중국의 핵전략 변화와 한국의 안보정책 방향

Since coming to power, North Korea's Kim Jong-un regime has been upgrading its nuclear forces through four nuclear weapons tests and hundreds of test launches of nuclear weapons delivery systems. The North Korean regime has pursued distinct actions to assert its status as a nuclear power following the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Notably, it first specified in the preamble to the amended Constitution in 2012 that it was a nuclear state, and then enacted the Nuclear Weapons States Act in 2013 to disclose its comprehensive nuclear strategy to the public. Afterwards, the regime declared the “completion of national nuclear forces” in 2017, and replaced the Nuclear Weapons States Act (2013) with the Nuclear Forces Policy Act in 2022. While the North Korean regime has been limited in its capacity to pursue nuclear retaliation against the United States, its redrafting of its nuclear legislation has signaled a fundamental change in its nuclear strategy as well as an active will to use nuclear weapons. The new enactment of the Nuclear Forces Policy Act (2022) presents a shift from a “no-first-use (NFU)” nuclear policy to a more aggressive stance that conditionally permits “first-use.” This change coincides with the recent focus of the Kim Jong-un regime on the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, it should be noted that the newly enacted Nuclear Forces Policy Act carries different implications from the traditional approaches of nuclear weapons states.

Introduction Jessica Keough (bio) Considerable uncertainty has surrounded the Trump administration's priorities in Asia. While U.S. cabinet officials have at times sought to reassure the region that the United States intends to preserve its commitment to the post–World War II international system, other comments and actions by the administration have indicated an inward turn that suggests less active U.S. engagement. These mixed signals have left regional allies, partners, and other states wondering what the future holds for their relationships with the United States. A roundtable discussion in the January 2017 issue of Asia Policy, "Assessing U.S.-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition," presented mainly American perspectives on the major issues facing the United States in its bilateral relations with leading powers in the Asia-Pacific at the outset of the Trump administration. This Asia Policy roundtable offers perspectives on U.S.-Asia relations from leading scholars and policy practitioners in select Asia-Pacific states. In their essays, these experts identify the most salient current and over-the-horizon issues in their countries' evolving relationships with the United States and evaluate how bilateral relations have progressed so far under the Trump administration. For China, Xie Tao examines four major issues confronting the U.S.-China relationship that both raise the possibility of conflict and offer prospects for cooperation: North Korea, the South China Sea, democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the sharing of global major-power responsibilities. The United States and China will likely find themselves working with each other in these areas, whether they want to or not, and will need to treat each other respectfully to avoid escalating risks. In Japan and South Korea, the U.S. alliance continues to form the bedrock of bilateral relations. Noboru Yamaguchi finds that, to Japan's relief, the U.S. commitment to the alliance and to Northeast Asian security seems unchanged, despite indications during Trump's presidential campaign that he might shift the burden for Northeast Asia's defense to the region. Kang Choi also addresses the importance of the United States' role as Northeast Asia's security guarantor in his essay on South Korea. Although Japan and [End Page 2] South Korea are concerned about China's rise and regional dominance, both identify North Korea as their most urgent security threat. According to Choi, the new administrations in Washington and Seoul will need to closely coordinate their policies toward the North and establish trust in each other. In light of North Korea's alarming acceleration of its nuclear weapons and missile programs, the allies face critical challenges ahead. While U.S. allies in Northeast Asia worry about abandonment, similar fears are very high in Taiwan. Ming Lee argues that, given its unofficial relations with most countries (including the United States) but also its unique security commitments from Washington, Taiwan struggles to make its voice heard internationally and fears becoming a bargaining chip in U.S. relations with China. The Kremlin is watching with interest the domestic upheaval in U.S. politics over allegations about the Trump campaign's possible links to Russia. Dmitri Trenin characterizes Russia's relationship with the United States under Trump as "confrontational with islands of cooperation." Issues such as NATO, European security, Afghanistan, and sanctions over Ukraine continue to generate friction, while reaching an agreement on sensitive issues such as Syria and the renegotiation of strategic arms control treaties will require a cautious, patient approach to overcome obstacles along the path of cooperation. China's rise is the defining structural characteristic shaping U.S.-India relations. Balancing China will likely bring Washington and New Delhi closer together over the long term, Rajesh Rajagopalan argues, however, that a number of roadblocks—the Trump administration's transactional approach to bilateral relationships, U.S. relations with Pakistan, economic nationalism, and domestic chaos in U.S. politics—could hinder this progress in the short term. Pakistan and the United States, by contrast, remain bound together over Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, but the long-term prospects for this strained relationship are uncertain. Moeed Yusuf details how Islamabad's and Washington's views of each other and their strategic priorities in South Asia increasingly...

China's status-quo-oriented post-Cold-War grand strategy of promoting cooperative security and multipolarity on the basis of the UN system is not applied in Northeast Asia. China's definition of its interests in Northeast Asia runs up against those promoted by the US alliance system, and no common political framework exists to encourage Beijing and Washington to adopt definitions that correspond to global rules of proper state conduct. Scholars and policymakers often base their analyses of Northeast Asian strategic uncertainty on the assumption that China applies its grand strategy in Northeast Asia as elsewhere, but that the regional context makes successful implementation difficult. This article instead argues that China has persuaded the international community that Northeast Asia is a region where special rules apply, justifying that Chinese policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula are exempt from the principles of state conduct underpinning China's global grand strategy.

Is Northeast Asia primed for peace or ripe for great-power rivalry? In this turbulent region, all the world-order challenges of arms control and disarmament, global North-South tensions, human rights and humanitarian intervention, environmental protection and eco-development, and democratization and humane governance are concentrated. More than any other part of the world, the divided Korean peninsula is the strategic crossroad where the four major regional/global powers–the United States, Russia, China, and Japan–uneasily interact. This authoritative work explores the complex and evolving interplay of national, regional, and global forces influencing Northeast Asia's security, economy, and identity. Written by a team of leading scholars, the book presents a variety of theoretical perspectives and case studies to offer a comprehensive analysis of the pressures that shape the policy choices of China, Russia, Japan, the United States, North and South Korea, and Taiwan. The authors' historically and culturally informed narratives help track and explain the changes and continuities of relationships within the region and with the United States and Russia. Concise and current, this book will be essential reading for all those concerned with the role of a changing Northeast Asia in world politics.

Drifting towards collaborative innovation: Patent collaboration network of China’s nuclear power industry from multidimensional proximity perspective

A new wave of interest in the complete elimination of nuclear-weapons is washing over international security institutions. Although the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is as old as the nuclear...

The 25 years since the end of the Cold War have seen several notable shifts in the global distribution of nuclear capabilities:* The Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States have slashed their arsenals by roughly 75% from 20,000-30,000 warheads to 7,000-8,000.1* France and Britain have also made substantial cuts, reducing their nuclear forces from 500 weapons at their peak to roughly 300 and 200, respectively.* Of the Cold War big five (the United States, Britain, France, Soviet Union, and China), only China has not reduced its stockpile, which is estimated at 250 warheads. Beijing has also made significant investments in modernizing its forces, developing new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles.* Three new countries (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have joined the list of acknowledged nuclear weapons states, and one (South Africa) has been removed.* Finally, in recent years a series of aspirants (Iraq, Libya, and Syria) have seen their nuclear ambitions foiled, while one (Iran) continues to press on toward the finish line.What are the implications of these developments for the conduct of international relations, and, in particular, how are they likely to shape events in eastern Eurasia, a zone of strategic interaction that extends from the Korean Peninsula, down through the South Asian subcontinent, and into the Persian Gulf region? The essays in this roundtable have helped shed light on three aspects of this question: proliferation, arms racing, and stability.ProliferationRegarding the further spread of nuclear weapons, the next chapters of the story in the broader Middle East will depend a great deal on what happens in Iran. If Tehran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, other states may feel compelled to follow suit, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. If it does not, Israel may remain the region's only nuclear weapons state.In East Asia, those states most likely to contemplate pursuing nuclear status are also anxious friends and allies of the United States. Japan, South Korea, and (albeit implicitly) Taiwan have until now been content to take shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But they could come to doubt the reliability of U.S. guarantees in the face of North Korea's new capabilities, China's nuclear modernization programs, or, especially in the case of Japan, both developments taken together.While this once-taboo topic has been discussed more openly in both Japan and South Korea in recent years, neither country shows any overt signs of moving to acquire its own nuclear forces. Still, as Noboru Yamaguchi explains in his essay, there is nothing in Japan's peace constitution that absolutely precludes the possibility, should the nation's leaders deem it necessary for self-defense. Like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has shown an interest in acquiring rocket and cruise missile technology that could someday serve as the basis for an independent deterrent force. For the moment, however, the potential for further proliferation in East Asia remains latent.Arms RacingOne of the main features of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was the interaction between their respective armaments efforts, including their offensive and defensive nuclear weapons programs. Although there are a number of competitive dyads emerging in Asia, and while the possibility exists for even more complex arrangements, the degree of interaction among the actors to date remains limited. As Benjamin Schreer describes, China's modernization of its long-range nuclear forces appears to be motivated in large part by a desire to reduce its vulnerability to a possible U.S. conventional precision strike. An increase in the number of weapons deployed, perhaps on multiple warhead delivery systems, could also reflect concern over the possible thickening of the U.S. national missile defenses. …

This study aims to examine the development status and technical characteristics of low-yield nuclear weapons initiated by the Trump administration, predict the development trend in the Biden administration, analyze strategic implications that have affected the R.O.K.-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy, and seek future countermeasures. Regarding deterrence theory, low-power nuclear weapons are evaluated as a means of simultaneously expanding deterrence by denial and by retaliation. Additionally, low-yield nuclear weapons can be evaluated as having the capability, communication of nuclear retaliation wills and possibilities, and credibility for these wills and capabilities, which are 3C elements of deterrence in that they are “possible-use nuclear weapons.” Hence, they can be evaluated as highly-applicable deterrence means. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and the U.S. is developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons, this article intends to make several suggestions regarding deterrence and response. First, because North Korea's policy to strengthen its tactical nuclear capabilities in 2021 is inevitably closely related to the technical characteristics of the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, it should be evaluated and prepared in connection with this. Second, it is necessary to understand the Biden administration's nuclear strategy regarding the extended deterrence strategy of the U.S. and discuss it closely based on the 5th NPR unveiled in early 2022. Third, to ensure the credibility of the R.O.K.-U.S. tailored deterrence strategy, “multilateral deterrence measures” must be considered at the regional level, including low-yield nuclear weapons.

This article is devoted to the analysis of interaction of the nuclear policy of Russia and the United States in the context of a crisis in bilateral relations, the collapse of the arms control system and the undermining of global strategic stability. First, the authors examine the current state of US-Russian relations in the sphere of arms control. As a result of the US withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the dim prospects of extending the New START, the authors conclude that the arms control and strategic stability system that was being put together over the course of four decades is in a deep crisis. Second, the authors examine the U.S. nuclear policy and Washington’s efforts to build up and modernize its nuclear capabilities. The 2018 Nuclear Policy Review points to the United States moving away from the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use and the desire to maintain options to end conflicts at any stage on terms favorable to the U.S. without a significant risk of starting a general nuclear war. In addition, the authors describe plans of the U.S. military to modernize the nuclear triad. When analyzing the 2019 Missile Defense Review, it is noted that the U.S. desire to ensure its absolute invulnerability to any missile threats, “left of launch” measures to provide missile defense before missile are launched by the enemy, and the integration of defensive and offensive capabilities of missile defense systems confirm the fears of Russia and other countries regarding maintaining their capabilities to conduct a nuclear retaliatory strike. Then the Russian nuclear doctrine is analyzed. The authors reject Western accusations that Russia has the concept of “escalate to de-escalate”, describe the conditions for Russia’s first nuclear use and the specifics of the “retaliatory counterstrike” concept, and also cite Russia's main concerns regarding threats from the US nuclear doctrine and nuclear modernization. We are also talking about the development of new nuclear weapons systems, such as hypersonic weapons, unmanned vehicles and cruise missiles. In conclusion, it is said that the U.S. doesn’t intend to try to maintain strategic stability any longer, Washington’s nuclear strategy has features that are dangerous to international security, which he blames Russia and that Russian fears regarding US nuclear policy are all but legitimate.

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. By Vipin Narang. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. 341 pp., $29.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-691-15983-6). Vipin Narang's Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era is the best political science book published on nuclear strategy in more than two decades. This is mostly because it is an excellent book and partly because nuclear strategy has not received the attention it deserves in recent years. During the Cold War, International Relations (IR) scholars flocked to questions of nuclear deterrence, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, classic works on the subject were published by leading lights, such as Richard Betts (⇓), Charles Glaser (⇓), Robert Jervis (⇓), Robert Powell (⇓), and others. For better or worse, however, the scholarly study of IR tends to follow real-world events, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War scholarship on nuclear deterrence slowed to a trickle. The United States principal foes, such as Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Libya, did not possess nuclear weapons, and The United States nuclear forces were of little utility against the unconventional challenges these adversaries posed. Policymakers certainly worried about nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist networks, and scholars continued to design rigorous research to analyze these questions, but traditional questions of nuclear deterrence and strategy remained overlooked. In the real world, however, the specter of nuclear confrontation is reemerging. The United States adversaries, including North Korea and Russia, have moved nuclear weapons to the center of their national security strategies, in part as an effort to offset The United States conventional military dominance. India and Pakistan are engaging in the most intense arms race the world has seen since the end of the Cold War, and Iran appears determined to earn admission into the club of nuclear …

With the rapid advancement of technology, the demand for energy is ever-growing. In response To meet the growing need, nuclear power has emerged as a viable solution. At the same time, states tend to strategically rely on this as a policy of deterrence, mainly through the development of nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been constantly advocating for the peaceful use of nuclear technology; however, there is rapid growth of these nuclear arsenals and, subsequently, an arms race. Enacting a robust legal framework is crucial to revitalize the core objective and prevent potential deviation. An extensive analysis of existing legal frameworks regulating nuclear energy and weapons are required, notably the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which is not prevalent in the existing scholarship. In In this milieu, the paper aims to examine various national/international laws governing nuclear weapons and provide a holistic understanding of the legality surrounding the same. This paper explores how the International Law Framework regulates nuclear weapons and their prohibition and how it sets standards, paving the pathway for their peaceful uses. In the national context, the paper analyses Nepal's laws and policies relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its subsequent technologies. However, this paper does not attempt to provide a blueprint for implementing nuclear policy in Nepal; rather, it highlights the need to collaborate with IAEA and nuclear-advanced countries, the opportunities brought, and the inherent challenges associated with it. Methodologically, the research involves reviewing secondary data, focusing on laws/regulations concerning nuclear weapons and their ethical considerations. This doctrinal study involves comprehensive reviews of various legal frameworks, case narrative studies, and content analysis. The aim is to explore the existing legal regime governing nuclear weapons and its relation to atomic/nuclear diplomacy.

Part 1: The Northeast Asian Security Complex 1. The Northeast Asian Security Complex: History, Power, and Strategic Choices Chung Min Lee and T.J. Pempel 2. The Requirements for Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Theory and Reality Ajin Choi Part 2: Security Challenges, Drivers, and Issues 3. Nuclear Weapons, State Bellicosity, and Prospects for an East Asian Security Architecture Joseph M. Grieco 4. Between Multilateralism and Bilateralism Geunwook Lee Part 3: State Interests and Strategies 5. European Experience and Lessons Hae-Won Jun 6. China's Strategic Option: Multilateralism and the Pursuit of Influence Sukhee Han and Luo Jianbo 7. What is a `Liberal' East Asia Policy? Japan and the DPJ Government Yoko Iwama 8. ROK: Toward Peace and Cooperation Hyung Min Kim 9. Leadership and Commitment: The United States, Its Allies, and Emerging Security Institutions in Northeast Asia Carol Atkinson and Giacomo Chiozza Part 4: Actualizing Security Cooperation and Its Future 10. The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue: An Experiment in Track II Multilateral Diplomacy Susan L. Shirk 11. Conclusion T.J. Pempel

Key Points For half a century, the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States has focused on the threat posed by North Korea. But today, as South Korea moves toward reconciliation with the North on the basis of a strong and credible deterrence, a new approach is required to guide the future of the alliance. South Korea and the United States need a strategic plan that defines shared objectives and the means for achieving them. This plan would identify possible problems that could occur en route to these objectives and suggest how to avert them, plus what the two countries would need to do if the problems were to happen anyway. A strategic plan would help guide the current discussions on the future of the alliance. It would give direction to the alliance and provide both Korean and American audiences with a clearer vision of why we maintain an alliance and what we gain from it. Such a plan might have helped avert the current nuclear weapons crisis with North Korea; now, it is needed to resolve the crisis. It should identify a mutually agreeable approach to propose to North Korea as part of multilateral discussions, an approach agreed to by the other regional players. Developing such a plan will not be easy because Seoul and Washington do not view some critical issues in the same manner. But the effort to describe and explain these differences may resolve some of them and prepare the way for adjusting the U.S. military presence in Korea and creating a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. ********** The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) provides an important framework from which to examine the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula and other challenges in Northeast Asia. With its focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this strategy is concerned with North Korea as much as, if not more than, any other state. In particular, North Korea poses a unique set of challenges in regard to WMD. North Korea stands in sharp contrast to the Republic of Korea (ROK) on issues such as human rights, democracy, and market economies. The National Security Strategy suggests that the United States should revitalize its alliance with South Korea, while encouraging North Korea to transform its political and economic system. Yet South Korea and the United States are currently having some difficulties in developing a consensus on how to approach Pyongyang, and appear to have no clear plan to operationalize the strategy to deal with North Korea. At issue are increasing ROK pride coupled with economic and other successes, the North Korean nuclear weapons development program, and the U.S.-led war on global terrorism. As South Korea and the United States are marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, internal and external confusion lingers and a crisis looms, caused by Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and the political repercussions of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Europe, due to varying national interests, some countries opposed military action by America and Britain against Iraq. While South Korea and Japan supported coalition forces in Iraq, there are concerns in both countries over future preventive military actions by the United States. But the focus of the security debate in Northeast Asia continues to be Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development. Sensitive differences in American and South Korean assessments of and predictions about these clandestine nuclear programs, coupled with concern about the dangers of war, have led to broad debate on the series of North Korean actions and even some claims that the United States is responsible for this crisis. Nationalist anti-American sentiments seen among some South Korean media and citizens, and reactive anti-Korean sentiments in the United States that are often exaggerated by some American media reports, have led to an eruption of demands for reductions and relocations of U. …

During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. 1Section:ChooseTop of page1 <<BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Missile defense: The present administration is requesting more than $10 billion this year for development and deployment of a missile defense system. Many scientists say the system, given current and foreseeable technology, cannot be effective. What proof of effectiveness should be required before the system is fully deployed? Given the low-tech nature of terrorist attacks and the limited missile capabilities of North Korea and other hostile nations, does missile defense continue to be a wise investment? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1Bush <<Kerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryOur policy is to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date, a weapons system that would defend the United States homeland against nuclear attack, including ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best technologies available. Early in my administration, I called for the examination of the full range of available technologies and basing modes for missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.The FY 2005 Defense Appropriations Act provides $10 billion that I requested for systems to defend against the threat from ballistic missiles. Later this year, the first components of America’s missile defense system will become operational, and we are on schedule for the next stages of the project. My administration will develop and deploy the technologies necessary to protect our people, fulfilling a pledge I made to the American people more than four years ago.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry <<2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryA missile defense that works is a wise investment, but one that pours money into defenses at the expense of other immediate national security needs is not. And that’s what this administration has done. Missile defense should be one element of a comprehensive national security strategy. But a single-minded focus on this technology and the threat it is designed to meet ignores the very real danger of terrorism and our greatest danger—terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.John Edwards and I will be committed to developing a missile defense system that works, is fully tested, and geared to the threats we face. But I will refocus our efforts on preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and dramatically accelerating the security of nuclear weapons and material in Russia and around the world. We will not sit by, falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system, while these threats continue to fester.2Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2 <<BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Climate change: Virtually all reputable research in recent years has reinforced the scientific conclusion that global warming is a real and growing crisis caused, at least in part, by the burning of fossil fuels. Do you accept that scientific consensus? Under what circumstances would you regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2Bush <<Kerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryGlobal climate change is a serious long-term issue. In 2001, I asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to provide the most up-to-date information about the science of climate change. The academy found that considerable uncertainty remains about the effect of natural fluctuations on climate and the future effects climate change will have on our environment.My administration is now well along in implementing a comprehensive climate change strategy to advance the science, expand the use of transformational energy and carbon sequestration technologies, and mitigate the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and in partnership with other nations. I created the new US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) to refocus the federal government’s climate research programs, for which my 2005 budget seeks nearly $2 billion to fund research across the federal government. The NAS endorsed the CCSP strategic plan, noting that it “articulates a guiding vision, is appropriately ambitious, and is broad in scope.”I also committed the nation to a goal of reducing American greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over the next 10 years, which would prevent more than 500 million tons of carbon emissions through 2012. To help achieve this goal, I created the Climate Vision program in 2003 to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions by energy-intensive industrial sectors. Participants in the Climate Vision program account for between 40 and 45% of US greenhouse gas emissions. I have strongly supported over $4 billion in tax incentives for renewable and energy-efficient technologies, including wind and solar energy and hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles. Also, in April 2003, my administration raised the fuel economy standards for light trucks and SUVs [sport utility vehicles] for the first time since 1996, saving 3.6 billion gallons of gasoline. And in my 2003 State of the Union [address], I announced a $1.7 billion hydrogen fuel initiative to accelerate research that could lead to hydrogen-powered, no-emission vehicles within a generation.Additionally, my administration is participating in robust international partnerships to promote clean, renewable, commercially available fusion energy and to construct the $1 billion FutureGen project, which will test the latest technologies to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, and sequester greenhouse gas emissions from coal. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry <<3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryI recognize the risk of climate change, and I have outlined a balanced set of programs that will have impact both in the near term and over the long term. My plan will also provide balanced support for technology that can increase the efficiency and cut greenhouse emissions in transportation systems, buildings, and industry that are attractive to consumers and US producers. Our programs will encourage the use of renewable fuels such as ethanol and renewable electric generation that produce little or no net greenhouse gases. I will expand the production tax credit for wind and biomass energy to cover the full array of renewable energy sources and increase Department of Energy (DOE) research into renewable energy sources and their applications. And I will propose an aggressive program of research, standards, and incentives to accelerate electric generation from renewable energy. Clean coal technology can play a critical role, given technology to cut carbon dioxide emissions.My plan would encourage energy efficiency with programs such as updated fuel efficiency standards, new tax incentives for automakers to build the new, more efficient automobiles of the future, and tax incentives for families to purchase more energy-efficient cars, trucks, and SUVs.3Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3 <<BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Science investment: There is concern in the science and economic communities that the US is losing its world leadership in the sciences, which they say bodes ill for future economic growth and global competitive-ness. To address that concern, should the US increase funding for basic science, and should the administration fully fund the 2001 bill, signed by the president, to double NSF’s budget? How would you reinvigorate science education for US-born students? What is the role of foreign scientists and students in the US scientific enterprise? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3Bush <<Kerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryIncluding my FY 2005 budget request, total federal R&D investment during the first term will have increased 44% to a record $132 billion in 2005. My FY 2005 budget request commits 13.5% of total discretionary outlays to R&D, the highest level in 37 years. In the context of the overall economy, federal R&D spending in the FY 2005 budget is the greatest share of GDP [gross domestic product] in over 10 years. Funding for basic research, the fuel for future technology development, is at an all-time high of $26.8 billion in FY 2005, a 26% increase over FY 2001. Funding for NSF during the four years of my administration has increased 30% over FY 2001 to $5.7 billion in FY 2005. NSF’s broad support for basic research, particularly at US academic institutions, provides not only a central source for discovery in many fields but also encourages and supports development of the next generation of scientists and engineers. Moreover, in fulfilling its mission, NSF has used its funding efficiently and effectively.As for the American scientific enterprise, it is important in this information and technological age that our students receive a first-rate science education, just as they receive quality instruction in reading, writing, and math. The federal government has no control over local curricula, and it is not my job to tell states and local boards of education what they should teach in the classroom. Nevertheless, the No Child Left Behind Act, one of my proudest legislative achievements this term, is improving our schools and, consequently, the teaching of science. NCLB requires, for the first time, assessments in science to give us better information about how our students are performing and how to improve instruction in science. I have also proposed creating the Presidential Math and Science Scholars Fund to provide $100 million in grants to low-income students who study math or science. This will ensure that America’s graduates have the training they need to compete for the best jobs of the 21st century.I also value the contributions that foreign scientists and students make to our nation’s scientific enterprise, while recognizing the importance of safeguarding our security. We will continue to welcome international students and scientists while implementing balanced measures to end abuses of the student visa system. My administration has already achieved several notable successes in reducing delays now being experienced by some visa seekers. We have increased security while speeding up the clearance process; approximately 1000 back-logged applications have already been cleared out.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry <<4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryFor three years, the Bush administration has squandered America’s leadership in the world, putting politics before science and doing nothing to create jobs while our workers fall further behind. The administration has proposed cuts for scientific research and grossly distorted and politicized science on issues from mercury pollution to stem-cell research. This approach not only limits the research that our scientists are doing today, it undermines important discoveries of tomorrow and threatens America’s critical edge in innovation. I will reverse this course by restoring America’s scientific leadership, helping find new cures, moderating healthcare costs, and developing new technologies that will create good jobs. I will boost support for the physical sciences and engineering by increasing research investments in agencies such as NSF, the National Institutes of Health, DOE, NIST, and NASA. This funding will help with the broad areas of science and technology that will provide the foundations for economic growth and prosperity in the 21st century.4Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4 <<BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Nuclear weapons: Does the US need to develop a new class of nuclear weapons to deal with the changing threats of the 21st century? Is there any circumstance in which you would support the resumption of nuclear testing? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4Bush <<Kerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryThe Nuclear Posture Review, released by my administration in January 2002, noted that the nation’s nuclear infrastructure had atrophied since the end of the cold war and that the evolving security environment requires a flexible and responsive weapons complex infrastructure. To that end, my FY 2005 budget reflects an increase over the 2004 enacted level in the weapons activities account, which encompasses the stockpile stewardship programs. There is no current need for testing due to the sophistication of computer modeling and other new technologies, but we must maintain the capability to test in case such testing becomes necessary in the future to ensure the safety and reliability of our defensive arsenal. We have not identified any need for developing new nuclear weapons. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry <<5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryNo, and a Kerry–Edwards administration will stop this administration’s program to develop a new class of nuclear weapons. This is a weapon we don’t need, and it undermines our ability to persuade other nations to forego development of these weapons.5Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5 Nuclear There is serious concern many that could or a nuclear in a US Do you the US is doing to and control of nuclear weapons and material both in the US and BushSection:ChooseTop of administration in has more to and control nuclear weapons and material than US weapons and are and both the Department of Defense and are to make more My administration has increased funding to weapons and material in the Union and has by years the schedule the administration for security in We are with Russia to end the production of and to weapons for of weapons. the my administration the to or and material We have already weapons material from several our in its for nuclear weapons. To against we the international in a global effort to account and of sources that could be used in such We activities in over 40 on this as well as with international the Energy the the and the of Defense we have dramatically our ability to that could be a threat to us and to our friends and my administration the billion initiative to support and nuclear safety in the This of the international is to a more of nation’s highest must be preventing from to nuclear weapons and the material to make We must in a global partnership with other nations to prevent the spread of these weapons. the Bush administration’s have in the have the we need to advance our security. September they have not nearly to and on the while the nuclear from and North Korea have Our security requires an immediate change of I have proposed a comprehensive strategy to of weapons and including an of programs to all nuclear weapons and within the and at research in the within four production of new material for nuclear weapons by a global on production of new of nuclear weapons and by development of the new generation of nuclear accelerating in US and nuclear and reducing of in nuclear weapons programs in hostile including by with North Korea to ensure the and of its nuclear weapons program and a global effort to prevent from the necessary to build nuclear weapons. international efforts to by and and as well as improving the security a presidential to prevent nuclear terrorism who will focus on a effort to all nuclear weapons and around the world and prevent a nuclear terrorist of Energy than of and have not in a comprehensive US energy policy. years into the future, what do you the US energy should How would you the US in that BushSection:ChooseTop of and energy is critical to America’s and homeland security. We will be more and more we are on foreign sources of energy. The of a comprehensive and balanced national energy policy has been one of my During my first in I proposed a national energy policy that would our energy production and systems, reduce our on foreign promote efficiency and increase domestic production from all of energy including renewable energy and continue to our economy and create new jobs. We will continue to with on the energy to the administration has nearly all of the more than in the comprehensive national energy policy that not as increasing reliability R&D to help prevent and the to its of million to provide energy security in case of of have proposed an program of research, and standards that would increase the efficiency of energy use and use of new energy sources that can ensure a and while reducing the risk of climate change. The program would be supported in by a billion energy security and from federal and gas the in by I have to around the and a of that can meet US needs both in the term and for in the Given the long time required to over energy investments such as of and trucks, industrial and we must a broad set of new technologies as as possible we have any of US energy use in the near term, many of the most control systems, and other technologies to improve the energy of buildings, and industrial that the US to reduce its on from the and I will set for fuels such as I will support research and incentives that will dramatically increase use of from wind and other renewable And I will encourage development of technology and nuclear generation with high standards for stewardship and of Nuclear recent by that nuclear is the best energy source to meet the US while protecting the renewable energy can be deployed on a Do you increasing the use of nuclear If what would you do with the BushSection:ChooseTop of support the further development of nuclear technologies as a clean, and to meet this nation’s future energy Nuclear for of our This which no pollution or greenhouse gas can play an expanding role in our energy future while the we with energy national energy policy several to encourage increased use of nuclear and to the that through the Nuclear my administration is with industry to the for an of a new US nuclear within the next years. through the the United States is with around the to develop a next generation of more and more nuclear that can also produce hydrogen and my administration has made a to the nuclear and the of a long-term at We are ahead with the of a to the Nuclear at the end of this administration is also committed to and in new technologies that will change the we generate I committed the United States to the international fusion energy as in is a important to test the of nuclear fusion as a source of and the of a nearly source of energy the that long-term of Nuclear can play an role in energy while reducing the risk of climate key such as nuclear nuclear and security must be John Edwards and I will ensure safety and science We George Bush’s plan to over the of a Kerry–Edwards administration will on science. John Edwards and I do not support as a nuclear and will that nuclear and transportation only on the of science and that to and the John Edwards and I will George Bush and to from a for an NAS study to is the as to long-term and or some other technology. an international to scientific for nuclear and nuclear from terrorist John Edwards and I will improve and security at nuclear In we will nuclear to to improve including measures to reduce to the an of National National Nuclear the national weapons continue to be with security spending and What would you to improve at the Does the current plan of the to the risk of the in the of the war on BushSection:ChooseTop of national are doing to deal with the threats of the 21st are a in our efforts to improve homeland are the source of technological and are helping the war on With their at the highest level in years, National National and National are also on the edge of defense research, protecting the nation’s infrastructure from terrorist attacks, and developing a that the of a nuclear This is we billion on weapons research and production in FY 2004 and I for billion for We must and security My administration has made effort to improve the the weapons do and one of efforts is that in all areas of central to the war on we can use our more and focus on his or of national play a critical role in our nuclear weapons stockpile and that our nation’s nuclear weapons are and The national also have an important role in preventing the spread of weapons of mass and in science for our nation’s have a of our nation’s but this record has been by and security at the has been John Edwards and I are committed to and and restoring the at these critical national of is being to the long-term of to the and Many scientists the will money from science How do you the importance of science exploration What is the funding between the BushSection:ChooseTop of I announced my for the future of America’s space exploration this will the of both and science will as to the and other vehicles continue to their and of to we have systems on and around a system and one on its to the for cannot be by the most or the most We need to and and for And only are of to the by space we our on the we are developing a new exploration to our This will be by and its first no than will to the as as and no than and use it as a for the We will with to the and for future will with the goal of and there for of Edwards and I will continue America’s long tradition of leadership in and space exploration as of a program to broad for this will not to programs such as the Bush administration’s Program that from in the with no or will in new programs to set by scientific in and other Our administration will on the of the scientific to the most for research and the most for these the of or are most to the 2004 American of

[ 38 ] asia policy The New Nationalism and the Strategic Architecture of Northeast Asia Francis Fukuyama While Northeast Asia has been a relatively peaceful and prosperous part of the world for the last two generations, there are developments unfolding in the region that can have destabilizing consequences. This should forceU.S.policymakerstothinkaboutwhetherthelegacysecurityarchitecture for the region, inherited from the Cold War, is adequate to meet new needs arising from these developments. The most troubling development is not North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons—a serious problem about which much has been written— but the upsurge of nationalism in the three main countries of the region: China, South Korea, and Japan. This new nationalism is likely to exacerbate in a very concrete way tensions now simmering beneath the surface, making an issue like North Korean nuclear weapons much more dangerous and difficult to handle. This author is not offering any particular insights about the nature of the newnationalisminChinaandSouthKoreaexcepttonotethatinbothcountries the upsurge in nationalism appears to be associated with generational change. That is, those who have been the most assertive in pushing a nationalist agenda (e.g., the campaign that collected some 22 million signatures in China to keep Japan out of the UN Security Council, or those opposing U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula and promoting an accommodation with North Korea) tend to be younger people who did not directly experience either the Pacific War or the Korean War. Both better educated and more prosperous, this generation can take the peace and prosperity they have enjoyed more for granted than can their parents. The passage of time thus has not softened nationalist attitudes but hardened them. This author has much greater direct knowledge of the nature of new nationalism in Japan. Perhaps the most important point to note is that nationalism is not new: the problem in Japan is not that there has never been a full and open debate in that country that appropriately assigned blame for the debacle of the Pacific War. The real significance of former prime minister Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University, and Director of SAIS’ International Development program. He is also Chairman of the editorial board of a new magazine, The American Interest. His latest book is America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (2006). He is available at . [ 39 ] roundtable • pursuing security in a dynamic northeast asia Koizumi’s visits to the shrine lies not in the symbolism of the twelve class-A war criminals buried there but rather in the Yushukan military museum next to the shrine. Yushukan presents the standard nationalist narrative about the war, which maintains that Japan not only was more a victim than a victimizer but also was liberating Asia from European domination and that Japan’s behavior was not different from that of any other colonial great power. If the one point of view on the war presented by Yushukan museum were just one among many, it might be defensible as an unfortunate but aberrant point of view in an otherwise pluralistic society. The problem is that the Yushukan is the only museum in contemporary Japan dealing with Japan’s twentieth century history and that successive governments have hidden behind the fact that it is run by a religious foundation to protect the museum’s status. Unlike the Germans, the Japanese were never able to break decisively with the prewar narrative, and until the Japanese do so their neighbors will continue to have suspicions of Japanese intentions. Why is this longstanding nationalist narrative making a comeback now? There are two structural reasons for the timing. The first has to do with the collapse of the left in Japanese politics. The Japan Socialist Party was always an obstacle to constitutional revision of Article 9—or a shift to more nationalistic policies—but its collapse in the 1990s has encouraged a broad shift to the right. Second, the long-term trend line of Chinese power is clear to Japan: while the Japanese economy is still several times the size of China’s, relative power positions will change in...