Abstract
The article analyzes the problems related to the philosophical analysis of epistemic duties – ranging from doubts about their existence as duties of a special kind to discussing the boundaries of such obligations and the limits of responsibility of the epistemic subject. Special attention is paid to the consideration of epistemic behavior that goes beyond the "call of duty”, supererogatory actions. The paper describes the main characteristics and examples of such behavior and makes a conclusion about the need to block or substantially clarify the imperatives of epistemic rationality, which require actions, although commendable from the point of view of standard epistemic normativity but lying beyond the scope of what is epistemically due.
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