Abstract

The paper discusses the possibility of using the deflationary conception of truth in explaining the nature of the concept of mathematical truth in the framework of the instrumentalist conception of mathematics. It is shown that the use of the concept of truth in mathematical theory is similar to the use of “ideal” mathematics in D. Hilbert’s program. It is also shown that this analogy interprets the function of the concept of truth as a means of simplifying the process of obtaining evidence (or as speed-up function).

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