杜魯門政府嘗試聯中(共)制蘇之決策過程(1949年1月至1950年6月)

本論文以美國國務院出版的「美國外交關係」 (Foreign Relations of the United States, FRUS)、甘迺迪及詹森政府期間重要官員的回憶錄、甘迺迪總統和詹森總統圖書館網路上提供的口述回憶錄、中華民國外交部檔案為主要資料來源。運用比較方法(Comparative Method)探討美國因應中華民國政府「反攻大陸」政策之決策過程，分析(1)理性決策(2)政府組織文化與(3)官僚政治此三種模式，如何影響決策者在外交政策上的制訂與執行。論文的寫作時期雖跨兩任政府，但鋪陳方式以決策理論三個模式為主軸，全文文力求緊扣美國對「反攻大陸」的態度與因應立場。從本論文的研究中發現：不論甘迺迪或詹森政府，華府對台北「反攻大陸」政策的一貫因應立場都是支持並利用中華民國政府軍隊牽制中共，但絕不讓台灣突發的軍事行動將華府捲入兩岸戰爭以維護其國家利益。在冷戰兩極化的國際體系下，任何有關「反攻大陸」的軍事計劃令美國感到十分困擾。縱使美國無法完全掌控台北當局對「反攻大陸」的軍事準備，但甘迺迪政府時期對勸阻台北的行動卻達到一定的成效。就理性決策模式而言，美國因應中華民國「反攻大陸」的決策過程中，有五個重要的因素影響從甘迺迪到詹森政府因應的對策：(一)中蘇分裂擴大的可能性；(二)「兩個中國」政策的推動；(三)豬灣事件的衝擊；(四)中美共同防禦條約的制約；(五)中共核武能力的崛起與越戰的影響。甘迺迪上台初期，憚於國內政治輿論的紛擾、美國與中華民國情報合作系統失效，以及蔣介石可能無預期片面採取的非理性舉動，只好以拖延的方式減緩台北推動反攻的步調，同時以「七點保證」與中華民國進行有限的合作。詹森政府時期，因越戰因素及國內反戰聲浪高漲，對於中華民國政府所提之「反攻大西南計劃」直接予以拒絕。就組織決策模式而言，柯爾克接替莊萊德出任駐台大使，重回以國務院為主體的傳統外交管道，取代中情局所扮演的特別角色。中情局副局長克萊恩無法有效達成勸阻蔣介石的任務，柯爾克堅定且有效地「阻止」中華民國政府「反攻大陸」，為美國爭取到更多的反應時間，守住美國的國家利益。在扮演和中華民國政府溝通的角色上，國務院的任務執行力和達成效率都比中央情報局高，因而使國務院建議的拖延策略成為甘迺迪總統最終採納的行動方案。就政府政治決策模式而言，國務卿魯斯克不論是由國務院定調的對中華民國反攻大陸採取拖延政策，或是台海危機發生時，主張透過外交途徑向中共和蘇聯傳達美國不支持台北反攻的的立場，皆充分獲得甘迺迪政府的高度信任並取得政策主導權，反觀國防部長麥納瑪拉、中情局局長麥康、副局長克萊恩在因應台海危機政策形成的過程中，基於維持美國在亞太地區的戰略利益，主張以軍事行動保衛台灣，嚇阻中共進逼。兩種主張相較之下，美國的國家安全比美國在亞太地區的戰略利益更重要，因此，魯斯克提出的因應方案較能貼近甘迺迪的希望和符合美國實際的利益，因而能說服甘迺迪成為美國因應中華民國「反攻大陸」政策的最終決策。論文的主旨如下：美國在國際冷戰局勢的考量下，希望台灣能扮演一個美方的棋子，卻不願讓台北的「反攻大陸」政策將冷戰轉為熱戰。本論文探討的焦點，即針對甘迺迪和詹森對中華民國政府「反攻大陸」問題的因應與其決策過程。除了美國的國家利益考量外，亦將探討還有那些因素促使決策者決定勸阻中華民國政府「反攻大陸」的決定，而所謂的國家利益，又如何經由美國的決策者及其參與決策的重要官員與組織來界定。

This thesis mainly describes two different parties how to adjust and shift predecessor’s China policy in their administration from the first party rotation to the second one. Although this thesis mentions the policies made by the leaders during 1949-2000 in those circumstances, the changes in this 50 years are slighter than recent ten years. For example, Chen Shui-bian puts forward the one country on each side policy to attempt to alter status quo of cross-straight, while Ma Ying-jeou consider that based on 1992 consensus, mutual respect, maintaining the status quo and shelving disputes are the best choices for Taiwan to make a break through.. Since the government of the republic of China moved to Taiwan, Taiwan’s China policy has always used no as the core. Every leader has faced different cross-strait circumstance, which is not only from the changes of China, but also the whole world. The policy in Chiang Kai-shek’s administration was Han people and other races cannot live together. Chiang Ching-kuo used “the 3 'No's”-“no contact, no talk and no compromise”, which was changed to “no initiative, no concession and no avoidance” to response. As the respond to “Jiang’s eight points”, Lee Teng-hui’s “six points”, “special state-to-state relations” and “no haste, be patient” policy mean that Taiwan has actively made a framework to cross-strait relationship from passively respond. When Chen Shui-bian’s in office, he advanced “four ‘No’s and one without”, “new five‘No’” ，“Bold conversation”and “Open actively and efficiency managing” to stabilize U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relations and clean the air. However, owing to the diplomatic thrust and sedulously squeezing out of China，Chen Shui-bian accordingly addressed “one country on each side” and “four ‘No’s and one without” for strengthen Taiwan as an independent country, which made cross-strait relationship to hit bottom. Before Ma Ying-jeou began his term of office，he raised “five dos and don'ts” and keeping negotiating with Chinese communist party. When he’s in office, he put forward “no unification, no independence and no use of force” as the cardinal principle of cross-strait policy and regard self-recognizing one China respectively as the basis of cross-strait consultation. Ma Ying-jeou administration even emphasize “equality ,dignity and reciprocity” and “the urgent prior to the subordinary, the easy prior to the difficult, and economy prior to politics” to deepen consultation system. After two times of party rotations, the leaders of Taiwan who are based on the core philosophy of party the belonged to, their administration would adjust China policy by the influence of Chinese leader. For the China policy of Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou，the shift of principles and the adjustment of economic exchanges are so different and still similar, which is how to adjust China policy to maintain the peace with Chinese communist party and make own country benefit the most.

When Mao Zedong shouted loudly, “The central people’s government of the People's Republic of China is established today” at the Tiananmen tower on October 1 of 1949, that very moment not only symbolized the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party as the victor in the Chinese civil war, but also signaled the beginning of the geographical and political separation across the Strait. “The Republic of China” and “the People’s Republic of China” have taken their respective controls across the Taiwan Strait for more than 60 years and the cross-strait relations experienced “military standoff and hostile confrontation.” When Taiwan lifted the ban on visiting relatives in Mainland China in the 1980s, the stance of “mutual confrontation and zero contact” was transformed into the phase of “open and exchange; cold government and enthusiastic citizens” with military conflicts largely reduced. However, the two consecutive Taiwanese presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian proposed the highly contentious “special state-to-state relationship” and “one country on each side” respectively. This led to the complete lack of trust from both sides and the People’s Republic of China unilaterally shutting down the official communication channel. When Ma Ying-jeou took the presidency in 2008, the governments of both sides began to resume their roles as promoters of the normalization of the cross-strait relations under the principle of the “1992 Consensus.” Nevertheless, the “two political entities” have been established for more than 60 years which have developed their own politics, economics and cultures.Although the current cross-strait relations are having great future prospect, they are only limited to “economic” exchanges. The “political” aspect is still confined to the “One China” and “Taiwan independence” policies firmly held by the governments across the strait. In addition, the potential “party alteration” in Taiwan every four years creates more uncertainty to the cross-strait stability. Although the cross-strait relations have witnessed a U-turn, the subjective and objective factors surrounding the person in power inevitably affect the cross-strait relations. Taiwan witnessed its first party alteration in 2000 when the KMT ended its rule for more than 50 years. Chen Shui-bian’s successful bid to the presidency was then confronted with issues such as how to break the cross-strait deadlock and the direction of Taiwan’s economic development in view of China’s emerging economic power. As a result, it is worth examining in details how the China policy was formulated and the effects thereof under Chen Shui-bian’s government amid pressures from both the United States and China internationally and the resistance from the opposition party domestically. Finally, the research conclusion is drawn from the evaluation on how the Democratic Progress Party responses to China as China constantly pushes on the economic front without sacrificing Taiwan’s sovereignty at the Post- Chen Shui-bian era as the summary of this thesis.

In the spring of 1949, the United States was encountered with the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist government in the Civil War and pondered how to keep the Chinese communists away from taking over Taiwan. Due to the disparity between the strength and global obligations, the United States government decided to provide Taiwan with political and economic assistances. However, the controversy over the strategic value of Taiwan remained heated in the U.S. government until the outbreak of the War in Korea. The thesis applies Graham Allison’s three models, namely, rational actor model (RAM), Organizational behavior model (OBM), and Governmental politics model (GPM), to explore the decision-making process of reappraising U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan. Three hypotheses are derived from the theoretical discussion. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the U.S. decision-making process of reappraising the nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan from January 21, 1949, when Dean Acheson assumed the post as Secretary of State, to June 24, 1950, when the Korean War broke out. From the perspective of RAM, the U.S. government favored the wedge strategy to contain the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding any move enraging the Chinese communists. As a result, the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan was adopted until the outbreak of the Korean War. From the perspective of OBM, the State Department was in favor of the wedge strategy and dominated the decision-making process. Accordingly, the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan was adhered regardless of constant challenges from within and outside the State Department, such as the China bloc, the Defense Department and the State Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. From the perspective of GPM, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, was firmly convinced the value and likelihood of the wedge strategy. And, most importantly, he maintained close relations with President Harry S. Truman. Consequently, he dominated the decision-making process and defeated all challenges of the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan, particularly from Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, and Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Judging from the aforementioned analysis, the main theme of the thesis is that the United Stated decided to adhere to the nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan until the Korean War broke our because the strategic value of Taiwan was not as important as that of the wedge strategy on Communist China. The successful testing of the three hypotheses proves that Allison’s three models can be applicable in the case study of this thesis.

During the period of 1948 to 1949, the ruling Nationalist government and Chinese Communists turned China into another battlefield by fighting to win the civil war. The Truman administration played a critical role during the civil war, due to U.S. continuous support for the Nationalists since World War II (WWII). However, as the Nationalists suffered from series of defeat that led to the Chinese Communists victory of the civil war in 1949, the U.S. began to shift its assistance towards the Nationalists that left great impact on Truman administration’s decision towards China aid policy and its relationship with the Nationalist government. The thesis uses the decision-making theory of Graham Allison to analyze the main factors that caused the Truman administration to consider further assistance towards the Nationalist. By implementing the three main models of the theory: Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model and the Governmental Politics Model, the thesis is based on this structure to discuss influential factors of 1948 China Aid Act and 1949 China White Paper and to explore the conflict and leading figures within the decision-making process. The aim of this thesis is to evaluate whether the U.S. decision will continue to support the defeated Nationalist government or began to withdraw its assistance for the Nationalists, due to U.S. interests concern. This decision undoubtedly arouse many debates within the White House, Congress, State Department, and the Nationalist government that finally led to the final release of the disputed China White Paper in 1949. At this point, the U.S. not only presented an adjustment and redefinition of aid to China but also indicated changes for its support to the Nationalist as well as the overall U.S policy in East Asia. The use of the decision- making theory also seek to prove the theme of the thesis which is Truman administration decision to shift its China aid policy by gradually disengaging from, instead of fully involving in China, as to lessen support for the Nationalist government during the period from 1948 to 1949.

摘 要 任何近現代重大思想及意識型態間的衝突，都傾向以武裝暴力模式做一總解決。對這些武裝暴力衝突如內戰、國際戰爭若有不正確的歷史解釋，相對就會讓之後的政治層面的解釋基礎不穩。國共在台海兩岸的對峙，對近代中國歷史走向有重大影響，但對這些戰事的純軍事部份，尚未有充分而深入的研析，從而也很難得到完善的歷史解釋。 本文研究目的在補充國共雙方在台海熱戰中歷史解釋的空隙，故而筆者首先擬就古寧頭戰役作一分析。因為古寧頭戰後，國共隔台海分治的情況逐漸成形，冄若古寧頭戰役若國軍戰敗，金門落入中共之手，將大幅壓縮國軍防衛台灣本島之戰略戰術空間，台灣能否屹立不搖至今不無疑問，以中華民國角度來說，對此一戰役當應深入分析。 國軍來台後重整，是日後國軍能有實力防衛台灣的重要因素之一，其中美國對國軍的援助及國軍自身的改革，皆需有一以軍事史角度為觀察重點的研究，故以第二章述明。 國軍與共軍在浙東島嶼的對抗，從韓戰前至韓戰後長達數年，雖最後國軍仍舊全面由浙東島嶼撤退，但是，國軍在浙東島嶼的防衛，是為第一次台海危機，為金門、馬祖閩東諸島的防衛，爭取約四年的時間增強軍力，不能以一時一地之得失而抹殺不談，是以第三章分析解釋其事。 第二次台海危機，因共黨自諱其敗文飾其戰略戰術之失，各方學者專家多為其言論所惑，對這次台海危機歷史解釋，常以中共解釋為準，其接近史實真相之解釋為何，當以第四章詳解。 國軍撤退來台，蔣中正總統無時無刻皆以反攻大陸為念，此一反攻大陸之史實解釋，為多方學者專家嚴評甚或嘰嘲。然而，根基於軍事史之實情如何，尚需深入研究方可定論。待反攻大陸之國光計畫中止，國共雙方在台海之熱戰，亦就此大概終止，故而筆者以第五章專研之，亦做為本文之結尾。

Four months after the Korean War broke out, the United States found itself fighting the Chinese Communists. The ensuing U.N. debacle caught Washington off guard. As then Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented, Peking's advance into North Korea ”was the greatest disaster which occurred to the Truman administration.” (1) The military confrontation between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), many agreed, consolidated anti-Communist ideology, militarized and globalized U.S. foreign policy, and prevented rapprochement of the two countries for two decades. Searching for causes of the fiasco, President Truman and his key advisers lay most of the blame on the miscalculation, ambition, and insubordination of U.N. Commander General Douglas MacArthur. The general (and his subordinates as well as supporters), on the other hand, argued that Washington politicians confused military with political objectives, thereby depriving his command of victory. (2) Recent scholars, transcending the ”Truman-MacArthur controversy” interpretation, largely agree that the differences between the theater commander and his Washington superiors were not so great. Instead of being pivotal on ”marching to the Yalu” and bringing about Peking's intervention, these scholars argue, MacArthur merely strengthened the preexisting inclinations of the administration. (3) Searching for reasons for the U.S.-PRC confrontation, they criticize the administration as a whole for being too cold war oriented and too arrogant in dealing with Peking. The latter's repeated warnings that it would intervene if U.S./U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel were ignored. The last opportunity to settle the conflict early, that is during the period the Chinese Communists broke off contact after the success of their initial attack, was lost. British scholars in particular stress London's efforts to bring about a diplomatic settlement, only to find Washington aloof to the idea of negotiation with the Communists. Instead, the U.S. elected to isolate and to coerce Peking into submission. Economic sanctions, the U.N. aggressor resolution, and sporadic threats of military retaliation, these historians maintain, all demonstrate irreversible U.S. hostility toward Communist China. (4) Studies, on the Communist side of the story also reach a consensus that Peking's decision to intervene was dictated by Washington's hostile actions rather than careful strategic design. (5) But was the U.S. so arrogant and reckless that it totally ignored Peking's warnings of intervention? Did it adopt an adamantly hostile attitude toward the PRC after the latter's entry into the Korean conflict? Was the idea of negotiation with the Communists absolutely unacceptable to the policymakers? How close were they toward recommending an expansion of the conflict into China? In order to modify and/or supplement existing answers to the above questions, this paper intends to analyze the deliberations of Washington planners on how to handle Peking's intervention throughout the acute stage of the Korean crisis. It will focus on their concepts regarding negotiation and political settlement, their thoughts on military retaliation and economic sanctions, as well as other forms of ”punishment” against the ”aggressor.” In the end, it will delineate the problems in the policymaking process which made U.S.-PRC military confrontation inevitable.

Like Regime, Like Newspaper: Comparative Analysis on Newspaper Industries across Taiwan Strait (1949-1958) Abstract Ever since 1949, across Taiwan strait, the Republic of China on Taiwan ruled by Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang, KMT) and the People’s Republic of China on Chinese Mainland ruled by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were antagonist to each other for a long time. Far-reaching changes were mandated both in Taiwan and Mainland China by the two regimes while communications between people on both sides of Taiwan strait were banned, and later vanished. Thus, to all professions across Taiwan strait, two groups of numerous experiments were performed at the same time. The experiences and consequences of these experiments influenced the working conditions, lives and cultures on both territories and evidenced distinction between the two national systems. As the most important media at the time, newspaper industry was highly regarded by both KMT and CCP. Although in the beginning of the political separation, newspaper industries across Taiwan strait were quite similar, the many newspaper policies raised by the two governments molded different environments for the industry. Experiments of newspaper industry under different regimes were taken place from then on. Within ten years, the newspaper industries evolved seperately across the strait, and around 1958, divergent newspaper systems appeared. Newspaper industry in Mainland China became a typical example of the industry under totalitarian regime, while newspaper industry in Taiwan showed itself a model of the industry under authoritarian regime. Base on the above historical background, what was the mechanism that caused and shaped different newspaper industries across Taiwan strait? How did newspaper industry respond to totalitarian or authoritarian ruling? What factors that differentiated authoritarianism from totalitarianism can be reached through the examples in newspaper industry? These questions reckon the necessity of comparative study on the same industry in two isolated and widely different regions during the same time period. This dissertation tries to be contributive to the answers. Newspaper industry is considered and studied here with its entire functionality. Not only are news reporting, editing and editorial writing examined, but newspaper’s producing, sales and management are also studied. Comparative historical analysis is applied as the main methodology with the assistance of knowledges from journalism, political science, sociology, business administration and accounting. Acknowledging newapapers as the “tongue and throat to the party” and tool for propaganda, CCP spared no effort to control newspaper industry. However, it’s means and artifices were nimble and flexible. From 1949, CCP elaborated a government-owned hierarchy newspaper system. Party leaders directed newspapers owned and operated by central to local governments, while tolerated temporary existence of some privately-owned newspapers. Following the establishment of the regime, CCP seized newspaper industry’s resources such as manpower, materials, financial supply, news announcing, circulation channels and market throughout Mainland China. The number of remaining privately-owned newspapers and circulation and advertising agent houses declined sharply and eventually died out in a few years. When CCP had monopolized the newspaper industry, consequently, it had monopolized the social capitals contained in the industry. Newspapers in the totalitarian country became part of the regime itself. On the other side of the strait, the retreating and exhausted KMT faced difficulties inside and outside Taiwan. For surviving, the adoption of a two-handed policy, with both suppressions and compromises was inevitable, which made the ROC of Taiwan an authoritarian country. Government’s publication moratorium and journalistic taboos set walls around newspaper industry, but also kept potential competitors away. Among the coexisting, fixed-numbered newspapers, those owned by government or KMT were in leading positions in 1949. However, due to the realism of authoritarianism, some “reservations,” such as social and crime news, popular supply and circulation markets, and advertisements had been made by the government for other newspapers to maneuver their future with free competition in these areas. Privately-owned newspapers utilized the opportunities created by these “reservations” to compete capitalistically. In ten years, resources contained in Taiwanese societies were gradually excavated and transferred to privately-owned newspapers when social capitals were being accumulated by them; meanwhile government- and KMT-owned newspapers began to ebb. Preparation for privately-owned newspapers to meet the further economic development and foundation for them to exceed government- and KMT-owned newspapers were established in this period of time. Ten years were short in history, yet long enough to create two completely different newspaper industries in two areas that were politically separated and isolated to each other. It was the decade right after the split in 1949 that the two regimes across Taiwan strait, CCP’s totalitarian and KMT’s authoritarian, formed newspaper industries based on each one’s political ideology. So ten years are long enough to have a specific newspaper industry appear under a regime’s specific ruling. Sensitive to its environment as any other news media is, newspaper industry is a product of the regime that brings about the media industry’s environment. Like regime, like newspaper.

This dissertation examines the motivations, logic, and functions of media control in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Rather than telling the history of media control in modern China, or giving a comprehensive account of the techniques employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to control the media, it investigates the origins of the CCP’s theoretical approach to the media, as well as the consequences of the resulting concepts for practical media work in the PRC. The first half of the thesis tracks the genesis of the Party’s media concept and reconstructs the conditions that contributed to its rise in the first half of the twentieth century; the chapters in the latter half follow this concept in its implementation through a number of case studies from the early 1950s through the late 1990s. Since the day of its founding, the CCP has placed great emphasis on questions of media and propaganda; after 1949 the party-state has claimed full control of the Chinese print, broadcast, and electronic media. Asking for the reasons behind this claim, I argue that it must be traced back to the Party’s desire to bring about the transformation of human consciousness and to create an environment conducive to this process, a utopian project informed as much by the Leninist version of Marxism as by Neo-Confucian ideas of education and state-society relations prevalent in the late imperial era. This project and its underlying fundamental assumptions have survived – in greatly transmuted form – to the present day and continue to inform the strict control of the Chinese media, even when such controls clash with other political and socio-economic interests of the Party-state. I propose to take the media as a variable to measure changes in the CCP’s approach to governance. The Party’s handling of the media serves as a mirror of state-society relations; consequently, the investigation into the media provides us with information on the CCP’s conceptions of governance under changing circumstances. I argue that over the past twenty years, the CCP has successfully altered and reinterpreted its vision of the state and its position therein; it has adopted a more flexible set of methods to achieve its fundamental political objectives. At the same time, however, the ultimate goals of the Party – originally formulated in Yan’an – have changed remarkably little.

This article explores why the People's Republic of China employed a surprisingly soft and lenient policy toward Japan in the 1950s despite their historical and political animosities. Relying on a relatively new concept in the study of international relations, I argue that China's conciliatory policy toward Japan represented a wedge strategy that was designed to detach Japan from the United States and weaken the US-Japan alliance. The logic of the theory also reveals that China's policy was in line with its against the United States during the Cold War. KEYWORDS: China-Japan relations, China's foreign policy in the 1950s, Cold War history, wedge strategy, US-Japan alliance.THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) EMPLOYED A SURPRISINGLY soft and lenient policy toward Japan in the 1950s despite the two countries' historical and political animosities. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Chinese people suffered Japan's military aggression in Manchuria, viewing Japan as China's main enemy. After the PRC was established in 1949, Japan continued to be in the enemy camp as the Cold War structure placed the two Asian states on opposing ideological sides. Japan signed a peace treaty with Taiwan, acknowledging the victory of the Republic of China in the Sino-Japanese war, and recognized the government of Taipei rather than the PRC. Nevertheless, China emphasized cultural links and sought to expand economic relations and political contacts with Japan. What explains China's approach toward Japan in the 1950s?Relying on a relatively new concept of wedge strategies developed by Timothy Crawford and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, I argue that China's overture toward Japan used those strategies to detach Japan from the United States and weaken the US-Japan alliance. The logic of wedge theory reveals that this policy was in line with China's strategy to deal with the United States during the Cold War.This article is organized as follows. First, I discuss how major schools of thought in international relations predict China's behavior and why their explanations are deficient. Next, I delve into key theoretical arguments about wedge strategies and explain why China is a significant case study. Then, I explain why China's policy toward Japan in the 1950s should be regarded as a wedge strategy by looking at the intent and origin of China's united front strategy. I explore the range of China's wedge strategies toward Japan and evaluate their effectiveness by looking at the US reaction. Finally, I examine some implications that the China case study can offer for the theory of wedge strategies.Major Schools of Thought and China's Friendly Approach Toward JapanChina's conciliatory policy toward Japan in the 1950s differs from what the major international relations theories might have predicted. Balance-of-power theory has difficulty in explaining why China tried to improve bilateral relations with Japan at that time. The theory assumes that states seek internal military mobilization or external alliance partners to confront others with considerable economic and military strength. China's foreign policy in the 1950s was clearly designed with the preponderant US military capability and the US alliance system in East Asia in mind. It is not surprising that the PRC, with dire economic conditions and a poorly equipped military force, chose to lean to one side, allying with the Soviet Union against the United States rather than opting for neutrality (Zagoria 1962; Gittings 1972; Yahuda 1978; Shen and Li 2011 ).1 The balance-of-power argument would predict that China would also confront Japan, given that Tokyo was a significant alliance partner for Washington. Instead, China sought to restore bilateral relations with Japan as early as 1952 when the Korean War was going on and US bases in Japan were crucial to the US war effort (Barnett 1977).The balance-of-threat theory has similar problems in offering explanations (Walt 1990). …

On November 26, 1945, the Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, announced his resignation to the American press. In doing so, he leveled charges against the State Department and a number of its Foreign Service officers—charges which questioned the integrity of many, in their relation with what Hurley termed the “Imperialist” and communist nations in China. Those charges were the beginning of two and one-half decades of ideological crusading in America by many who developed the theory that those men charged by Hurley had been responsible for America’s “loss of China” Hurley was sent to China in 1944 as President Roosevelt’s personal representatives to Chiang Kai-shek. His directive was to promote efficient and harmonious relations between Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell, Commander of American Forces, China Theatre. Hurley was, further, to facilitate Stilwell’s exercise of command over the Chinese armies, which, it was hoped, would soon be placed under him. Failing in this mission, Hurley was ultimately appointed to the rank of Ambassador after the resignation of Clarence T. Gauss. Hurley had by this time, taken on the responsibility of promoting negotiations between the Kuomintang Government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party, headquartered in Yenan. Rather than simply offering his “good offices” in the negotiations, Hurley became personally involved, interjecting his personal, ideological beliefs into the proposals of each side. Through his involvement, Hurley became personally committed to unification on his terms and eventually gave the Kuomintang Party and Chiang Kai-shek the impression that the United States was permanently committed to support of the Central Government. Hurley soon came into conflict with a number of Foreign Service officers and the Department of State, below the level of the Secretary of State, over opposing interpretations of American policy in China. Hurley became intransigent in his overwhelming support of the National Government, while members of the State department believed that the United States should remain flexible in its approach to the problems in China to avoid supporting the losing side in what was seen as an inevitable civil war. Hurley came to see criticism of Chiang Kai-shek’s government and suggestions for alterations in policy, as personal criticism directed to him. In the face of this perceived threat to himself, he had a number of Foreign Service officers re-called or transferred, only to discover that they had been reassigned to positions which he thought were superior to his. In the face

The Japan-Taiwan Relationship:An Unstable Stability June Teufel Dreyer (bio) Japan's relations with Taiwan (Republic of China, or ROC) have been shaped by both countries' relationships with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. Despite President Chiang Kai-shek's adversarial relationship with Japan during World War II, relations between Japan and his ROC (first on the mainland and then on the island of Taiwan) were cordial during the postwar period. Shared opposition to Communism provided a common bond. An estimated twenty thousand Japanese troops under Japanese command wore Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) uniforms and fought against the Chinese Communist troops until 1948.1 Strategic reasons also reinforced ties: the city of Hualien on Taiwan is but 69 miles from Japan's Yonaguni Island. Were Taiwan to be absorbed into the PRC, the territorial waters of Japan and China would be uncomfortably close. This essay argues that strategic calculations, shared democratic values, and generally pleasant memories of colonial history will foster the continued development of Taiwan-Japan relations, although these will remain constrained by each side's fear of unduly angering China. The first section situates the relationship in a historical context, while the second section examines the development of relations under Shinzo Abe and Tsai Ing-wen. The essay concludes by considering the outlook for the Taiwan-Japan relationship. The Past Is Prologue As the PRC began its ambitious industrialization program, Japanese businesses saw lucrative opportunities and pressed for the normalization of diplomatic relations that would facilitate these. Tokyo's 1972 derecognition of the ROC in favor of the PRC dealt a sharp blow to the Taipei government, but economic and other ties continued informally. When Chiang Kai-shek's son and heir Chiang Ching-kuo died in office in 1988, he was succeeded [End Page 161] by his Taiwanese vice president. Born in Taiwan when the island was a Japanese colony, Lee Teng-hui infuriated Beijing by saying, correctly, that he had been a Japanese citizen for most of his life. In deference to Japan's acceptance of Beijing's one-China policy, Lee agreed not to visit Japan officially so long as he was in office, though he was able to use his language fluency to arrange informal meetings with Japanese officials. Under his administration, the ban on Japanese-language media programming was lifted, with the Taiwanese quickly becoming enthusiastic consumers of the latest Japanese television programs as well as Japanese fads and fashions. A new Taiwanese word, harizu (Japan mania), came into being. After a Chinese show of force in the Taiwan Strait ahead of Taiwan's 1996 election, Japanese officials, aware of the implications for their own security, committed to the United States to help defend the shuhen jitai (the waters around Japan), refusing Beijing's demand that Taiwan be explicitly excluded from the definition thereof. By 1999, retired members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces had become frequent visitors to Taiwan. As China became less Communist and more prosperous, formerly anti-PRC elements in Taiwan became attracted by the mainland's nationalistic message. Overwhelmingly composed of those who had come to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek and their descendants, this group tended to identify as Chinese and favored unification with China, albeit under a variety of improbable scenarios (such as the PRC accepting ROC rule or the complete democratization of the PRC). Native-born Taiwanese, by contrast, were more resistant to incorporation into a country they had never been part of. The former became known as the "blues" and the latter as the "greens," with Lee, the first popularly elected president, as the standard bearer of the greens. In 2000, the term-limited Lee was succeeded by another Taiwanese, Chen Shui-bian, who continued his de-Sinification policy and moved still closer to Japan. These developments not only angered China, which from time to time accused Japan of wanting to bring Taiwan back under its control, but also upset the George H.W. Bush administration, which feared that Chen might provoke a war that could involve the United States. Chen's successor, Ma Ying-jeou, born to a family from the mainland, reversed this process, declaring unification...

The records of the American-owned Shanghai Power Company (SPC) offer some significant insights into Sino-American relations during the critical period after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took control of China.1 The company’s correspondence tends to substantiate the position of those, such as John S. Service, who believed that the Chinese Communists desired American aid and cooperation.2 Shanghai Power’s experience under Communist rule for more than eighteen months from May 1949 to December 1950 indicate that the United States, not the CCP, was primarily responsible for closing the Open Door in China.3 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) not only appeared willing to tolerate American firms for the short term but sought to establish some type of relationship with the United States until as late as January or February 1950.4 The Truman administration, pursuing a policy of containment, refused to deal with the Chinese Communists, except on its own terms, and attempted to control trade with the PRC in order to force compliance with American demands.5 Shanghai Power opposed the administration’s policies toward the Chinese Communists. Its president, Paul S. Hokins, argued that the United States government should negotiate with the CCP and that trade should be maintained between the two countries, even if it had to be continued on Communist terms. Finally, the evidence indicates that economic factors such as potential profits and protection of capital ranked high in the company’s decisions, but its officers, particularly Hopkins, showed a genuine concern for the welfare of Shanghai and its inhabitants.

CONFRONTING THE REALITY OF CHINESE AND AMERICAN POWERThe events of 2001 provide the basis for a fascinating case study of the dynamics of contemporary Sino-American relations. On the one hand, deep conflicts of interest and domestic politics generated sharp conflict and pushed the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States apart. On the other hand, countervailing imperatives that required co-operation compelled leaders of both countries to keep conflict within manageable limits and sustain a co-operative relationship. During his presidential campaign, George W. Bush opposed Bill Clinton's concept of 'strategic partnership' with China, and he began his term as president of the United States with forceful rejections of that policy. His administration's actions on Taiwan and in other areas outraged Beijing. Meanwhile, in Beijing, the government laid out clear markers on Taiwan and threatened dire consequences if Washington did not satisfy Beijing on this core issue. Yet by the end of the year both sides were again speaking of a co-operative partnership.What unfolded in 2001 provides an example of the socialization of a new president to the imperatives of co-operation with China - as repugnant as that co-operation might be from the standpoint of American values. Bush was merely the most recent in a series of US presidents who took office pledging more forceful policies toward the PRC only to be reconciled eventually to the need for continued co-operation with China. Jimmy Carter in 1976, Ronald Reagan in 1980, and Bill Clinton in 1992 all acted in much the same fashion. This process of socialization of American presidents is largely a function, I will argue, of the reality of the PRC's great national capabilities and, consequently, of the very high costs the US risks if it fails to reach an accommodation with China.As for the Chinese, 2001 witnessed a successful exercise of 'unity through struggle' with the United States. Beijing forcefully rejected and 'struggled against' new US policies antithetical to Chinese policy interests and against the 'arrogance' that rendered Washington unwilling to treat China with due respect. Yet, in the end, the result and purpose of this 'struggle' was 'unity.' In spite of deeply repugnant and offensive US policies toward Taiwan and 'bullying' in various areas, Beijing ended 2001 in partnership with the most vigorous US-led global effort since the end of the cold war - the campaign against terrorism. Beijing was forced to confront the overwhelming economic and military capacity of its opponent. The imperatives of China's economic modernization, upon which the Chinese Community party (CCP) has pinned its survival, require co-operation with the United States. Yet China's domestic politics dictate that co-operation should not be at the expense of core Chinese interests. During the 1990s, anti-US nationalism was cultivated by the CCP regime as a legitimizing substitute for Marxism. The result was impressive, but, as a consequence, the regime was compelled to demonstrate its toughness when it dealt with the United States. Thus China must 'struggle' tenaciously with the US, compelling it to respect Chinese face and Chinese core interests, even though the objective is 'unity' with the United States. The central purpose of China's 'unity through struggle' diplomacy in 2001 was to demonstrate to Washington that it needed Chinese co-operation, but that co-operation would be forthcoming only if Washington met China's minimal requirements.There is in China great anger and frustration that throughout the 1990s the US sometimes seemed unwilling to co-operate with China and sometimes was willing to co-operate - but only on terms repugnant to China.(1) Time and again Beijing has felt compelled to 'struggle' against these 'arrogant,' 'hegemonist' trends - most prominently during the debate over most-favoured-nation (MFN) linkages in the early 1990s and over Taiwan in the mid-1990s. …

Translating the Socialist State:Cultural Exchange, National Identity, and the Socialist World in the Early PRC Nicolai Volland (bio) The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 marked not only the start of a profound transformation of the Chinese state institutions, the society, and the economy, but also the beginning of a monumental project to redefine the nature of the Chinese nation-state and its position in the world. The establishment of a new government was to give new meaning to the Chinese nation, in its own eyes, and in terms of its interaction with other nations. The politics of "leaning to one side (yi bian dao)," that had been agreed on in 1949,1 meant that the PRC was conceived as a state in the broader framework of the "socialist camp" from its very first hour.2 The integration of the PRC into an emerging socialist world that spanned half of the globe, from Berlin to Pyongyang, from Warsaw to Hanoi, and from Sofia to Novosibirsk—was a momentous event and gave legitimacy to the young regime that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was starting to build; it left an imprint on this regime for decades to come. On the topmost plane of politics, the PRC's entry into the socialist camp was translated into a series of bilateral treaties that the Chinese government signed with other socialist nations, and with the Soviet Union in particular. These processes have been relatively well-researched.3 However, the institutionalization of China's cooperation with the socialist nations of Eastern Europe and Asia could be but a first [End Page 51] step in the enormous project of redefining the Chinese nation-state. The next task for the CCP, arguably at least as important as winning diplomatic recognition from its new allies, was to reshape the nation's identity in the minds of its citizens. This new identity had to be both national and international; it was to define the nation-state and at the same time to transcend the national borders. To generate this kind of consciousness among the citizens of the nations in the socialist bloc was key to consolidating the new regimes—a task faced not only by the Chinese government, but by the other socialist nations as well. In this process, cultural factors played a key role, and a fundamental mechanism to create a feeling of cohesiveness and shared goals and values was the promotion of cultural exchanges.4 Soon after the founding of the PRC, the CCP thus began to set up a network of contacts and institutions entrusted with fostering exchanges in the cultural field designed to anchor the PRC firmly in the socialist camp. The government set out to build a cultural diplomacy that would assist and complement the PRC's efforts on the high-level diplomatic fronts and would penetrate deep into the populace to instill identity politics in the people's minds. In contrast to the formation of foreign policy in the early PRC, these efforts in cultural diplomacy have received surprisingly little scholarly attention.5 This article is an effort to explore some of the institutional dimensions and fields of activity of cultural exchange between the PRC and the [End Page 52] Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and to relate them to the complex patterns of identity politics in the early Cold War era.6 In the following pages, I will discuss several crucial avenues of cultural exchange that characterized the involvement of the PRC in the cultural diplomacy of the socialist camp. These include mutual visits of orchestras, writers, and drama troupes, the participation of Chinese delegations in international competitions and festivals, and the exchange of students in fields such as arts, drama, and music. Finally, an especially important field was the translation of literature across the socialist camp. In a coordinated effort, representative examples of the national literatures—in particular new works written in the socialist spirit—were translated simultaneously into multiple languages and circulated across the bloc. Readers in Poland thus read the same Russian novels at the same time as their peers in Romania, North Korea, and the PRC, and Chinese...