1959: Moscow, Washington, London, Paris

Abstract

In 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan were confronted with a new crisis, in addition to their concerns about disarmament, the Middle East, and even the situation in the Far East. On 10 November 1958, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the premier of the Soviet Union, told an audience in Moscow that the Western powers had violated their postwar agreements over the future of Germany. He called upon the United States, Great Britain, and France to end their occupation of West Berlin and said that the Soviet Union intended to negotiate a separate treaty with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), thereby enabling the East Germans to control the access routes to Berlin. The Western powers, therefore, would be forced to negotiate a separate arrangement with East Germany, a country which they did not recognize diplomatically, in order to maintain their rights in Berlin. Khrushchev’s speech was perceived as a tactic designed to force the West out of Berlin. Shortly after his 10 November speech, Khrushchev gave a six-month ultimatum for settling the Berlin issue, holding out the prospect of armed confrontation if a settlement was not reached.1