Добродетель и долг в моральной философии Томаса Рида

Abstract

Based on the material of T. Reid’s ethical conception, it is shown that in the moral-philo­sophical teaching, built around the concepts of duty, obligation, the concept of virtue also re­tains its significance. Although Reid consciously conceptualizes morality through norms and duties, the concept of virtue plays an important role in his teaching. Without virtue, it is im­possible to achieve two ends specific to human nature – the individual’s own good on the whole and what appears to be our duty. Reid shows that the person’s virtue coincides with her good on the whole, or happiness. This goal, however, can only be achieved when a hu­man being combines it with the fulfillment of duty for duty’s sake rather than for self-inter­est. In connection with the principle of respect for duty, Reid sees the role of virtue in that it is a necessary condition for the fulfillment of duty and of moral obligation. It is virtue as a quality of the moral agent, manifested in his power to distinguish between good and evil, to make judgments concerning one’s own duty and to act according to one’s understanding-conviction, that makes the act performed virtuous and proper through the motive. Through the concept of virtue Reed grasps the idea, important to Early Modern ethics, that every duty is internally binding through a moral motive.