13 Religious politics and minority rights during the Yudhoyono presidency

Abstract

On most aspects of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's performance over his ten-year presidency, history will likely be kind—his cautious, indecisive, middle-of-the-road approach will earn more positive than negative accolades in areas of economic growth, foreign policy and even probably, at the end of the day, corruption. One area that is an unmitigated loss for him in terms of ‘legacy points’, however, is his administration's performance on religious freedom and minority rights. Especially during his second term, minority groups such as the Ahmadiyah, Shi'a and even Christian groups experienced sustained and repeated attacks—increasingly involving the use of violence. Indonesia's much-lauded international reputation for tolerance and pluralism has been tarnished significantly. The score card on this issue is so straightforward that this chapter will not focus its analysis on arguing that minority rights and religious politics in Indonesia have regressed over the past decade; others have already effectively, and repeatedly, made that point. Human Rights Watch (2013: 6), for example, declared that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been inconsistent at best in defending the right to religious freedom. The absence of leadership has emboldened groups willing to use violence against religious minorities and the local and national officials who cater to them. Similarly, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (2014: 125) concluded that Indonesia's transition to democracy and economic stability has been marred by sectarian violence, terrorist attacks, the growth of extremist groups, and rising intolerance toward religious minorities and ‘heterodox’ groups. Numerous scholarly and media articles have also noted with concern that Indonesia's famed religious tolerance appears to be on the retreat (Fealy 2011; Jones 2013; Harsono 2014). Rather than reiterate these arguments, this chapter will focus on the role of the president himself in at best allowing, and at worst contributing to, the deterioration of minority rights and the politicisation of religion in Indonesia. Yudhoyono was elected in 2004 on a platform of anti-corruption and forward-looking progress for Indonesia. By the end of his first term, however, significant problems in Indonesia's religious relations were emerging. Nevertheless, he was re-elected in 2009 with a landslide victory and a huge mandate for reform (Timberman 2009).