Взгляды иранской внесистемной оппозиции на двенадцатидневную войну 2025 г.

Recently Iran has once again been in the headlines. Reputed to be developing nuclear weapons, the future of Iraq's next-door neighbor is a matter of grave concern both for the stability of the region and for the safety of the global community. President George W. Bush labeled it part of the “Axis of Evil,” and has railed against the country's authoritarian leadership. Yet as Bush trumpets the spread of democracy throughout the Middle East, few note that Iran has one of the longest-running experiences with democracy in the region. This book looks at the political history of Iran in the modern era, and offers an in-depth analysis of the prospects for democracy to flourish there. After having produced the only successful Islamist challenge to the state, a revolution, and an Islamic Republic, Iran is now poised to produce a genuine and indigenous democratic movement in the Muslim world. Democracy in Iran is neither a sudden development nor a western import. The concept of democracy in Iran today may appear to be a reaction to authoritarianism, but it is an old idea with a complex history, one that is tightly interwoven with the main forces that have shaped Iranian society and politics, institutions, identities, and interests. This book seeks to understand why democracy failed to grow roots and lost ground to an autocratic Iranian state. Why was democracy absent from the ideological debates of the 1960s and 1970s? Most important, why has it now become a powerful social, political, and intellectual force? How have modernization, social change, economic growth, and the experience of the revolution converged to make this possible?

The first encounter between the World Bank and Iran over Iran's oil dispute with Great Britain took place in Washington, DC. The World Bank's Vice President, Robert Garner, met with Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, who was in the United States to address a British resolution pending before the United Nations Security Council. In three Bank missions to Iran between January and March 1952, several features of the Bank's proposed temporary management of the recently nationalized Iranian oil company were discussed. The Iranian government refused to approve the employment of British nationals under the Bank's operation of the nationalized oil company. The Bank, meanwhile, prevented by its Articles of Agreement from excluding employment of personnel from one of its members, could not agree to undertake the temporary operation of Iran's nationalized oil company. After a few months' break in contact between Iran and the Bank, the Iranian government sent a representative to the Bank to reopen the discussions - but unaccompanied by a controversial international adviser Mossadegh had requested. Consequently, when the oil talks reopened, the Iranian representative was unprepared to fully articulate a new Iranian proposal that would allow the reengagement of British personnel. Unfortunately, the Bank team did not follow up on this meeting and did not support the Iranian representative in refining the new proposal. Less than a year later, Mossadegh was deposed, and an international consortium took over operation of the Iranian oil company. The fall of Mossadegh demolished the hope for national sovereignty and full democracy in Iran - with far-reaching consequences for the Iranian people and the international community. This article, based mostly on archived and unpublished World Bank materials, reviews the involvement of Mohammad Mossadegh's government with the World Bank after the March 1951 nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Before nationalization, the AIOC had a considerable international market share for crude and petroleum products. Its operation of the world's largest refinery in Abadan ensured an uninterrupted supply of oil products to the British merchant and navy fleet. However, the Iranian workers in Abadan lived in appalling conditions, with no running water or electricity. The AIOC's profit distribution was also highly uneven. For example, in 1946, its profit taxes to the British government were twice as large as its royalties and net profits payments to Iran. In February 1951, the AIOC increased its profit-sharing offer to 50-50, but the Iranian government was not satisfied. Many Iranians considered the AIOC exploitative, and its nationalization plan constituted a critical element of the government reform program. On March 20, 1951, the Iranian Senate approved the nationalization bill. In May 1951, the AIOC applied to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for arbitration proceedings. While British warships were stationed near Abadan, the British government appealed to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pass a resolution for the two parties to resume negotiations.1 After the AIOC was nationalized and its British personnel left Iran, operations at its oil fields ceased. Iranian-trained workers were unable to manage large-scale oil production, and a British-imposed embargo made it almost impossible for Iran to find tankers to export oil.2 Consequently, the heavily oil-dependent Iranian economy suffered considerably and while the US refused to grant financial support and the Soviet government declined to repay its wartime debts to Iran, budget and balance-of-payments deficits ballooned.3 Among several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute, at least two were made by from the US government: first by Henry Grady, US Ambassador to Iran,4 and then by W. Averell Harriman, President Harry S. Truman's special foreign policy assistant, who went to Tehran to reconcile the two diverging positions. …

During the early years of the Cold War, developing nations outside Europe approached the United States for large aid programs similar to the Marshall Plan to promote postwar reconstruction. In uncertain times, such requests for massive economic aid forced the Truman administration to determine whether or not large government-sponsored programs, as requested by these peripheral nations, were suitable and desirable for nonindustrialized areas and whether or not, in a broader context, such programs enhanced America's national security. The answer, at first, was a definite no, yet by 1951 that decision was reversed. An examination of the administration's decision and its later reversal provides an insight into the relationship between foreign policy and Cold War strategy; into the dynamic relationship between the U.S. government and the American private sector, developing nations, and wartime ally England; and into the changing nature of postwar American interventionism. The question of aid was of particular concern in Iranian-American relations. No other issue so exercised diplomatic energies and patience as the question of how much aid should go to Iran, when it should be given, and for what purpose. Most historians of Iran rightly perceive this period as a time of missed opportunities and agree that within this period lay the seeds of future revolution. The main reasons they cite for these missed opportunities generally fall within the overall framework established by Bruce Kuniholm, who asserts that Cold War considerations overrode all others. James Goode argues, for example, that because of the demands of the Cold War the United States missed a chance to establish a constitutional democracy in Iran during this period of possible Iranian democratic rebirth, while Mark Lytle argues that the United States missed an opportunity to encourage Iranian neutrality in the Cold War, being more interested in a Middle Eastern version of the Monroe Doctrine. Two eminent historians of Iran likewise criticize the American response to Iran during the early Cold War: James Bill posits the inauguration of the long-term policy of support for Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlevi here, and Richard Cottam writes that in the Cold War battle for influence in the political affairs of strategically important Third World nations, the United States became allied with local conservative elites who favored slow, controlled change and a strengthened monarchy. A contrasting view is presented by Stephen McFarland, who argues that it was the Iranians who sucked the United States into involvement in Iran by persuading it that the Soviet threat to Iran was real.1

The Ultimate Social Network: China's Expansionary, Internationally Oriented United Front Strategies 1923-2020

President Trump’s announcement of his ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs on 2 April 2025 constituted a rare alliance-disruptive shock in American economic statecraft, exposing Japan and the European Union to the same coercive trade measures imposed on the United States’ strategic competitors. From Beijing’s perspective, this episode appeared to offer an opening to activate an external ‘united front’ type strategy by mobilizing U.S. allies as ‘intermediate forces’ against unilateral American pressure. Yet the outcome ran counter to this expectation: both Japan and the EU moved rapidly toward bilateral accommodation with Washington, while China’s appeals for a coalition yielded little tangible alignment. This article argues that the aftermath of Liberation Day reveals the structural limits of China’s united front diplomacy vis-à-vis US-anchored allies. It highlights three constraints – material inducement deficits, timing asymmetries, and deep credibility gaps rooted in alliance embeddedness – that prevented Beijing from converting symbolic convergence into actionable coalition outcomes. At the same time, developments in 2026 suggest that China’s united front approach remains a long-term, although constrained, strategy of external coalition management rather than alliance rupture.

AFTER 1800, THE FORTUNES of both Spaniards and Native Americans in the North American West changed dramatically. Spain evacuated the vast Louisiana Territory in 1803 and surrendered the Southwest upon Mexican independence. The United States had acquired Texas by 1845 and much of the rest of the Southwest at the end of the Mexican War in 1848. More tragically, Anglo Americans pushed Native Americans off their homelands and into Indian Territory or onto reservations that represented only a tiny fraction of the lands these Indians had once occupied. We tend to think of the United States in the nineteenth century as a juggernaut, but what if Europeans and Indians in the trans-Mississippi West had banded together? Could they have changed history by blocking United States expansion? Could Arkansas, and Missouri be part of Mexico now, or the Spanish-speaking or French-speaking Republic of Louisiana, or an Osage-dominated or pan-Indian nation, bordered on the east by the United States and the south by Mexico, with its own representatives at the United Nations? Those possibilities sound far-fetched in the twenty-first century. But Tecumseh and other Indian leaders in the Ohio Valley built a powerful pan-Indian alliance, supported and armed by the British, in the early nineteenth century. West of the Mississippi, there were Spaniards and Indians who in the late eighteenth century had conceived of a similar collaboration against the United States. It is not simply in retrospect that the Louisiana Purchase was understood as a crucial step in American expansion. Spain had fought against Britain during the American Revolution, but by the end of the war officials in Spanish North America already had reason to worry about the new republic with which they were sharing the continent. In 1783, neither Spaniards nor Indians who had fought in the war were invited to participate in negotiating the Treaty of Paris. As part of the treaty, the British surrendered what would become the states of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama to the United States. The Congress quickly began surveying these lands and selling them off. But it was Spain's troops that during the war had seized much of this region from the British. With good reason, Spanish officials worried about the unmeasured ambition of a new and vigorous people, hostile to all subjection, advancing and multiplying . . . with a prodigious rapidity, as the Spanish governor of Francois Luis Hector, the Baron de Carondelet, put it. The Spanish predicted that this expansionist people's next acquisition would be which spanned the entire western Mississippi Valley, from present-day Louisiana to Minnesota in the north and the Rockies in the west.1 Likewise, Louisiana's native peoples heard rumors of a new kind of Luropean, who came in unprecedented numbers, trampled Indian land rights, and called themselves Virginians, Pennsylvanians, and Americans. In the 1780s, Iroquois, Shawnee, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw speakers from the east toured telling tales of an ambitious plague of locusts that was streaming across the Appalachians. The visitors warned Louisiana Indians that their lands would be next.2 If the Indians and Europeans of Louisiana had banded together, they could have assembled ten thousand men to defend against the expanding United States, and more if they had recruited Indians and Frenchmen in the contested regions just east of the Mississippi. So why didn't they? The peoples west of the Mississippi failed to resist Anglo-American expansion because of their own historical relationships within the region. No united front, they were instead a barely co-existing collection of peoples who did not necessarily trust one another any more than they trusted the United States. Their failure to unite had clear precedent. Most of the people in Louisiana had in fact contemplated joint military action against another expansionist people, the Osage Indians, themselves residents of the purchase territory. …

The article elaborates the politics of nationalism and socialism among the Pakhtuns, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Analyse the Pakhtun left political organizations and Movements as well as the Pakhtunistan issues, and Hashnagar pesaeants uprising. The paper led us to the banning of all left political organization including Communist Party of Pakistan, Khudai Khedmatgar and other regional nationalist and socialist organization during Cold War. The Cold War re-shaped the political dynamics in Pakistan particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Both were the Front line Provinces in the great game between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Pakistan joined the United State-led West-bloc, the SEATO and SENTO pact was signed against the Communism. Therefore, the Pakistan state took action against the left political organization in Pakistan, due to the Pakhtun socialists activated in a new mask of socialism and strongly opposed the ruling elite of Pakistan. While the nationalist cleared their stance to work for a progressive Pakistan. Both were organized and engaged with Pakistani leftists against the Pakistani ruling elite and finally they organized anti one unit front known as United Front and merged their organization and formed a national level left party, the National Awami Party. The National Awami Party was a geniune left political party all the left banned organization including nationalist and socialist joined it with the manofestation of socialism in Pakistan. However, the ideological split in the International communist movement influence the politics of National Awami Party and its leadership in Pakistan. Meanwhile the National Awami Party split into two factions Pro-Mascow and Pro-China, among the Pakhtuns the pro-China faction were eliminated by the pro-Moscow Wali Khan group from his Party. Consequently, the pro-China faction formed a new left political organization called the Mazdoor Kisan Party in 1967. However, during the 1970 election the Maoist pro China Mazdoor Kisan Party did not participated in general election and mobilized the Hashnagar peasant uprising against the landlords but many lanlords were the candidate of different poltical parties. This article analysis the unification and split in the left political wing in Pakistan and particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and overview the historical developments and events which shaped and re-shaped the nationalist and socialist tendencies among the Pakhtuns.

U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua

Looking back on his South Africa days, Gandhi once said, ‘In South Africa, I was surrounded by Jews.’1 Among these Henry Polak would have been glad if the Jews of South Africa offered support to the Indians there as he believed their disabilities to be similar. The matter of immigration rights, for example, affected both communities alike. ‘Disinherited residents’, both Jewish and Indian, suffered under a common yoke.2 But there were those in the South African Jewish community who saw things differently. D. Greenberg retorted:3 I wonder if Mr Polak has ever thought what would be the feeling of the white population in Africa towards the Jews if they ... threw in their lot with the Indians. A possible platform for a ‘united front’ could have been provided by the socialists It did not happen that way, however; but there were a few Russian immigrants who thought that the class struggle concerned Asiatics no less than immigrants from the continent of Europe. Yeshaya Israelstam was one of these. Born in Lithuania he came to South Africa via the United States where he took part in socialist activities. He regarded the struggle for a new social order as a matter which involved all the oppressed, regardless of colour. Such a line of thinking received some support very much later in the century when the voices of many prominent South African Jewish citizens were raised against apartheid.

This paper will analyze the People Republic of China's (PRC) position toward international hegemony in the context of the PRC's global perspective since its establishment in 1949 until the end of 2018. The study aims to expose China's attempts to oppose this hegemony throughout the Cold War by forming a "united front" against the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it aims to clarify why China has abandoned this strategy and has called for a "harmonious world" since 2005. The study is based on the premise that "the more China benefits from the hegemony of the global economic system, the more it will call for a harmonious world and give up opposing international hegemony practiced by other powers.” The study is divided into four sections. The first examines China's position toward American hegemony in the 1950s. The second explains China's worldview of the "Intermediate Zone" to form a "unified front" against the hegemony of the superpowers through the 1960s. The third reveales China's attempt to establish this united front through the Chinese "Three Worlds" strategy which dominated China's Worldview from the 1970s until the end of the Cold War. The fourth section shows the shift in China's attitude toward international hegemony after China has abandoned the idea of traditional provocation against the hegemony of international powers and began to call for a "harmonious world", in which China could participate. The researcher uses both the historical and analytical descriptive method to explain this study. The study concluds that China has failed to oppose international hegemony practiced by the two superpowers during the Cold War, and its improved position in the global economic system as an economic and political power after the end of the Cold War has made Beijing seek to expand its network of peaceful relations with all international and regional powers in a hope to create a "harmonious world" that serves its economic success as well as its global rise. Keywords: China, International Hegemony, "Intermediate Zone" strategy, "Three Worlds" strategy, "Harmonious World".

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY has always been amenable to both changing fortunes of politics in China and success or failure of governments and revolutionary groups outside. The 1970s, however, have brought such change that ideology itself is now of marginal importance in China's foreign relations. During past two years People's Republic of China (PRC) has sought to strengthen relations with rightist and socialist governments alike in Africa, Middle East, and Latin America. Concurrently it has, with few exceptions, loosened ties with revolutionary and dissident groups. Perhaps ultimate example of pragmatism was Beijing's normalization of relations with United States in January 1979. Even some aspects of recent Chinese history seem no longer to retain their power over Chinese foreign policy. In mid-1978 Beijing normalized relations with Tokyo and in recent months has taken remarkable step of publicly supporting rebuilding of Japan's military capability.' The PRC has come a long way from support for people's revolutionary wars to a time when unity against Soviet hegemonism rather than socialism is Chinese watch word. Today building of the broadest possible united front has replaced even effort to walk on two legs of revolution and diplomatic ties that characterized Chinese policy in early 1970s. In past three years Chinese appear, in fact, to have reassessed strategic situations. Emphasis on an approaching frontal confron-

In the heyday of the Cold War, China remained confrontational toward the United States and other Western powers but at the same time seemed conciliatory toward Asian nations. This was largely reflected in Beijing's diplomacy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘united front’ at the Geneva and Bandung conferences. Based on recently declassified archives and material in China and probing into the insights of China's foreign policy calculations in the mid-1950s, this article argues that, through actively participating in multilateral diplomacy, the Chinese leaders expected to construct an image of a ‘normal state’ and play a leading role in normalizing international politics in Asia.

We review the generic limits and classification of the little studied Australian fauna of the soldier fly subfamily Chiromyzinae. Among chiromyzines are many species that are confirmed agricultural pests of sugar cane, maize and grasses, including Inopus rubriceps (Macquart, 1847) that has been introduced in New Zealand and the United States. A taxonomic treatment is provided for the genera that occur in Australia, including illustrations and the first robust identification key. Several nomenclatural changes are made. The monotypic genera Archimyza Enderlein, 1921, and Stenimas Enderlein, 1921, are synonymised under Chiromyza Wiedemann, 1820, and the status of four species is revised: Inopus grandicornis (Hardy, 1920a) comb. nov. and Inopus longicornis (Hardy, 1924) comb. nov. are transferred from their previous position in Chiromyza; and Chiromyza australis (Macquart, 1850) stat. rev. and Chiromyza matruelis (Enderlein, 1921) stat. rev. are transferred from their previous position in Hylorops Enderlein, 1921, rendering Hylorops a monotypic genus, endemic to Chile. A total of 13 genera are now recognised in the Chiromyzinae, with four genera and 18 described species known from Australia. We also present the first record for New Zealand of the Australian species Boreoides tasmaniensis Bezzi, 1922, which was most likely accidentally introduced.

On the face of it, Palmerston’s defeat in 1858 signalled the beginning of the end of his public life. His advanced age alone militated against his return to office. Now in his seventies, suffering from chronic gout and seemingly exhausted by his labours, he was being written off by Members of Parliament as early as 1855. The 1857 parliamentary election had given him a lease on life, but it was unlikely that the forces that coalesced to bring him down in February 1858 would succeed him. Although the new Tory ministry under Lord Derby’s leadership still lacked the strength of a majority, in comparison the Opposition was in disarray. Palmerston’s leadership of the opposition in the House of Commons appeared merely titular. He headed a shadow cabinet and held party meetings but beyond that he was seen as a spent force, unable to command a following.1 Russell was still his obvious rival and their clashing ambitions, catalysed by their differences over parliamentary reform, stood in the way of any reconciliation. When opportunities did arise to attack the ministers, poor communication among Opposition leaders and clever deceptions by Disraeli allowed the government to snatch victories from the jaws of defeat. The opposition, for example, roundly attacked the Tories’ version of an India Bill in May 1858, but it survived when the opposition leaders’ efforts disintegrated into squabbling. This was described well by the radical Trelawny, when he said ‘we are merely on the stage on which a fencing match or triangular duel is taking place between the great party leaders opposed to the Ministry’.2 Well-conceived but badly executed censure motions aimed at the ministers were awkwardly withdrawn by the opposition, fearful that divisions would only reveal the weakness in their ranks. As the 1858 session proceeded, Lord Derby’s sober, moderate government produced a series of modest but important reforms, suggesting that enlightened improvements could be realized without the overseeing assistance of the Whigs.3 The property qualifications for MPs were abolished, postal services between the United States and Ireland were established, minor concessions were given to Catholics, and peace was maintained abroad.

The intensity of minilateral coalition-building among the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners, especially the consolidation of the Quad and the formation of AUKUS in 2021, has rekindled concerns over the relevance of ASEAN multilateralism and ASEAN’s claim to centrality in the regional architecture. Although the challenge to ASEAN-led mechanisms from competing and parallel institutions initiated by other powers is not a new phenomenon, this article argues that the intensity of today’s geopolitical tensions, primarily but not exclusively between the United States and China, has driven America and its Indo-Pacific partners to invest more in minilateral coalitions than in ASEAN institutions to advance their strategic goals. The institutional challenge that these minilaterals present to ASEAN is three-fold. First, they signify the entrenchment of hard balancing by the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners and their reduced reliance on ASEAN’s normative influence. Second, their small, nimble membership holds out better prospects than ASEAN institutions in delivering tangible results and effective responses to regional security challenges. Third, they accentuate the pre-existing strategic incoherence within ASEAN in the face of Great Power competition.