested by the rich memoir and creative literature have hardly as yet been touched.

Six decades ago William Chamberlin wrote that “the collapse of the Romanov autocracy . . . was one of the most leaderless, spontaneous, anonymous revolutions of all times. . . . No one . .. realized that the strikes and bread riots . . . would culminate in the mutiny of the garrison and the overthrow of the government.” The kernel of truth in this description, that no one knew for sure that the strikes of 23 February marked the beginning of the end of tsarism, has ever since mesmerized historiography of the revolution, leading to grave misapprehensions of what occurred and why. My 1990 study of the revolutionary movement during World War I and in the February Revolution painted an alternative picture in which socialist agency looms large in the onset and carrying out of tsarism’s overthrow. New evidence about the February Revolution further strengthens my original arguments. This study’s twofold purpose is to orient readers in the complicated events that preceded and accompanied the fall of the old regime and, with the use of new archival materials and analysis, renew the case for reinterpreting Russia’s February Revolution.

Читать онлайн статью 'The activities of the Russian Monarchist Union during World War І and the February Revolution: Historiographical Problems ', Golovina O.V., в электронном журнале SENTENTIA. European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences. - 2014. - N3 на сайте nbpublish.com

A report of the S-l 1 Committee on existing air pollution training activities within the continental United States, delineating the location and size of programs. The report further emphasizes the shortage of trained personnel and training activities. To alleviate these problems, cooperative effort is proposed on the part of APCA to promote local training activities.

Arthropod-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue, scrub typhus, and leishmaniasis continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. military forces deployed in support of operational and humanitarian missions. These diseases are transmitted by a variety of arthropods, including mosquitoes, ticks, chiggers, sand flies, and biting midges. In addition to disease threats, biting arthropods can cause dermatitis, allergic reactions, and sleep loss; therefore, monitoring of vector impact and integrated use of personal protective measures (PPM) and methods to reduce the vector populations are needed to protect service members. The U.S. military has played a vital role in vector identification tools and the development and testing of many of the most effective PPM and vector control products available today, including the topical repellent DEET and the repellent/insecticide permethrin, which is applied to clothing and bed nets. Efforts to develop superior products are ongoing. Although the U.S. military often needs vector control products with rather specific properties (e.g., undetectable, long-lasting in multiple climates) in order to protect its service members, many Department of Defense vector control products have had global impacts on endemic disease control. The impact of vector-borne disease on military operations is well known (Engelman and Joy 1975, Peterson 1995, Withers and Craig 2003). Combat experiences with yellow fever in the Spanish-American War led to the deployment, in 1900, of the Yellow Fever Commission to Cuba (Engelman and Joy 1975, Lang 1988). Major Walter Reed and other researchers were sent to Cuba to investigate the causes and transmission of yellow fever. By 1901, the commission proved that yellow fever was transmitted by the Aedes mosquito. Using this knowledge, Major William Gorgas implemented programs that eliminated yellow fever in the Panama Canal region and in the United States. The last case of yellow fever in the Panama Canal Zone was reported in May 1906 (Byerly 2005, Pierce and Writer 2005). Major Gorgas also succeeded in controlling malaria in the Panama Canal Zone, and this improvement in disease conditions made it possible for the United States to complete the canal (Engelman and Joy 1975). These initial successes in the field of medical entomology set the stage for subsequent efforts by the U.S. military to control vectors and prevent vector-borne diseases that expanded during World War II. Last minute delousing of service members using the newly-discovered insecticide DDT halted an epidemic of louse-borne typhus (Lang 1988). Problems with malaria in the Pacific theater led Army malaria control teams to use DDT for mosquito control in 1944 (Engelman and Joy 1975). These U.S. combat experiences led to the commissioning of military entomologists and the formation of vector-borne disease control units (Lang 1988). Ultimately, this has grown into a career field and program that produces and supports world-class research in vector control. The U.S. military is prepared to deploy service members anywhere in the world in support of humanitarian efforts and operational missions vital to national security. U.S. military personnel and civilian support staff are presently deployed in over 130 countries, including many places where diseases transmitted by arthropods (e.g., insects, chiggers, and ticks) are still prevalent. Therefore, U.S. personnel may be exposed to a wide range of vector-borne diseases to which they have no acquired natural immunity and for which U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensed vaccines are not yet available (Dickens 1990). Biting and stinging arthropods can degrade mission readiness and combat effectiveness even in the absence of disease transmission, because persistent pests and itching bites are associated with lack of sleep, dermatitis, secondary infections, and death from allergic reactions. A recently published quantitative algorithm, utilizing information from the U.S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (renamed the National Center for Medical Intelligence in 2008) to score the relative importance of various diseases by taking into account their severity and the likelihood of infection, found that arthropod-borne diseases account for 28 of the top 40 endemic disease threats impacting deployed U.S. troop operations (resulting in lost manpower days, decreased unit morale, and medical costs), which suggests that improved vector control products are needed (Table 1) (Burnette et al. 2008). Malaria, dengue fever, and diarrhea (often caused by bacteria that can be transmitted by flies) are currently the top three threats and have been important threats in past wars. In late 1992 through early 1993, 131 U.S. military members contracted malaria, including at least 11 cases of Plasmodium falciparum, while deployed to Somalia (Sharp et al. 1995, Wallace et al. 1996). In 2003, 80 (28%) of 290 Marines who went ashore in Liberia to oversee a civil transition acquired malaria (Debboun et al. 2006). Because malaria can be a relapsing disease and because the female Anopheles mosquitoes capable of transmitting malaria exist in the United States, returning troops can transmit malaria to others (Brunetti et al. 1954). Malaria remains a continuing threat for troops deployed to Afghanistan and South Korea (Ciminera and Brundage 2007). Dengue fever is transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes in both rural and urban areas in some regions. Although rarely fatal in adults, this disease often necessitates hospitalization for supportive care. Diarrhea and/or vomiting have been a problem for some 60% of service members deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), although it is unclear how many of these cases are due to fly-transmitted disease (Monteville et al. 2006). Other vector-borne diseases that have significantly affected recent U.S. military operations include leishmaniasis and sand fly fever (both transmitted by sand flies) (Aronson et al. 2006). Among hospitalized U.S. service members during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, there were 12 cases of visceral leishmaniasis (a potentially fatal infection affecting multiple organs) caused by Leishmania tropica protozoa. There have been more than 1,000 incident diagnoses/reports among U.S. service members deployed to OIF/OEF of cutaneous leishmaniasis, a potentially disfiguring parasitic skin disease; most of these cases were caused by L. major protozoa. (Approximately 1,000 cutaneous leishmaniasis cases occurred among U.S. service members in the Persian Gulf Command during World War II.) In addition, at least four service members in OIF/OEF have acquired visceral leishmaniasis caused by L. infantum protozoa (Myles et al. 2007). There is concern that asymptomatic latent leishmaniasis infection could be occurring in deployed troops that might cause subsequent disease in service members who later become immunosuppressed because of other diseases. Due to their small size and the fact that not enough is known about their biology, sand flies are difficult to control; to date, the use of air-conditioned quarters by service members in Iraq has proven to be the only effective countermeasure (Coleman et al. 2006, Sanders et al. 2005). Scrub typhus, a potentially life-threatening disease caused by Orientia tsutsugamushi bacteria that is transmitted to humans via bites from infected chiggers, has also impacted U.S. troops, particularly those engaged in jungle warfare in the Far East in World War II and the Vietnam War. To manage vector-related threats, the U.S. military utilizes medical entomologists in preventive medicine teams to assess impacts of vectors and vector-borne diseases and optimize use of available personal protective equipment and pest management practices by deployed forces. This effort receives input from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board and the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) (Debboun et al. 2006). Research to develop new products to diagnose, prevent, and treat many of the vector-borne diseases affecting U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) personnel is funded by the Military Infectious Diseases Research Program (MIDRP). In addition, efforts to identify vectors and improve and replace currently available DoD vector control products continue; product evaluation often involves overseas laboratories. Repellents and pesticides used by the U.S. military at present must be U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered. However, the U.S. military has additional criteria (e.g., little to no odor, efficacy in multiple climates, efficacy against multiple arthropods, compatibility with U.S. military materials) and is therefore engaged in further testing of EPA-registered repellents to determine whether these products meet U.S. military needs. Bed nets have been used as a means of protection against arthropod-borne diseases for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years. Bed net use became compulsory for U.S. soldiers in the Pacific during World War II following severe outbreaks of malaria and dengue fever (Sapero 1946, Bwire 2000). Since that time, the U.S. military has been involved in developing and testing improved versions of bed nets. Controlled trials in the 1980s demonstrated that bed net use could provide significant protection against malaria and, in particular, evaluated the effect on civilians of bed nets treated with permethrin, an insecticide/repellent often applied to bed nets to help further prevent insect bites (Lines et al. 1987). At present, only pyrethroid-based insecticides are registered by the EPA for application to bed nets. Current U.S. military research includes evaluation of synthetic pyrethroids (permethrin, deltamethrin, or alpha-cypermethrin) for optimum performance against sand flies, with the goal of incorporating the selected compound into future versions of the U.S. military bed net. Research such as the trials mentioned above has helped lead to a greater role for bed nets in the implementation of malaria control programs worldwide. For example, international health groups are providing long-lasting, insecticide-treated nets (LLIN) to residents in malaria-endemic areas of underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa. In such areas, regular use of insecticide-treated bed nets can reduce childhood mortality up to 20% and severe disease up to 50% (Lindsay et al. 1991, Gimnig et al. 2003). The use of LLINs is a key component of the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative, established in 2005 and coordinated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The goal of this program is to reduce deaths due to malaria by 50% in 15 African countries. This objective will be met in part by ensuring that at least 85% of children less than 5 years of age and of pregnant women have access to and routinely use LLINs. The U.S. military standard insect bed net that has been used for many years (it is not impregnated with an arthropod repellent) requires four 36-inch poles to be set up for use with military cots and must be completely tucked in on all sides of the cot to prevent biting insects from entering. The Self-Supporting Low-Profile (SS-LP) bed net is a smaller bed net recently developed for short-term use by highly mobile forces (e.g., Infantry, Rangers, Special Forces) by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) in collaboration with Breakthrough Technologies. This lightweight bed net constructed of flame-retardant materials and rip-stop fabric includes an internal, self-supporting flexible vinyl ester/fiberglass frame, a waterproof floor, two zippered doors, and a mesh top. The frame pops open automatically from a 12-inch-diameter backpack package so that the bed net is ready for immediate use on bare ground or over a standard military cot or hospital bed (Frances et al. 2003). The tightly woven mesh is intended to exclude small insects such as midges and sand flies, and all fabric surfaces are impregnated with EXPEL, an EPA-registered permethrin-based insecticide. A comparison of the SS-LP bed net with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) mosquito bed net found that both bed nets provided greater than 97.9% protection compared to unprotected personnel (Frances et al. 2003), and the insecticide-untreated SS-LP bed net provided better night-time protection than the untreated ADF bed net. However, the small dimensions can provoke claustrophobia and the fine mesh of the SS-LP bed net limits air flow, which can cause overheating and noncompliance in hot climates (Coleman et al. 2006). WRAIR is working with several companies to develop a new erectable, durable, low-weight bed net that is sufficiently tall to allow a soldier to sit up on a cot within the bed net. The DoD is evaluating long-lasting net products that are already commercially available as well as new long-lasting netting materials being developed by companies supported by military Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program funding. The goal is a bed net constructed of high-denier polymer fabric with integrated insecticide to help protect against small biting insects, but with a mesh large enough to permit adequate air flow. Use of battery-operated fans to improve air flow within the new bed net and improve vector control has been considered, but employing products that require batteries increases the logistical burden on deployed troops. The revised bed net could be useful to civilians as well as the U.S. military. However, some troops decline to use any bed nets because of concerns that they will not be able to escape blast injuries while confined in a bed net. Development of a repellent-impregnated fabric belt to be worn over pants around the waist area (thereby avoiding skin contact issues) could provide an alternative means of vector control for such individuals. Many cultures use plants or plant material to repel insects. The smoke produced by burning plant material is thought to work by increasing heat, lowering humidity (thereby reducing mosquito sensory input), and masking human-produced carbon dioxide (Davis and Bowen 1994). Plants can also be used more directly. Many plants (e.g., eucalyptus, citronella, catnip, sage, lavender, basil, thyme, and the tea tree) contain oils that repel arthropods when applied to skin, hair, or wood (that keeps insects out of an area where humans or animals dwell) (Moore et al. 2007). In fact, the use of plants as natural repellents can be an inexpensive and aesthetically appealing option. However, both of these methods have drawbacks that limit their use in military situations. Smoke has adverse health effects and can reveal the locations of deployed personnel to potential adversaries. Similarly, strong plant odors emanating from natural oils can reveal personnel locations. In addition, insect repellents are only effective in the vapor phase and plant-related repellent compounds are generally highly volatile. Therefore, application to human skin results in an initially strong but often short-lived repellent effect. Although it may be possible to lengthen repellent activity by incorporating these natural oils from plants into ointment or gel formulations, at least one drawback remains. Deployed service members do not always have access to clean running water for hand washing and showers and thus often do not wish to apply sticky or oily repellents to already oily skin. Plants with components that can kill insects include nicotine, Mentha (mint) species, and pyrethrum daisies. Pyrethrum, a natural plant oil with minimal mammalian toxicity derived from two species of pyrethrum daisies (Tanacetum cinerariifolium and Tanacetum coccineum), has been used for centuries to control pests. Pyrethrins, the insecticidal components of pyrethrum, are located in tiny oil-containing glands in the flower head. Pyrethrum was probably introduced into Europe circa 1300 by Marco Polo, and pyrethrum powders were used by military troops from the time of Napoleon to kill head and body lice. Because insects avoid pyrethrum, pyrethrum also has repellent effects. Major Gorgas used pyrethrum in Cuba to control yellow fever and malaria by burning it inside sealed dwellings. Spiral-shaped burnable mosquito repellents containing mixtures of pyrethrum powder have been marketed since 1902 and these items are still widely used in Asia. Pyrethrum daisies were grown in the United States from approximately 1870 to the early 1900s and then imported from Japan until World War II, at which time the United States supported efforts to grow pyrethrum crops in Kenya to make pyrethrum products available to Allied troops. More potent and photostable pyrethroids (synthetic analogs of pyrethrum) were developed in Europe beginning in the 1930s (Moore and Debboun 2007, Moore et al. 2007). Permethrin was first synthesized in 1972 in the United Kingdom and registered for agricultural use in 1979 by the EPA. Permethrin is an odorless, water-based, and ultimately biodegradable compound with low mammalian toxicity that will not damage plastics, is harmless to natural and synthetic fabrics, and is somewhat resistant to degradation by sunlight (Hossain et al. 1989, Macedo et al. 2007). Although useful as a topical treatment for human head lice and scabies and as an insecticide/repellent when applied to horses, permethrin is ineffective as an insecticide/repellent when applied to human skin because the compound does not bond to human skin. Important early research on permethrin was conducted by Wellcome Research Laboratories. The DoD began evaluating permethrin for clothing treatments in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1979. In a three-day field evaluation at Camp Lejeune, NC, 21 subjects participated in studies that demonstrated that permethrin-treated clothing protected against chigger mites (Breeden et al. 1982). The effectiveness of pressurized sprays of permethrin on clothing for protection against the lone star tick (Amblyomma americanum) has been demonstrated (Schreck et al. 1982). Pressurized sprays of commercially available permethrin (0.5%) or DEET (20% or 30% concentrations) applied to military field uniforms were evaluated in May 1984 as protectants against bites by the Ixodes dammini tick in Massachusetts. A one-minute application of permethrin to the exterior surface of pants and jackets provided 100% protection against attack by all life stages of the tick, whereas application of DEET provided much less protection. Field evaluations in in the of results in of service members from bites of the U.S. in demonstrated that long-lasting permethrin clothing can be via an with both and methods used by the DoD to clothing have been registered by the and permethrin-treated clothing was for DoD use in and civilian use in et al. et al. et al. 1989, et al. insecticidal effect on clothing can last two to but is by A has been when large groups of personnel permethrin-treated uniforms are U.S. service members are on and provided with methods to combat uniforms with permethrin and a long-lasting DEET for application to exposed skin, as part of an integrated when deployed to where vector-borne diseases exist et al. and The U.S. uniforms that have been with Although there have been of efficacy of permethrin as an insecticide for some vectors in some areas, permethrin is still a useful clothing repellent et al. impacting U.S. troops is that because the of currently used uniforms do not permethrin the of vector-borne diseases in OIF/OEF personnel could that the threat of in OIF/OEF is the use of uniforms is for U.S. Army ground A for synthetic insect repellents and insecticides for U.S. troops was during World War II, when Japan and were the major for pyrethrum as well as as the of during the World development of synthetic by U.S. military the burden of disease by Allied troops malaria, dengue, and scrub research on synthetic insect repellents (Sapero The U.S. military on the insecticide beginning in insecticidal properties of this compound were by the and helped develop products 2000). and over potential repellent/insecticide compounds many synthetic were by with U.S. War Department and demonstrated significant protection against in and (Moore and Debboun 2007). provided protection against of these to clothing and skin significantly the of scrub typhus among troops in the Pacific theater during World War II In researchers and William developed small pressurized by to vector control World War II, a repellent known as known as or that and became in the United States. However, products containing were from the U.S. and in following identification of toxicity (Moore and Debboun 2007). The development of DEET was an important et al. 1954). DEET is a insect repellent that is effective against mosquitoes when applied to skin. DEET products became available to the in the of the EPA in The EPA registered and this product remains the most widely used and widely DEET has been used for a with minimal reported adverse many of which involved or use of this DEET have been and it has been for human including children and pregnant women and The (that the was developed by and supported through DoD funding. This was when applied to skin areas with or because of the and was effective for only one to two the U.S. Army and in developing the and is a containing DEET with that and of the repellent et al. This DEET by and registered by the EPA in 1991, is used by the U.S. and to of protection conditions et al. et al. its as a DEET does have on and protective and can synthetic suggests that some DEET the oily and and, in particular, service members have about its effectiveness and et al. 2005). This has led to efforts in repellent research by the U.S. military. control of vectors and arthropod-borne diseases necessitates development of means of key vector and U.S. military vectors of malaria and yellow fever in the late and 1990). In when a major of the mosquitoes in was by the U.S. Army Medical in the for a more the of the became the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical in became The was that this could be conducted at the National of in supported by a from the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development The of in the Department of was as the most to its in the the of mosquito and the of mosquito have been used to identify this Army the and the The Walter Reed located at the Center of the in the beginning in The is an that is to the and of important The has developed to the important mosquitoes of the and which can be via the Military preventive medicine deployed in an operational can and arthropods capable of transmitting endemic diseases to identify many of these vectors via and this information to assess the likelihood of human and develop and effectiveness of control The also supports vector research such as and repellent and insecticide The staff includes three research entomologists an Army and two There are also for staff and research and National Research are by the vector research and is provided by the with the that the mosquito will be and at the The identification to mosquitoes of the U.S. Pacific Command of and U.S. Command of are To date, new species of mosquitoes and new species of biting midges have been future include the development of mosquito for important African mosquitoes and sand have been published in to military 11 civilian and A of studies and major identification have been published et al. and et al. et al. 2005, and et al. 1990). that identify in vectors help U.S. military preventive medicine service members vector-borne disease A malaria for of malaria in mosquitoes has been developed and marketed by with Army and overseas DoD have the for and A was by Medical et al. and development of a used to identify and in mosquitoes was also supported by U.S. Army funding. Other used by the U.S. military to diseases in vectors since include fever and during the and and sand fly fever and and and et al. The U.S. Force has developed for and identification of dengue in mosquitoes et al. 2007). endemic in service members via testing

La thème soutenue dans cet article est que, étant donné la façon dont les stratèges nucléaires définissent la rationalité, la logique de la dissuasion mène inévitablement à la guerre. La logique de la dissuasion dont il s'agit dans cet article est une logique causale qui s'intéresse uniquement à la prédiction et aux conséquences des décisions étatiques. La définition de la rationalité qu'elle implique insiste sur les coûts, les gains et les risques; les notions d'incertitude ainsi que d'anticipation y sont centrales. La crise des missiles cubains, en 1962, serf d'illustràtion à la thèse de l'article. On peut comprendre, dans un contexte de dissuasion, les mesures prises par le président Kennedy, mais il reste que la menace de représailles brandie par le président augmentait de façon sensible la possibilité d'une guerre entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique. Kennedy courait le risque d'une guerre pour sauver la dissuasion, au nom d'une logique où l'on se devait de brandir des menaces et même d'utiliser des armes nucléaires, pour sauver cette logique même. Il n'y a pas d'apocalypse devant nous. Il se peut que la guerre nucléaire n'arrive pas d'ici cent ans. Mais on ne pourra toutefois pas l'éviter, parce que les homines s'appuient sur une logique de la dissuasion. La sécurité est la servante de la paix, mais quand on se fait le champion d'une logique de la dissuasion on prépare peu de paix et pas de sécurité pour l'avenir.