《何博士備論》戰略思想之研究：以美國在阿富汗反恐戰爭為例的檢證

Reviewed by: Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy Ralph Hitchens Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy. By Zeev Maoz. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. ISBN 0-472-11540-5. Maps. Tables. Figures. Glossary. Notes. References. Indexes. Pp. xii, 713. $45.00. Let's get the criticism out of the way. Israeli scholar Zeev Maoz has written a landmark book about Israel's "forever war" against the Arabs and Palestinians. But it's also a "forever book"—he could have done it in half the number of pages, with the excess profitably spun off into monographs and articles. Maoz's thesis is succinctly captured in a bumper sticker I saw recently: "War isn't working." The simplified story line of the Arab-Israeli conflict is that Israel was the heroic underdog from the 1948 War of Independence through the dramatic success of the 1967 Six Day War, after which things began to go south: the seemingly pointless War of Attrition, the nasty surprise of the Yom Kippur War, the invasion of Lebanon that dragged on for an incredible eighteen years, while festering in the background was the rising tide of unrest in the occupied territories. Maoz, however, takes us all the way back to demonstrate that while the War of Independence might have been a "just war," it was the only one to which Israelis can point. In subsequent decades, he argues, Israel consistently relied on military force as the principal instrument of foreign policy—fumbling, time and again, genuine diplomatic opportunities to resolve crises and build stable relationships with its neighbors. From the outset Israel's political leadership and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) settled on the "limited use of military force" as the best way to deal with their apparently intractable Arab neighbors. Reasonable, you might think, until Maoz explains that what they really meant was "unlimited use of limited military force"—an ongoing policy of military reprisals directed at the neighboring states from which cross-border terrorist activity was launched. This was intended to confront Arab governments [End Page 585] with unpalatable choices: if they were unwilling to restrain Palestinian guerrillas and other terrorists operating from their territory, IDF reprisals would escalate to unacceptable proportions and war would be the only option. This, of course, played into the hands of the IDF with its carefully nurtured "escalation dominance" posture while allowing Israel to avoid being identified as the aggressor. The Sinai war of 1956 (in collusion with Britain and France) was undeniably aggressive, but the notion that Israel is to blame for the 1967 and 1973 wars appears harder to swallow. Maoz methodically deconstructs through each case, summarizing the consensus scholarly viewpoints before presenting his own analysis of policy alternatives. Well-documented and sometimes deeply laced with counterfactual reasoning, these lead the reader to conclude that during the past five decades Israel's troubles have overwhelmingly been of its own making. Maoz supports his case in part by recourse to databases he has compiled, detailing every instance of conflict in Israel's history, no matter how insignificant: cross-border terrorist attacks and IDF reprisal raids, small and large. He's the very model of the modern political scientist, wielding just enough quantitative data to disabuse his readers of their preconceptions without overwhelming them. He also proves himself a competent narrative historian, refreshingly free of the academic jargon within which all too many in his discipline take refuge. (Furthermore, he's a former paratroop officer, no ivory-tower academic.) The architects of the "unlimited use of limited military force" strategy are the usual suspects, starting with David Ben-Gurion and continuing through a succession of defense ministers and IDF chiefs of staff. In recent decades, Maoz notes, an astonishingly high percentage of the latter came out of the paratroops or commando units, where they made their bones in cross-border reprisal operations. Interestingly, Ben-Gurion himself in his twilight years began to have second thoughts about the policy he set in motion. Maoz describes a famous incident immediately preceding the Six Day War, in which IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin...

Стаття присвячена проблемі підвищення ефективності протидії застосуванню військової сили з боку більш сильного у воєнному відношенні противника шляхом асиметричного впливу у вразливих для нього точках і завдання йому неприйнятного збитку, за якого він вимушений відмовитися від подальшого застосування військової сили. Розглянуто метод формування групи суб’єктів, яка в умовах обмежених ресурсів здатна завдати противнику такого збитку.

The relationship between domestic civil–military relations and the use of foreign military force has been long debated. The two primary perspectives on the issue, civilian conservatism and military conservatism, are antithetical. The former maintains that military authorities are more likely to advocate for the use of military force than civilian counterparts, while the latter advances the opposite argument. Empirical research to date has added little clarity to the relationship. We shed new light on this long running controversy through analyses of a different, and arguably more appropriate, set of measures for the key variables of concern: civilian control, civil–military conflict, and the use of foreign military force. In zero-inflated negative binomial estimates of 165 countries from 1946 to 2010, we find consistent support for civilian conservatism. More specifically, when civilian control erodes or civil–military conflict reaches particularly high levels, the likelihood that a state will launch a foreign military intervention increases.

A methodology for predictive evaluation of the effectiveness of an asymmetric response to modern threats is presented in the interests of ensuring an adequate level of military security of the state. In the context of the integrated use of military and non-military instruments (economic, political, information-psychological, etc.), there was a need to evaluate and predict the effectiveness of the asymmetric use of military and non-military forces and means in countering force pressure and the use of military force against a state that opposes a stronger military opponent. The main limitation of the state, which conduct offensive actions, is the loss of personnel. For the state-victim of aggression, the loss of personnel, population, infrastructure, etc. in such a conflict much more. World experience shows that the state, which is significantly weak in military relations, by carrying out asymmetric measures to counter threats by military and non-military subjects of the defense forces, is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy, including and in non-military areas of security, and thereby force an even stronger military opponent to abandon the use of military force against it. We propose the effectiveness of counteracting state aggression, which significantly dominates the target state in military power, to assess the total level of threat de-escalation at a certain time due to the symmetric (direct military) and asymmetric (complex) counteraction of aggression in the form of conducting a local special operation. The number of local special operations is determined by the capabilities of the state-victim of aggression. Formed system of restriction and decision-making criteria defined the aggressor state to refuse further aggressive actions.

Reviewed by: China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March Harvey Nelsen (bio) Andrew Scobell . China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xiv, 300 pp. Hardcover $65.00, ISBN 0-521-81979-2. Paperback $23.00, ISBN 0-521-52585-3. Under what circumstances is the communist leadership in Beijing prepared to use military force, either beyond its borders or internally? Andrew Scobell answers this question through the combination of an analytical framework and a historical survey. The framework begins with the "cult of defense." This has its roots in China's victimization during some 150 years of its recent history. It leads the Chinese to believe that they are always acting defensively, even when the military actions are offensive. The cult of defense has the potential of causing grave misunderstandings between China and its regional and global rivals. Americans should have little trouble understanding the concept since the United States believes that it uses its military power for justice, democracy, and international stability. However, most foreign nations feel that America is dangerous, unilateralist, and aggressive. China is not yet so perceived, but Scobell feels that the cult of defense has the long-term potential of alienating its regional neighbors. The second factor in the analytical framework is civil-military relations. Scobell demonstrates that a fundamental shift has taken place over the last fifteen or so years. When the paramount leader in China had extensive military experience, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was under his command and control. This applied to both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Subsequent top civilian leaders have had no military experience. The PLA, as a result, has become more of a corporate structure and better able to exercise political influence on behalf of its interests and values. The third level of analysis is strategy. This has evolved from "people's war" (which required the invasion of China to be effective) to "limited wars under [End Page 171] high-technology conditions." Early strategies saw the PLA operating within China. Current strategy calls for force projection and meeting foreign threats offshore. People's war was defensive. Now Chinese military planners emphasize the advantage of striking first. The five case studies in this book were selected to demonstrate how various portions of Scobell's theory have functioned in the past. The first case was the intervention in Korea in 1950. The centrality and prestige of Mao Zedong overwhelmed any foot-dragging on the part of cautious military leaders. Case number two was the PLA intervention in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) beginning in 1967. This is the weakest chapter in the book. Scobell attributes the intervention to a desire by the PLA leadership to avoid a descent into chaos. In fact, Mao had to push a reluctant PLA into the arena. A purge of the Central Military Commission was required to get the PLA to respond to Mao's demand. The public security apparatus in the provinces was cracking down on radical Red Guard organizations and the Cultural Revolution was in danger of grinding to a halt. It was either force the PLA into the fire or give up on the GPCR (which certainly would have seen the political finis of Mao). A major purpose of the intervention was to have the PLA take over all public-security functions and shut down the local security bureaus, which it did. After the Wuhan Incident of July 1967, the PLA became a central focus of GPCR attacks. Scobell misses the important order of August, which forced the PLA to "arm the revolutionary left." The PLA found itself creating a counter-armed force. Those revolutionaries who were not favored in the receipt of arms simply raided the arsenals. Mao pulled back from the brink of civil war within a month, canceling the political attacks on the military leadership and allowing the PLA to establish governing "revolutionary committees" throughout China. The last chapter in the GPCR came when Jiang Qing (Madam Mao) and the GPCR central leadership group created the "urban militia." This was a counter-armed force specifically intended to...

Today, terrorism becomes a threat in the form of megaterrorism triggering a transnational disaster that causes reckless and large damage. The Korean government dispatches troops as peace keeping force for various activities in the international society. For this reason, Korea comes to be a target of an international terrorist group. In particular, externally, since South Korea has a hostile relationship with North Korea which is equipped with an advanced ability of terrorism, it always faces the threat of terrorism. Therefore, it is more important to make preemptive prevention and responses in the comprehensive security dimension. In addition, internally, the country has frequence access of foreigners and an increased number of North Korean refugees due to its growing activities in the world; severe social discontent along with the increase in unemployment rate and the widening gap between the rich and the poor; such a structural setting as high population density suitable for new terrorism. In this circumstance, blended terrorism is likely to occur simultaneously. If these external or internal factors trigger complex megaterrorism in an urban area where important national facilities, multi-purpose facilities, or other social infrastructure are concentrated, and thereby a lot of human lives and assets are damaged, it is impossible to respond to such a disaster with limited police force. For this reason, it is inevitable to protect the security of the nation and the public and maintain public order with the use of military force. According to the counter-terrorism system of South Korea, in principle, military force is put in only if a terror is posed to military facilities. In this case, there is no controversy, because the system is well established under the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the head of the countermeasure headquarters makes a request of support, exceptionally, it is possible to operate military force as well as military facilities. Even if the exceptional necessity to make up for insufficient police force is accepted, it is unavoidable to restrict military intervention in the private sector strictly in terms of constitutional order. Therefore, this study tries to suggest the establishment of new provisions pertinent to military presence and withdrawal procedures and the scope of work in the Act on Counter-Terrorism when counter-terrorism operation forces exceptionally intervene in a domestic situation, just as in Martial Law Act according to which military forces are allowed to intervene in such a situation as a state of national emergency in order to maintain public order. Essentially, the domestic counter-terrorism activity is use of public power for protecting social order and security. Therefore, in principle, it is required to prevent terrorism and take suppression activity with the use of police force. Exceptionally, if it is inevitable to put in the counter-terrorism operation forces under the Ministry of National Defense, it is necessary to establish new provisions suggested in this study, including ‘the limitations of the counter-terrorism of police force’, ‘the necessity of urgent support’, ‘the proposal by the director of National Counter Terrorism Committee’, ‘the approval by the President’, the control procedures of the National Assembly, such as notification to the National Assembly and the procedure of withdrawal request of the National Assembly, and the scope of work, in the Act on Counter-Terrorism.

В останні роки, на тлі російської збройної агресії проти нашої держави, певними українськими політиками, громадськими діячами, у засобах масової інформації час від часу порушуються питання щодо необхідності уведення в Україні правового режиму воєнного стану. Разом з тим, як показала практика, законодавче врегулювання питання уведення правового режиму воєнного стану не відповідало умовам, що склались під час російської збройної агресії проти України. Тому керівництвом держави було ініційоване внесення суттєвих змін до законодавства для правового забезпечення протидії збройній агресії РФ, зокрема й у питанні запровадження правового режиму воєнного стану. Метою статті є: на основі проведеного аналізу положень вітчизняного законодавства та міжнародного гуманітарного права, досвіду запровадження в листопаді-грудні минулого року в Україні положення правового режиму воєнного стану, розкрити його сутність, мету, заходи, а також основні питання порядку його уведення та припинення дії. У статті розтлумачені і систематизовані поняття: воєнний конфлікт − форма розв’язання міждержавних або внутрішньодержавних суперечностей із двостороннім застосуванням воєнної сили. Основними видами воєнних конфліктів є війна та збройний конфлікт ; локальна війна − війна між двома чи більше державами, у якій воєнні дії обмежені територіями воюючих держав та переслідують воєнно-політичні цілі, що зачіпають переважно інтереси лише цих держав (територіальні, політичні, економічні тощо); регіональна війна − війна, що охоплює певний регіон (частину континенту) за участю всіх чи більшості держав регіону та з метою досягнення воєнно-політичних цілей, що зачіпають інтереси цих держав; інші ‑ особливий правовий режим, особливі повноваження, особливий період, воєнний стан. Викладені у статті результати проведеного наукового дослідження щодо правового режиму воєнного стану дозволить більш системно та цілеспрямовано його запроваджувати органами виконавчої влади, органами місцевого самоврядування та органами військового управління, а також використовувати у навчальному процесі Національного університету оборони України імені Івана Черняховського та інших навчальних закладах.

揭暄為明朝時期的戰略思想家，其著有《揭子戰法》、《兵經百篇》等書。本研究以揭暄的《兵經百篇》為主體，透過軍事戰略的途徑，來分析揭暄在《兵經百篇》一書中的軍事戰略思想。並透過揭暄的軍事戰略思想來分析第一次海灣戰爭中，美軍與伊拉克軍隊的建軍與軍事力量的使用。 本文首先建立軍事戰略的基本概念，而後分析明朝末年的戰略情勢，並且討論揭暄的軍事戰略思想，最後則以揭暄軍事戰略思想中，有關建立與使用軍事力量的觀點來分析第一次海灣戰爭。 本文認為揭暄在軍事戰略思想上，有五項重要原則：分散原則；更替原則；延遲、速決與牽制；超軍事力量；點眼。然而這些原則也還是會受到時空環境與戰略目標、手段等因素的影響，因此對於戰爭的勝負結果，不盡然存在決定性的影響。

Humanitarian wars are a primary means of globally affirming a specific model of humanity, built according to the cultural, moral, and economic standards of Western democracies. How are forms of humanity produced in the context of humanitarian war in Afghanistan? How are notions of freedom mobilized? How does the idea of a prospective humanity relate to the use of military force? In an attempt to reflect on the different configurations of freedom and humanity that emerged in the context of recent Afghanistan conflicts and international interventions, this article addresses the perspective of two key figures: the Taliban and the humanitarian soldier. Building on narratives such as poetry, interviews, and conversations conducted during fieldwork, this angle allows us to observe the complexity of the Afghan humanitarian theatre in a way that goes beyond mere assessments of political and economic interests, revealing a fragment of global contemporaneity that is crucial for understanding how processes of producing humanity combine with war and humanitarian efforts.

Throughout the years, Song Dynasty's 'weak force' has long been discussed by scholars. When researchers attempted to answer this phenomenon, they usually attributed it to Song Dynasty's 'Zhongwen Qingwu' policy. As time goes by, the thesis of Song Dynasty's 'Zhongwen Qingwu' was seemingly raised as a paradigm which could interpret Song Dynasty's civil-military relations. In this article, I strive to analyze how the thesis was developed, and address some questions to this thesis in following themes: Have most historians come to a consensus about the thesis? Did the civil-military relations always remain static in Song Dynasty? Whether Song literati generally despised military people and affairs? Actually, it is true that some Song people emphasized literati/civil affairs, and disdained military people/affairs; however, the phenomenon did not only exist in Song Dynasty. For example, similar situation appeared in Tang Dynasty too. In addition, the term of 'Zhongwen Qingwu' is still controversial and actively-debated. When discussing related issues of Song Dynasty, we had better not to consider the thesis as a prerequisite, so that we would be capable of avoiding some falsehoods which the thesis brings about.

Tibet and Communist China (1949–1951) The victory of the Chinese communists and the proclamation of the PRC on 1st October 1949 automatically confronted a new Chinese leaders with the issue of ‘liberation’ of Tibet. The coordinated propaganda campaign has started, in which the leading role played the Xinhua News Agency and the authority of the CCP party – the People’s Daily (‘Renmin Ribao’). The importance of the issue followed from the fact that Mao Zedong personally directed the entire action, and personally revised most of the texts concerning Tibet. In fact, the official formula of ‘peaceful liberation’ promoted by Beijing, meant the incorporation of Tibet with the consent of local authorities. Hence, the concept of a ‘gradual approach’ developed by Mao, anticipating the absorption of Tibet mainly by peaceful means, gradation of transformation, avoiding radical reforms and action by gentle persuasion. It may be recalled that at that time the use of military force was treated by Mao as finality. As soon has turned out, along with political, diplomatic and propaganda preparations intensive preparations for the military operation were undertaken in Beijing. The article presents the successive stages of the Chinese conquest of Tibet, which eventually ended with a Chinese military invasion, coincidentally in the same period, while on the Korean Peninsula Korean War broke out.

The study is to investigate the rise and fall of Civil-Military relation during the early period of the South Song Dynasty. When the North Song Dynasty was destroyed by the Tungustic Dynasty, princess Gao Zhou was elected the Emperor of the South Song Dynasty, known as Gauzong. At that time, the South Song Dynasty suffered from being bullied by the Tungustic Dynasty and the Chyi Dynasty outside and robbery and rebellion inside. In order to survive and develop his country, the South Song court corrected some of the North Song Dynasty's policy, nevertheless, it led to the situation of military's power surpassing the government. Thus, Gauzong decided to restore to curtailing the military's power, the traditional way of governing, which conducted by the North Song Dynasty. The Emperor surrounded by the civil officers who formed the central policy system, possessed superpower. The advantage of centralization of authority totally avoided of being usurped by insiders. But national defense power was declined to zero under the policy of curtailing military's power. The destiny of the South Song Dynasty was doomed to perish by outsiders. From the point of view, under the principle of the civil superiority over the military, how to create and maintain a stable Civil-Military Relation is an important subject for both military and political leaders to learn.

The Anti-Secession Law and the Taiwan Relations Act are both domestic laws that China and America made in view of Taiwan. Speaking with legal parlance, the common characteristics of these two laws is their view of a territory that they do not control. With respect to the context, the Anti-Secession Law and the Taiwan Relations Act are both dictating to one country its relationships with other countries, so certain comparisons can be made. This essay is therefore intending to compare the legal basis of the recognition of the ownership of Taiwan, and the consequent international law issues, i.e., the establishing of relationships with Taiwan, the different views concerning what those who are governed, the human rights issues, and the rules governing the using of force. The first issue towards these two laws would certainly be the legitimacy of the Anti-Secession Law and Taiwan Relations Act which in common claim to rule over the situation of Taiwan. Secondly, the Anti-Secession Law and Taiwan Relations Act stand on a very reverse side pertaining to the territorial issue of Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act set out a clear view that ”Taiwan's status not confirmed”, while the Anti-Secession Law of China strongly yet unilaterally proclaimed that 'Taiwan is part of the ”holy” territory of People's Republic of China'. Thirdly, the Anti-Secession Law and the Taiwan Relations Act are both domestic regulations which governs their own diplomatic order towards Taiwan, which in nature shall not interfere in any sense with the national development of other country. Taiwan Relations Act is well sustained as a domestic regulation which does not concern with how the order of Taiwan will change. However, the Anti-Secession Law is intending to interfere and limit the decision of Taiwan should there be any tendency towards independence. In the Anti-Secession Law, China characterizes Taiwanese people into ”Secession group for Taiwan independence” and ”Taiwanese compatriots that are included in all China”. On the other hand, in the Taiwan Relations Act, the States also conceives that there are two kinds of Taiwanese: ”Taiwanese people” and ”the Chinese at this side of the strait”. ”Taiwanese people” are the subjects that the Taiwan Relations Act, while the Chinese at this side of the strait think ”there is only one China” and will be the concerned party in the future which solve the problems peacefully with ”the Chinese on the other side of strait”. More importantly, the Anti-Secession Law conceives Taiwan as part of The People's Republic of China, which prohibits any possibility of independence, and is consequently contrary to the related rules of International Human Rights Treaties, e.g., the right of self-determination. Furthermore, its Article 8 wrote a blank check for the use of force against a state which is beyond its jurisdiction, which is infringing The Kellogg-Brigand Pact 1928 and the UN Charter that prohibit in any case the use of military force without due cause.

When confronted with a persistent foreign policy problem that threatens U.S. interests, and that cannot be adequately addressed through economic or political pressure, American policymakers and opinion formers have increasingly resorted to recommending the use of limited military force: that is, enough force to attempt to resolve the problem while minimizing U.S. military deaths, local civilian casualties, and collateral damage.These recommendations have ranged from the bizarre-such as a Predator missile strike to kill Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, or the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez-to the unwise-the preemptive bombing of North Korean ballistic missile sites-to the demonstrably practical-air raids into Bosnia and Somalia, and drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan. However, even though they have been a regular feature of America's uses of military force through four successive administrations, the efficacy of these Discrete Military Operations (DMOs) remains largely unanalyzed, leaving unanswered the important question of whether or not they have succeeded in achieving their intended military and political objectives. In response, Micah Zenko examines the thirty-six DMOs undertaken by the US over the past 20 years, in order to discern why they were used, if they achieved their objectives, and what determined their success or failure. In the process, he both evaluates U.S. policy choices and recommends ways in which limited military force can be better used in the future. The insights and recommendations made by Zenko will be increasingly relevant to making decisions and predictions about the development of American grand strategy and future military policy.

The empirical literature on arms buildups and the use of interstate military force has advanced considerably over the last half century. Research has largely confirmed that a relationship exists between arms buildups and the subsequent use of force, although it is historically contingent. The relationship seems to have existed in some earlier historical periods but has not been a feature of international politics since 1945. Broader work such as the steps-to-war model brings understanding to such variation by demonstrating how arms races are interrelated with other causes of conflict, such as territorial disputes and alliances. Still, many important dimensions of the arms race–conflict connection remain to be explored. Differences between qualitative and quantitative arms races, for example, have not received sufficient empirical scrutiny. Precise theory also needs to be developed on direct and indirect relationships between arms races and conflict, and such theory requires empirical investigation.