Особенности рыночных структур с позиции регулярно-динамической теории

Abstract

The article focuses on the application of the regular-dynamic method in the theory of industry markets. It introduces the Hamilton function and key parameters of portal connections that describe market barrier properties and formulates the fundamental equations of market dynamics. The solutions of these equations determine crucial characteristics of commodity-money exchange at each market link and establish relationships that describe typical regimes of local equilibrium market interaction, including perfect and monopolistic competition, pure monopolies and monopsonies, as well as oligopolies and oligopsonies. The study reveals that the interaction among agents in a perfectly competitive market is influenced by weakly disturbed portal connections, which prevent firms from reaching a profitable level of exchange with an equilibrium price solely determined by technological parameters within the firms. In the case of a monopolistically competitive market, the price demonstrates an inversely proportional dependence on the volume of supply, which is characteristic of small businesses offering differentiated goods based on quality. It is observed that the equilibrium price in monopoly markets exhibits monotonic growth as the production activity of interacting firms increases. This price increase is attributed to an elevation in the seller’s barrier and a reduction in the depth of buyers’ market pits in the case of pure monopoly, while the reverse occurs in pure monopsony with an increase in the depth of the buyer’s pit and a decrease in sellers’ barriers. The article investigates the relationship between the equilibrium price and the parameters of technological processes, as well as the barrier properties of firms acting as sellers and buyers in oligopoly and oligopsony markets. Furthermore, the study highlights that the structure and effectiveness of oligo markets significantly depend on the relative positioning of technological frequencies between market leaders and outsiders. The article proposes an analytical description of the “race for the leader” effect. Lastly, for all the analyzed modes of market interactions, the stability of the processes governing equilibrium price formation is substantiated.