正確的抉擇或唯一的選擇：論中國共産黨人何以要加入中國國民黨(1922~1924)

Like Regime, Like Newspaper: Comparative Analysis on Newspaper Industries across Taiwan Strait (1949-1958) Abstract Ever since 1949, across Taiwan strait, the Republic of China on Taiwan ruled by Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang, KMT) and the People’s Republic of China on Chinese Mainland ruled by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were antagonist to each other for a long time. Far-reaching changes were mandated both in Taiwan and Mainland China by the two regimes while communications between people on both sides of Taiwan strait were banned, and later vanished. Thus, to all professions across Taiwan strait, two groups of numerous experiments were performed at the same time. The experiences and consequences of these experiments influenced the working conditions, lives and cultures on both territories and evidenced distinction between the two national systems. As the most important media at the time, newspaper industry was highly regarded by both KMT and CCP. Although in the beginning of the political separation, newspaper industries across Taiwan strait were quite similar, the many newspaper policies raised by the two governments molded different environments for the industry. Experiments of newspaper industry under different regimes were taken place from then on. Within ten years, the newspaper industries evolved seperately across the strait, and around 1958, divergent newspaper systems appeared. Newspaper industry in Mainland China became a typical example of the industry under totalitarian regime, while newspaper industry in Taiwan showed itself a model of the industry under authoritarian regime. Base on the above historical background, what was the mechanism that caused and shaped different newspaper industries across Taiwan strait? How did newspaper industry respond to totalitarian or authoritarian ruling? What factors that differentiated authoritarianism from totalitarianism can be reached through the examples in newspaper industry? These questions reckon the necessity of comparative study on the same industry in two isolated and widely different regions during the same time period. This dissertation tries to be contributive to the answers. Newspaper industry is considered and studied here with its entire functionality. Not only are news reporting, editing and editorial writing examined, but newspaper’s producing, sales and management are also studied. Comparative historical analysis is applied as the main methodology with the assistance of knowledges from journalism, political science, sociology, business administration and accounting. Acknowledging newapapers as the “tongue and throat to the party” and tool for propaganda, CCP spared no effort to control newspaper industry. However, it’s means and artifices were nimble and flexible. From 1949, CCP elaborated a government-owned hierarchy newspaper system. Party leaders directed newspapers owned and operated by central to local governments, while tolerated temporary existence of some privately-owned newspapers. Following the establishment of the regime, CCP seized newspaper industry’s resources such as manpower, materials, financial supply, news announcing, circulation channels and market throughout Mainland China. The number of remaining privately-owned newspapers and circulation and advertising agent houses declined sharply and eventually died out in a few years. When CCP had monopolized the newspaper industry, consequently, it had monopolized the social capitals contained in the industry. Newspapers in the totalitarian country became part of the regime itself. On the other side of the strait, the retreating and exhausted KMT faced difficulties inside and outside Taiwan. For surviving, the adoption of a two-handed policy, with both suppressions and compromises was inevitable, which made the ROC of Taiwan an authoritarian country. Government’s publication moratorium and journalistic taboos set walls around newspaper industry, but also kept potential competitors away. Among the coexisting, fixed-numbered newspapers, those owned by government or KMT were in leading positions in 1949. However, due to the realism of authoritarianism, some “reservations,” such as social and crime news, popular supply and circulation markets, and advertisements had been made by the government for other newspapers to maneuver their future with free competition in these areas. Privately-owned newspapers utilized the opportunities created by these “reservations” to compete capitalistically. In ten years, resources contained in Taiwanese societies were gradually excavated and transferred to privately-owned newspapers when social capitals were being accumulated by them; meanwhile government- and KMT-owned newspapers began to ebb. Preparation for privately-owned newspapers to meet the further economic development and foundation for them to exceed government- and KMT-owned newspapers were established in this period of time. Ten years were short in history, yet long enough to create two completely different newspaper industries in two areas that were politically separated and isolated to each other. It was the decade right after the split in 1949 that the two regimes across Taiwan strait, CCP’s totalitarian and KMT’s authoritarian, formed newspaper industries based on each one’s political ideology. So ten years are long enough to have a specific newspaper industry appear under a regime’s specific ruling. Sensitive to its environment as any other news media is, newspaper industry is a product of the regime that brings about the media industry’s environment. Like regime, like newspaper.

After the Second World War, a bipolar world, known as the Cold War Era, has been clearly formed between the Western Bloc and Communist Bloc while the United States and the Soviet Union at the peak on each side. In Eastern Europe, the United States was restrained and felt helpless about Soviet expansion in this area with the perception of Yalta system. On the other hand, in Asia, with the breakdown of talks, an all-out war resumed. A Chinese civil war fought between Kuomintang (also as KMT or Chinese National Party) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the end of 1948, KMT has occupied the inferior position. In the early period of 1949, CCP forces crossed the Yangtze River and successfully captured Nanking, the capital of KMT’s Republic of China (PRC) government. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with its capital at Beiping, which was renamed Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and millions of Nationalist Chinese retreated from mainland China to the island of Taiwan. Confronted with the CCP takeover of mainland China, the United States came to reformulate its China Policy which later marked a turning point in Sino-American relationship during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950. In June 1948, the leader of Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, was officially denounced and his party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), was ejected as a member of the Cominform by the Soviet Union. Since the West branded Tito a Soviet puppet for his loyalty and constancy of faith to Stalinism, the Tito-Stalin Split presented a whole new realm of possibilities to the United States for its dilemma in china—“Chinese Titoism.” With the influence of Stilwell Incident over Sino-American relationship and the facts of Tito-Stalin Split, Truman made an about-face change to U.S. China Policy in 1949. By the early 1949, the Truman Administration has already been making plans to diverge from Chiang and his KMT such as the publication of China White Paper; at the same time, Truman Administration keeping making chances to have conversations with the CCP. By meeting and negotiating with the CCP officials, Truman Administration attempted to disunite Communist China and the Soviet Union, expected Mao to be the “Asian Tito,” and then Communist China can joint forces with the United States to fight against the Soviet Union, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Until the outbreak of Korean War in June 1950, the United States finally realized that what it faced is hostile china along with the Sino-Soviet partnership. By applying Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure and basis, the thesis would step by step explore the decision-making process of Truman Administration in engaging China to counter the threat from the Soviet Union during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950 through the perspectives of the rational assessment and choice on national interest, struggles between/among organizations based on different target and organizational culture, and pulling, hauling and bargaining games among relative bureaucrats. In addition, the thesis also applied the principles from Alexander L. George’s book, Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy, to aim at examining how President Truman’s, who has the final say, character, personality, value and world views made effect in the decision-making process of the target case study. In the process of theory confirming, the thesis discovered that by the period of transformation of Chinese regimes in 1949, the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 presented the United States a new inspiration for the Communist World, that is, the Eastern Bloc is not a rigid “Iron Curtain.” Truman Administration considered that Titoism may set its roots upon China, the Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict could be a replay situation that occurred in mainland China, and both would put the strategic thought—Engaging China to counter the Soviet Threat—into practice. Nevertheless, from the historical perspectives, this kind of strategic thought seemed over-optimistic, which did not conform to fully rational considerations. However, with regard to the background of the early Cold War Era and the suspicion between the Truman Administration and KMT, the alternative that the United States took reflected the principles of “bounded rationality model.” As a result, by examining the decision-making process of Truman Administration in engaging China to counter the threat from the Soviet Union during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950, what the thesis explored not only the facts about the Sino-American relationship in this period, but also the continuity and change of Truman’s China Policy along with its cause and effect.

Reviewed by: From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936 Gordon Y. M. Chan (bio) Chan Lau Kit-Ching . From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. ix, 342 pp. Hardcover $59.95, ISBN 0-312-22428-1. As Professor Chan Lau Kit-Ching aptly observes, Hong Kong's first encounter with Chinese Communism predates July 1, 1997. It has been involved in the Chinese Communist movement ever since the movement's inception in 1921, and for many years before the Communist takeover in 1949 Hong Kong had served as headquarters for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Guangdong. The examination of this previously neglected history promises to shed light on our knowledge of the revolutionary movement not just in the locality of Hong Kong but also in Guangdong and the Chinese nation as a whole (pp. 1-2). Based in Hong Kong, Chan enjoyed a favorable position while exploring this topic. Besides ready access to local archives, both government and private, the proximity of Hong Kong to Guangzhou allowed her to conduct archival research conveniently in the Guangdong Provincial Archives, which hosts the most comprehensive collection of pre-1949 Party documents on Guangdong (including Hong Kong) accessible to both Chinese and foreign historians.1 Furthermore, the Feng Ping Shan Library at the University of Hong Kong has an impressive and expanding acquisition of historical materials on the CCP in Guangdong, published [End Page 412] both publicly and internally in the People's Republic of China (PRC). These resources were within "easy reach" (p. 12) for Chan, who teaches at the University. Given Chan's obvious advantages, the outcome of her research is, however, disappointing. Notwithstanding some shrewd observations, this present work is marred by a marked unfamiliarity with the historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution. A quick historiographical survey will refute Chan's belief that there is "a dearth of regional studies of the Chinese Communist Movement, especially in the English language" (p. 2). Over the last two decades, Western scholarship has produced intensive studies of the revolution in local contexts,2 although they are predominantly rural in focus. Chan's study could well be a valuable contribution to the underrepresentation of the Chinese Communist urban revolution in the recent literature. Unfortunately, her lack of awareness of many major issues at stake, coupled with her reluctance to discuss the possible implications of her own findings with other scholars in order to enhance our general understanding of the CCP's history, suggests otherwise. The structure of this book is simple. Its four main parts trace the history of the CCP in Hong Kong and Guangdong from 1921 to 1936. The story begins with the small Guangzhou Communism Group that was initiated, in 1921, by Chen Duxiu, together with three Guangdong students he had taught in Beijing who had been exposed to the "new thoughts" of the May Fourth Movement. About a year later, the Socialist Youth League, which was to be superseded by the Communist Youth League in 1925, was established in the province. This organization represented the earliest Communist presence in Hong Kong (the CCP was not founded in the colony until 1924). As a British colony, Hong Kong expectedly exhibited many political and socioeconomic features distinct from those of Guangdong. The awareness of their existence impelled many Hong Kong cadres to ask their superiors on the other side of the border for special treatment and greater autonomy in pursuing revolutionary activities. Several times Chan emphasizes that these appeals mark the initial conception of "one country two systems"—a principle that the PRC employed to resolve the colonial questions of Hong Kong and Macao. The inference drawn here is interesting. Readers should bear in mind, however, that the desire of the regional Party branches for more autonomy based on concerns about their peculiar local conditions was common in the early history of the CCP and was by no means unique to the Communists in Hong Kong.3 Before 1925, Communists had made little headway in Hong Kong; it took the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike/Boycott to bolster their position. Because of this...

摘 要 任何近現代重大思想及意識型態間的衝突，都傾向以武裝暴力模式做一總解決。對這些武裝暴力衝突如內戰、國際戰爭若有不正確的歷史解釋，相對就會讓之後的政治層面的解釋基礎不穩。國共在台海兩岸的對峙，對近代中國歷史走向有重大影響，但對這些戰事的純軍事部份，尚未有充分而深入的研析，從而也很難得到完善的歷史解釋。 本文研究目的在補充國共雙方在台海熱戰中歷史解釋的空隙，故而筆者首先擬就古寧頭戰役作一分析。因為古寧頭戰後，國共隔台海分治的情況逐漸成形，冄若古寧頭戰役若國軍戰敗，金門落入中共之手，將大幅壓縮國軍防衛台灣本島之戰略戰術空間，台灣能否屹立不搖至今不無疑問，以中華民國角度來說，對此一戰役當應深入分析。 國軍來台後重整，是日後國軍能有實力防衛台灣的重要因素之一，其中美國對國軍的援助及國軍自身的改革，皆需有一以軍事史角度為觀察重點的研究，故以第二章述明。 國軍與共軍在浙東島嶼的對抗，從韓戰前至韓戰後長達數年，雖最後國軍仍舊全面由浙東島嶼撤退，但是，國軍在浙東島嶼的防衛，是為第一次台海危機，為金門、馬祖閩東諸島的防衛，爭取約四年的時間增強軍力，不能以一時一地之得失而抹殺不談，是以第三章分析解釋其事。 第二次台海危機，因共黨自諱其敗文飾其戰略戰術之失，各方學者專家多為其言論所惑，對這次台海危機歷史解釋，常以中共解釋為準，其接近史實真相之解釋為何，當以第四章詳解。 國軍撤退來台，蔣中正總統無時無刻皆以反攻大陸為念，此一反攻大陸之史實解釋，為多方學者專家嚴評甚或嘰嘲。然而，根基於軍事史之實情如何，尚需深入研究方可定論。待反攻大陸之國光計畫中止，國共雙方在台海之熱戰，亦就此大概終止，故而筆者以第五章專研之，亦做為本文之結尾。

Reviewed by: Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army Peter O. Hefron (bio) Lanxin Xiang . Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army. Lanham, New York, and Oxford: University Press of America, 1998. xi, 223 pp. Hardcover $37.50, ISBN 0-7618-1129-x. Lanxin Xiang, Professor of International History at Geneva's Graduate Institute of International Studies, has written a well-researched work that is part biography of Chen Yi and part military history of the Chinese Communist Revolution. It traces Chen Yi's career from radical student to founder and commander of the New Fourth Army (NFA). It is also a military history of the NFA, dealing especially with its pivotal role in destroying the main power base of the Guomindang (GMD) in central and eastern China during the 1947-1949 period. One of the book's strengths is Xiang's use of his interviews with surviving members of the NFA as well as his utilization of newly published primary sources, mainly from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The history of the Eighth Route Army, created by the veterans of the Long March, is well known. Xiang provides us with an in-depth look at what happened to those scattered Chinese Communist Party (CCP) guerrilla units in Southeast China that the CCP Central Committee left behind at the start of the Long March. From these units and their commanders arose the New Fourth Army. He traces the evolution and unification of these units during their three years of isolation from Mao Zedong's Yan'an headquarters. Communications were reestablished in late 1937, parallel to the creation of the second CCP-GMD United Front. From the surviving thirteen thousand "Red Bandits," Mao in Yan'an, Chen Yi and his guerrilla cohorts in southern China, and the Guomindang fashioned the New Fourth Army from October to December 1937. Xiang gives a detailed analysis of the chief battles of the NFA as well as of the controversies between Mao and the NFA leadership over correct military and political strategy. The NFA soon became a microcosm for the factional rivalry between Mao's real and imagined enemies within the CCP, ranging from the pro Stalinist Comintern group to potential rightists among CCP military officers. The NFA ostensibly harbored both varieties. The NFA also served as the arena for strategic debates between Mao and the NFA's leadership, soon personified by Chen Yi and a number of his generals such as Su Yu, Ye Fei, and Huang Kechang. At issue were three matters: Should the CCP continue to rely on Mao's guerrilla warfare strategy or escalate permanently to conventional mobile warfare using regular CCP troop units? By 1947, mobile warfare was favored and successfully practiced by the NFA. To do otherwise, Chen felt, would extend the civil war by allowing the GMD to dominate the battlefield. [End Page 248] Should the NFA follow Mao's periodic desire to rebuild the CCP guerrilla bases south of the Yangzi River or follow Chen's strategy of taking the revolution to the GMD's strategic heartland north of the Yangzi River? Xiang discusses this seesaw debate in detail. Finally, should the CCP's chief goal for the second CCP-GMD United Front be to fight the Japanese invaders or to use it as cover for the CCP to expand its territory, troops, and population at the expense of the GMD? Unlike the other two issues, this latter debate was easily won by Mao. Soon most of the NFA leadership accepted Mao's view that the anti-Japanese war was secondary. CCP expansion, even at the risk of restarting the civil war, was necessary if Mao was to defeat the GMD government after the Western Allies defeated Japan. Xiang includes an analysis of Mao's pre-1949 purges of his CCP opponents, most notably the anti-Bolshevik purge of the early 1930s and the 1942 rectification of both Rightists and Cominternists. Mao's egocentric determination to become "China's Stalin" through periodic purges, regardless of their impact on the revolution, is a forerunner of post-1949 Maoist excesses. Inevitably these issues focus the author's attention on the credibility...

Reviewed by: Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies ed. by Cheng-Tian Kuo Jonathan Brasnett Cheng-tian Kuo, ed., Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press B.V., 2017. 425 pp. €109 (hb) ISBN 978-94-6298-439-4 Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies is an impressive volume that aims to explore the evolution of religion-state relations, the influence of religion in nationalist discourse and the phenomenon of nationalism as a quasi-religion in the “Greater China” region (i.e., China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). Kuo’s introduction lays out the competing theories of modernism, which sees religion as having no place in the modern Chinese polities, and revisionism, which holds that religion and politics have influenced one another throughout Chinese dynastic history and that this has continued into modern China, with nationalism replacing religion as the primary tool for strengthening the legitimacy of the rulers. He summarizes the current context in contemporary “Greater China,” arguing that the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or mainland China) mobilizes a “political Trinity: patriotism, socialism, and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)” with all other religions subservient (p. 13); in the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan), religions enjoy both freedom of worship and freedom to influence politics; in Hong Kong, a “civil religion” is developing which defends democratic values but remains fragile (p. 14). Part I of the volume examines the nexus between Chinese religion and nationalism before the foundation of the PRC in 1949. Chapter 2, by Chi-shen Chang, explores the different form of “Chineseness” or Chinese identity, which form the basis of modern Chinese nationalism. This “Chineseness” could have a political-geographic connotation, based on the territory historically controlled by Chinese rulers; it could have a cultural connotation, based on sharing a common “language, costumes, customs, and values” (p. 62); or it could have an ethnic connotation based on common Han ethnicity descended from the mythical Yellow Emperor. Chang cites Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, the seventeenth-century Chinese philosopher, who argued that Chinese identity was based on the Confucian ideal of defending the Chinese territory, culture and ethnicity from barbarian invasions, which remains a key aspect of “Chineseness” to this day. [End Page 101] The third chapter, by Julia C. Schneider, examines the ways in which China sought to assimilate or “sinicize” those living within its territory who did not share the same Chinese linguistic, cultural, ethnic or even national identity. Applying Liang Qichao’s 梁啟超 concept of “lesser nationalism,” which regards those who are not ethnically Han residing inside the Chinese territory as inferior, she argues that the Ming and Qing dynasties undertook “Confucian civilizing” missions to assimilate other ethnic groups to the dominant Han culture. Likening this practice to Christian missionizing, Schneider insists that the Han Chinese perceived their Confucian values and culture as supreme, thereby justifying expansionism and sinicization during the Ming and Qing dynasties, which continues to inspire Chinese nationalism today. The fourth chapter, by Adam Yuet Chau, discusses different “spheres” (jie 界) that formed in Chinese society as it modernized in the early 20th century, each advocating on behalf of different interest groups, including the scholarly sphere, the minorities sphere, the political sphere, and the religion sphere. These spheres, in theory, should complement each other in a functioning modern state, but during the Maoist era of the PRC, many of them, including religion, were deprived of their autonomy and co-opted by the CCP to serve as “instruments in the state’s effort to mobilize society for building socialism” (p. 132). Chau argues that, in an effort to ensure that the religion sector could never be influenced by foreign interests, the CCP encouraged the creation of representational bodies for each religion which are amenable to state control, fostering greater Chinese nationalism among actors in the state-sanctioned religion sphere. Chapter 5, by Robert D. Weatherly and Qiang Zhang, outlines two different types of nationalism employed by the CCP, and gives an example of each type. First, confrontational nationalism emphasizes one’s victimization at the hands of an “enemy” by focusing on a symbolic injustice. The CCP has used this approach by often highlighting the Yuanmingyuan incident (1860), in...

In the midst of last century, during the war between KMT (Kuomintang) and CCP (Chinese Communist Party), a large number of KMT Chinese soldiers and their families retreated all the way from Yunnan, China to Myanmar and Northern Thailand (Thaibei). With their “anti-Communism” belief, the Chinese in Thaibei maintained close relationship with the Republic of China (Taiwan) for past decades, by receiving plenty of benevolent resources from the Taiwanese government and the general public. In Northern Thailand, Chinese school exists in each village. Local Students can learn Mandarin with Taiwanese textbooks in the traditional Chinese format. Parents are desirous of sending their children to study in Taiwan. However, during the past years, the abundant resources provided from CCP have changed the condition in the traditional anti-Communism area. China struck on Thaibei Chinese villages with the ground of “taking care of Thaibei compatriots.” The report has found that the resources from China are similar to those from Taiwan, including school admission offerings, overseas passports, scholarships, simplified Chinese textbooks, permanently stationed teachers, exchanges and training activities of teachers. Chinese people in Thaibei have different attitudes and perceptions towards China in different areas, positions and backgrounds. Receiving the resources from China has caused a huge controversy in the traditional pro-Taiwan Thaibei Chinese community. The sensitive problem between “pro-China” and “pro-Taiwan” groups is still difficult to be solved. By tracking the studying path of Thaibei students studying in China, this TV in-depth report discusses their motives of choosing China over Taiwan. It also analyzes Thaibei Chinese's tangle with China by investigating the controversy caused by China resources provided to Thaibei.

The communist revolution of China was led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded in 1921 in the wake of the May Fourth movement. The CCP began as a very small Marxist‐inspired left‐wing intellectual club, with little political influence prior to its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) in 1924. The GMD were motivated to ally with the CCP in order to obtain support from the Soviet Union in their fight with the northern warlords. With the help of the CCP, the GMD was remodeled from a loose organization into a Leninist party, and the GMD also received financial and other support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the CCP also developed quickly by infiltrating the GMD‐controlled army and by expanding its organizations in the urban and rural areas of southern China. While the alliance between the GMD and CCP brought great success for both parties, tensions also grew as the parties pursued different agendas. After the initial military success against the warlords during the Northern Expedition, a growing number of the GMD's leaders and generals became very unhappy about the CCP's infiltration into the GMD‐controlled army as well as about the CCP's radical property redistribution policy, which was implemented in the territories recently occupied by the GMD's Northern Expedition army. As a result they no longer wanted to share power with the CCP. In early 1927, shortly after Northern Expedition troops occupied Shanghai, the GMD started to purge the CCP‐controlled organizations in the city and labeled the CCP an illegal organization. The purge soon spread, with hundreds of thousands of CCP members and their sympathizers arrested and killed. In response, the CCP staged several military uprisings in late 1927 in places where they had strong influence. While all these uprisings were easily suppressed by the GMD army, the surviving members of the CCP were able to retreat to mountain areas and conduct guerrilla warfare.

The communist revolution of China was led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded in 1921 in the wake of the May Fourth movement. The CCP began as a very small Marxist‐inspired left‐wing intellectual club, with little political influence prior to its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) in 1924. The GMD were motivated to ally with the CCP in order to obtain support from the Soviet Union in their fight with the northern warlords. With the help of the CCP, the GMD was remodeled from a loose organization into a Leninist party, and the GMD also received financial and other support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the CCP also developed quickly by infiltrating the GMD‐controlled army and by expanding its organizations in the urban and rural areas of southern China. While the alliance between the GMD and CCP brought great success for both parties, tensions also grew as the parties pursued different agendas. After the initial military success against the warlords during the Northern Expedition, a growing number of the GMD's leaders and generals became very unhappy about the CCP's infiltration into the GMD‐controlled army as well as about the CCP's radical property redistribution policy, which was implemented in the territories recently occupied by the GMD's Northern Expedition army. As a result they no longer wanted to share the power with the CCP. In early 1927, shortly after Northern Expedition troops occupied Shanghai, the GMD started to purge the CCP‐controlled organizations in the city and labeled the CCP an illegal organization. The purge soon spread, with hundreds of thousands of CCP members and their sympathizers arrested and killed. In response, the CCP staged several military uprisings in late 1927 in places where they had strong influence. While all these uprisings were easily suppressed by the GMD army, the surviving members of the CCP were able to retreat to mountain areas and conduct guerrilla warfare.

As a result of the repeated failure of his revolutionary efforts, Sun Yat-sen decided to borrow from the Soviet Union's successful experience. But his advocacy of a total revolution by the whole people was essentially contradictory to the proletarian revolution of Soviet Union. After the Guomindang (KMT) reorganized and began to admit members of the Chinese Communist Party, they gained considerable power within the KMT and were able to influence its political line, which gave rise to an eruption of ideological contradiction. Within the KMT, controversies erupted between the left and the right, and in society conflicts emerged between merchants and workers. By this time Guangdong merchants were already in a state of discontent with the revolutionary government, because they had been subjected to a range of severe harassments stemming from levies imposed by both the government and visiting armies. After its reorganization, the KMT headquarters established peasants' and workers' bureaus, but lacked any corresponding merchants' bureau. Its propaganda and policy were biased toward the peasantry and workers to the neglect of merchants, which caused the latter to suspect the KMT of promoting communism. As far this point is concerned, the conflict between merchant militia and the government was based on both ideological differences and practical fears. As well the left and the right within the KMT and the CCP all engaged actively in the conflict, in a struggle for revolutionary leadership. The right cultivated the power of merchants and promoted party organizational reform, while the left established an additional bureau of merchants in its fight against the right. The establishment of this bureau by the KMT headquarters was on the one hand a measure to pacify merchants in the wake of the conflict with merchant militia, while on the other hand it implied a conflict of revolutionary line. However, although the left established a merchants' bureau, it had no clear plan as to how to define the status of merchants in a revolutionary program based primarily on the peasantry and workers. Not until the second plenary conference of national representatives of the KMT, was a merchants' movement adopted as party policy. But owing to the fundamental contradictions between the two ideologies and revolutionary lines of the KMT and the CCP, the issues surrounding merchants were to constantly reappear without resolution.

This thesis has two related objectives. First, it proposes a general critique of the way in which liberal theorists have understood the democratisation process—particularly in their search for its nascent forms in the late Qing Dynasty and early Republican China. In this sense, it is a work of political philosophy and aims to counter poorly formulated criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is not to condone everything the CCP does, but rather to highlight the frequent misperceptions of key concepts employed by their international interlocutors—especially freedom, democracy and government. The core of the argument rests on Dankwart Rustow’s three stage “matrix” which suggests that those factors that bring a democracy into being are not necessarily the same as those that sustain it. The argument, here, is that certain types of government have a role to play in the democratisation process. This problematises the generally-accepted view that the role of government (any government) is to remove itself from this process altogether. This is evidenced by the long standing liberal “truth” of the necessity of the public/private divide. Second, the thesis outlines a history of the first indigenous Chinese public park—Zhongyuan Gongyuan (Central Park). In this sense, the thesis is also a work of history. The park, itself, is significant because, unlike the west, there has not been a history of formalised public spaces in Chinese history—like the agora, forum or piazzas. The establishment of the park, therefore, highlights a considerable, albeit geographically localised, watershed in the objectives of Chinese government. Previous governments kept their gaze towards heaven; early Republican governments reversed the direction, and looked towards the people. The newly established municipal authorities clearly saw the health, morality and conduct of the masses as the raison d’etre of the park; the aim was new citizens who would contribute to the political modernity and capitalism that would make China strong. To build a new China required a dramatic rethinking of what the citizen would look like, and the earlier intellectual reconfigurations—especially those of Liang Qichao’s xin min—found their material expression, at least partially, in the ways in which the patrons consumed these new public spaces like Zhongyuan Gongyuan. The story of the park, then, provides a case study that demonstrates that government, at least in Republican China, did play a role in the creation of some of the basic elements of democracy—for example, civil society, modern citizenship and the public sphere.

NEWLY RELEASED SOVIET DOCUMENTS reveal that during the 1920s the Soviet Foreign Ministry East Asian specialists assigned growing significance to the British crown colony of Hong Kong. One may credibly argue that, at least in Britain's case, Cold War conflicts with the Soviet Union for influence over existing colonies, for example, Hong Kong, and in such developing countries as China, began in 1920. This article examines the interactions and issues generated by the collision of British Hong Kong, the Soviet Union and China during the 1920s. It investigates the extent of Soviet involvement in Hong Kong and South China, the reasons why the communist movement collapsed so drastically in both places by the late 1920s, divisions between Comintern and Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID) officials over Soviet policy toward the area, and Hong Kong's significance in Soviet policies toward both China and colonial

A year after the sudden ending of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the second stage of the Chinese Civil War began and ended in 1949 with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There is heated debate on the cause of the Nationalists’ defeat: Was it the CCP’s strengths or the Guomindang (GMD)’s weaknesses? The outcome of the war was ultimately an interplay between the GMD’s weaknesses and the CCP’s strengths. The GMD made serious tactical errors in areas where the CCP was strong, which exacerbated the GMD’s deficiencies, and bolstered the CCP’s status as a viable alternative. In terms of both popular support and military successes, the GMD fell short, which was in stark contrast to the CCP’s immense gains. This essay demonstrates how, first of all, the Nationalists lost the support of key social groups while the Communists won their support through the attraction of their ideology and the promise of socioeconomic reforms. Second, the GMD made errors that deeply weakened their military strategy while the CCP embraced mobile warfare. In the end, the GMD’s failures were not enough to lead to their defeat, nor did the CCP’s strengths alone cause their success.

The generally accepted view of the first United Front in China was that the Communist International (Comintern) initially proposed this policy in 1920, at approximately the same time that Marxist study groups were being formed into a communist party in China.' According to this view, an active policy of alliance between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD) began in 1922, as a result of the intervention of Henk Sneevliet (Maring), an agent of the Moscow-based Comintern. These dates assume the existence of the CCP prior to the Comintern's adoption of the United Front, an interpretation that most recently published Western histories of the CCP accept.2 Not surprising, historians from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the former USSR also subscribe to this view because to do otherwise would devalue the CCP's role.3 However, this traditional view that the CCP was integral to the United Front is contradicted by a wealth of evidence showing that the Bolsheviks proposed this policy almost three years before the CCP was formed. In fact, Soviet officials first promoted an alliance with Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) during summer 1918 before there were any communists in China at all. The Comintern followed suit during spring 1919, more than a year before Marxist study groups were formed. Finally, with the Comintern's backing, in January 1921 Chen

In 1898, with the foundation of the Metropolitan University of the Qing Dynasty (Jingshi da xuetang) in Beijing, the modern higher education system was established in China. After the Qing Dynasty, China has been ruled by two political parties before and after 1949: Kuomintang (KMT) dated from 1911 to 1949 and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)1 dated from 1949 to present. The history of Nanjing University (NJU) can be traced back to Sanjiang Normal School founded by the Qing government in 1902. The NJU witnessed the development of modern higher education in China. The Nanjing city used to be the capital of the KMT regime and National Central University (NCU) was under the control of the KMT. Nevertheless, today Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu province and NJU is under the control of the CCP. As commonly known, the KMT and the CCP followed different political systems. The political status of the city and the university has changed a lot. It is worthwhile to do a research on the party controls of the KMT over NCU and the CCP over NJU within a changeable century to find which political system benefit the university more. This thesis introduces and compares the party controls of the KMT over NCU and the CCP over NJU in chapter two (party controls over personnel) and chapter three (party controls over the whole university). Afterwards, chapter four discusses the continuum of the political controls from the Qing Dynasty, to the KMT and then to the CCP and chapter five gives a summary as the conclusion. It is commonly known that China has a long civilized history for more than five thousand years. Within this long period of time, China formed a traditional Chinese authoritarianism with a typical Confucian orientation and three related structural aspects, hierarchical system, paternalism and bureaucratic pattern. This traditional Chinese authoritarianism was widely accepted and adopted by all dynasties and political regimes in China. All the modern universities (including NCU and NJU) and political parties (including the KMT and the CCP) in China are influenced by this type of authoritarianism while they are at the same time influenced by the Soviet Union (mainly in party constructions of the KMT and the CCP) and western values (mainly in university affairs including university settings and university administrations) in the late days. So the traditional Chinese authoritarianism, Soviet Union influence and western values are the three most