통일 후 남북한 산업구조 재편 및 북한 성장산업 육성방안 (Ways to Reform Industrial Structure of North and South Korea and Nurture Growth Industries in North Korea after Unification)

Last orders in Pyongyang

본 연구는 남 · 북한 유아교육과정을 비교 분석하여 통일대비 유아교육과정의 방향성 정립과 통합을 위한 시사점을 제시하는데 그 목적이 있다. 남 · 북한 유아교육과정 비교는 4가지 비교준거, 즉 유아교육목표, 유아교육과정 영역 및 일과 운영, 교수 · 학습방법, 평가의 측면에서 이루어졌다. 연구결과 남 · 북한 교육이념의 차이로 인해 다양한 영역에서 유사점보다는 차이점을 보였으며, 통일대비 유아교육과정 정립을 위해 다음과 같은 시사점을 도출하였다. 첫째, 남 · 북한 유아교육과정에서의 통합을 이루기 위해서는 교육의 고유한 기능과 목적을 반영한 새로운 교육이념 정립이 필요하다. 둘째, 남 · 북한 유아교육과정 영역 및 일과운영 비교에서 가장 차이를 보인 영역은 정치사상교육으로, 통일 후 정치사상교육을 통해 공고히 형성된 북한의 정치사상의식을 극복할 방안이 마련되어야 할 것이다. 셋째, 통일대비 남 · 북한 유아교육과정의 통합을 위해서는 유아교육과정에명시된 유아교육관련 용어정리 및 표준화작업이 이루어져야 할 것이다. 결론적으로 통일대비 남 · 북한 유아교육과정 비교에서 유사점을 보이는 영역부터 점진적인 통합을 시도하는 것이 필요하며, 남 · 북한 간 상호교류를 통해 이질성 극복을 위한 노력이 지속적으로 이루어져야 할 것이다.This study was conducted to compare and analyze the curriculum of early childhood education in South Korea and North Korea in order to establish the direction of early childhood curriculum. Based on this, the purpose of the study is to propose educational alternatives for possible integration. The comparison of North and South Korean early childhood education curriculum was conducted in terms of educational goals, early childhood curriculum area and daily management, teaching and learning methods, and assesment. As a result of the study, there were more differences found than similarities in various areas due to differences in the educational philosophy between South and North Korea, and the following implications were drawn. First, in order to integrate North and South Korea’s early childhood curriculum, a new educational ideology that reflects the unique function and purpose of education should be established first, and specific curriculum and contents should be developed accordingly. Second, the most significant difference in the content and operation of North and South Korean early childhood education curriculum is political ideology education, which is the most important content of the North Korean early childhood education course. Third, in order to integrate the South and North Korea early childhood education curriculum in preparation for unification, it is necessary to organize and standardize the terms related to early childhood education in order to unify them. In order to do this, it is necessary to try to integrate them gradually starting from areas showing similarities, and to endeavor to overcome discrepancies through mutual exchange between South and North Korea.

2016년 대북제재 이후 북한경제 변화와 신남북협력 방향 (Changes in the North Korean Economy and Guidelines to New Strategies of Inter-Korean Cooperation after UNSCR since 2016)

Liberalists has declared that economic trade brings about political cooperation and peace between two countries through enhancing the economic benefits, promoting conversation, and removing misunderstanding. On the basis of this declaration, the policy on North Korea has been pushed ahead by the Korean government which tries to transform the relationship with North Korea from mistrust and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. It has been twenty three years since the economic trade between South and North Korea began in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo which was triggered by the Declaration of July 7 and the North-South Korean Economic Relation Measure of October in 1988. The total turnover between South and North Korea was about 15.9 billion USD during the period from the beginning of January, 1989 to the end of September, 2011, out of which 13.2 billion USD is for commercial trade and 2.6 billion USD is for economic aid. However, the controversy is being aroused in South Korea about the policy on North Korea because North Korea tends to keep hostility towards South Korea through nuclear experiment, blowing up the Cheonan ship, shooting a South Korean tourist in Keumkang Mountain, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. It seems to the realists that the economic trade between South and North Korea brings about reinforcing the North Korean military power and weakening the security in South Korea, which results in hindering the peace in Korean Peninsular. From the point of this issue, this paper aims to analyse the effect of trade and economic aid on easing conflicts between South and North Korea empirically. The result of this study can be summarized as follows. First of all, the increase of total turnover is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, which means that the increase of total turnover will decrease the conflict index. Secondly, the increase of commercial trade does not significantly affect the conflict index. Thirdly, the increase of non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, which means that the increase of non-commercial trade will bring about creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea. Finally, the multi-variable analysis shows that rate of change in non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, but rate of change in commercial trade is not. To sum up the results of the empirical analysis, the increase of total turnover and/or non-commercial trade is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, but not in the case of the increase of commercial trade. In other words, the economic trade between South and North Korea does not necessarily reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular. In fact, it has been happening in the real world since fifty years ago. Social welfare in North Korea should be enhanced to reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular through the economic support and trade from South Korea. The amount of social welfare increase in North Korea should be enough to offset the amount of social welfare decrease due to the cessation of the economic support and trade. Therefore, the economic trade between South and North Korea needs to be vitalized more and more so that North Korea be economically dependent upon South Korea. Limits of this paper, which are left to be studied in the future, are as follows. First of all, it needs to be analyzed how much social welfare has been enhanced in North Korea through the economic trade between South and North Korea for the past twenty three years. Secondly, it also needs to be studied what is the level of dependence of North Korea on South Korea, and whether the economic sanction toward the North Korea of the Lee Myung-bak administration is significantly effective or not.

본 연구는 남한의 2015 개정 음악과 교육과정과 북한의 2013 개정 음악과 교육과정을 비교 분석하여 통일을 대비하여 남북한 음악과 교육과정 통합을 위해 해결해야 할 시사점을 도출함을 목적으로 한다. 남북한 음악과 교육과정 구성, 문서 체제, 항목별 내용(성격, 목표, 내용, 교수․학습 방향, 평가 방향, 교과서 집필 방향)을 비교한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 음악과의 정의와 역할의 진술 내용, 표현과 감상 영역을 주요한 내용 영역으로 설정하고 있는 점은 남북한 음악과 교육과정의 공통점이라고 할 수 있다. 이는 교육과정을 구성하는 기본적인 항목에서 공통점을 가지고 있는 것이기 때문에 지속시켜 나갈 필요가 있다. 둘째, 북한 음악과 교육과정의 ‘음악무용’ 과목 제시, 애국주의와 사상의 강조, 성취기준의 구체적 제시, 교과서 집필 방향의 상세한 제시 등은 남한 교육과정과의 차이점이다. 교육과정과 교과서의 역할에 대한 시각 차이와 사상적 측면은 앞으로 좁혀나가야 할 중요한 쟁점이다. 이러한 남북한 음악과 교육과정에서의 차이를 줄여 나가기 위해서는 총론과 연계한 남북한 음악과 교육과정 연구, 남북한 음악 용어 차이 극복을 위한 기초 연구, 남북한 공통 음악과 교육과정의 개발 및 적합성 검토가 후속 연구로 수행되어야 한다.This study aims to analyze the characteristics of the revised music curriculum of North and South and draw implications associated with curriculum integration between the two countries. This study set out to compare North and South Korean music curriculums in organization, document system, and content by the item(character, goal, content, teaching and learning direction, evaluation direction, and writing direction for textbooks). The comparison results were as follows: First, both the North and South Korean music curriculums set the definitions and roles of the music subject and its expression and appreciation domains as major areas, which suggests that both of them need to continue these basic items since they are common between their curriculums. Secondly, the North Korean music curriculum was different from its South Korean counterpart in offering the Music and Dance”subject, putting an emphasis on patriotism and ideology, providing specific achievement criteria, and setting directions for textbook writing in details. North and South Korea need to narrow a gap in important issues such as different views of roles of curriculums and textbooks and ideological aspects. These differences between North and South Korean music curriculums can be resolved by doing research on North and South Korean music curriculums associated with the general introduction, basic research to overcome differences in musical terms between North and South Korea, and follow-up research on the development of common music curriculums between North and South Korea and the review of their fitness.

Changzoo Song (bio) Perspectives on Korean Unification and Economic Integration, edited by Young Back Choi, Yesook Merrill, Yung Y. Yang, and Semoon Chang. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2001. 193 pp. $85.00 cloth. The collapse of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the consequent unification of Germany in 1990 opened new prospects for Korea's reunification. Especially with the grim economic situation in North Korea, German-style "absorption" unification seemed a natural course for the two Koreas. Nonetheless, the difficulties experienced by Germany after the unification called for more practical assessments of the costs and benefits of Korea's unification. This was the background when unification discussions in Korea actively began to embrace economic, cultural, and social considerations in the 1990s. In the past, the discussions had been very much dominated by political discourse. The book under review reflects such a change in unification discussion. Composed of twelve articles, the book can be roughly divided into three parts: the first three articles examine security issues of the Korean peninsula; the next six articles deal with economic integration and cooperation between North and South Korea; and the last three articles analyze the costs and benefits of unification. While the book covers several different issues from different angles, the contributors have a relatively unified view. This is that an abrupt collapse of North Korea will result in huge costs. They therefore advocate gradual integration. In this respect, the book supports the "Sunshine Policy" of South Korea's former president Kim Dae-Jung. Such a view is well represented in Tony Hall's introduction, in which he observes that North Korean people's perception of foreigners (especially Americans) became much more favourable in the late 1990s after food aid programs. Such changes in "ordinary people's thinking can play an important role in its leaders' reaching out," he states (p. XV). In a similar vein, Young-Sun Lee argues that gradual unification would cost less (chapter 10), and Young-Back Choi suggests immediate unification would not bring any good either to North or South Korea (chapter 12). One of the most controversial articles in the book is "Cost and Benefits of Unification" by Choi. This article argues that, contrary to the belief of Korean nationalists, South Korea would not benefit from unification in terms of natural resources, cheap labor, bargaining power, or defense budget reduction. Choi estimates that South Korea will have to assume all the costs to develop North Korea, to produce welfare provisions, and to solve social conflicts if the two countries are unified. Based on this assessment, Choi carefully, but confidently, contends "no unification" is a "superior alternative" for both Koreas (p. 175). While the idea that unification would be too chaotic and costly is not totally [End Page 140] new, it is rare to see such a daring view openly declared. As most Koreans believe that unification is an absolute necessity, Choi's argument is innovative and makes this book rather special. A further important article is "Can Reindustrialization of North Korea Support a Sustainable Food Supply?" This article maintains that North Korea, in its comparative disadvantage in agricultural production, would be able to import grains if it hosted labor-intensive light industry such as textiles and footwear manufacturing from South Korea (p. 83). By so doing, this article directly supports the Sunshine Policy and South Korea's project to build industrial complexes in North Korea. While the book poses good arguments for a functionalist approach to national integration, it suffers from some defects. Although the book focuses on economic cooperation between the two Koreas, including telecommunication cooperation, the possible benefit of the Trans-Korean Railway if connected to the Chinese and Russian railway systems is not covered. In addition, some of the articles in the book are too short to be able to offer a sustained argument. For example, chapters 3 and 2 are only four and six pages each. In chapter 12 some footnotes are numbered incorrectly. A more serious problem, however, lies in the volume's heavily economic orientation. While this is understandable if we consider that most of the contributors to the book are economists, some readers may find this volume's orientation...

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between two Koreas. This paper reviews history and scope of economic cooperation between two Koreas, leading to conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The SouthNorth Joint Communique states that reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means; that the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes; and that the two sides shall institute various exchanges in economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee.Regardless of cooperative spirit expressed in 1972 communique, economic cooperation between two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: lack of progress on political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, focus of North Korean issues shifted to development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting Framework in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with United States, South Korea, and Japan as organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to continued and extended failure of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under 1994 Agreed Framework. KEDO was more a political arrangement than an act of economic cooperation. We thus turn our attention to economic cooperation.Dawn of Economic CooperationAlthough trade between two Koreas began in late 1980s, first meaningful event in inter-Korean economic cooperation occurred on January 13, 1998, when Chung Ju-young, founder of Hyundai chaebol, traveled to North Korea through China and signed an agreement with North Korea on what would later be known as Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Chung's visit to North Korea was made possible by election of Kim Dae-jung as President of South Korea in December 1997.During his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung announced his Sunshine Policy for dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, which led to President Kim winning Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. …

IntroductionGiven the gravity and urgency of North Korean issues, the U.S. cannot avoid addressing highly uncertain prospects in the North. Although Korea is a middle-sized country-the North and South Koreas together are roughly the same size as Britain and have a combined population of 70 million, Koreans feel small because they live amid giants. Their geopolitical neighbors are China, Japan, Russia, and America, whose spheres of influence overlap in Korea. As a result, the peninsula has been over the past 50 years the site of recurrent collisions between great power interests.Ever since the Korean War, two rival governments, communist in the North and capitalist in the South, have been locked in mortal combat. Half a century later, there is still no peace on the horizon. By American estimates, North Korea has i.i million troops; South Korea has 700,000, which, however, are augmented by 37,000 American armed forces. All men have military experience, and millions (the number of reserve troops is 4.7 million in North Korea and 4.5 million in South Korea) are eligible for call-up in case of war (Kim, 2003, pp. 8-9). Since Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack on July 8, 1994, the future of North Korea became the core of Northeast Asian security issues. Arguments focus on North Korea's current situation, policy directions, and the results of its policies.The U.S. has recently questioned how to confront sponsoring terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. Policymakers face two choices: engagement or confrontation. In the past, the Clinton administration had engaged with North Korea to prevent its development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Bush administration quickly put North Korean relations on hold until a policy review was conducted. By early July 200i, the new administration's policy, under the influence of Colin Powell, validated a continuation of the U.S.-North Korean dialogue. However, North Korea expressed strong concern through other channels that the Bush administration operated under a di∂erent and more di[double dagger]cult set of principles than the Clinton administration. North Korea's view of the Bush administration's tougher line on relations was validated in 2002. In the past, the U.S. State Department had labeled North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as rogue states whose military policy and support of other groups threatened Washington's security. In his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, however, Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an axis of evil, thus extending his war on terrorism. A series of one-sided hard-line actions taken by both sides since then has caused their relationship to deteriorate along the following pathway: engagement [arrow right] containment [arrow right] confrontation [arrow right] regional crisis [arrow right] international crisis. Consequently, daily headlines about this newly strained relationship between the two old enemies filled the news media around the world though this stando∂ has been somewhat overshadowed by the Iraq war since March 2003.In our dialogue, we will first discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Second, we will analyze four ways of dealing with the nuclear deadlock, backing our views with a survey of MBA students. Third, we will argue why the U.S. should publicly announce its clear-cut position on North Korea's nuclear program once and for all. Finally, we will argue why engagement is the only viable option to resolve the latest altercation between the U.S and North Korea on nuclear weapons.North Korean Nuclear Weapons ProgramIn i989, it became undeniably obvious that North Korea was assembling the elements of a nuclear weapons program. However, its nuclear technology emerged as early as the late i950s; the program gained momentum in the i960s and again in the mid-i980s. North Korea initially obtained a small research reactor from the Soviet Union and later began construction on a larger reactor at the Yongbyon site. …

This study addresses whether North Korea–China trade dilutes the effectiveness of the unilateral sanctions imposed by South Korea and Japan, and if so, to what extent and in what way. The structural adjustment of North Koreas export pattern in size and trade type dilutes the effectiveness of the unilateral sanctions imposed by South Korea in particular. South Koreas economic sanctions significantly boost North Koreas exports to China, and the export increase has been substantial to cover the loss from the sanctions. North Korea has increased exports to the Chinese domestic market (by general trade) and those passing through China (by bonded trade). These findings show that North Korea has mitigated the economic damage of sanctions by employing various techniques for trade diversion. Changes occur because incentives for both North Korean regime and foreign firms are expedient particularly after South Koreas sanctions.

Purpose: This study seeks to present ways to realize tourism and unification for North and South Koreas based on the development of tourist destinations which can help link tourism to exchanges including mutual visits for the separated families of North and South Koreas, the North-South dialogue, politics, economy, culture and sports by developing tourist destinations from which politics of the two Koreas are fully excluded towards the realization of multi purposed tourism as well as the realization of mutual tourism for the two Koreans absent South Korean tourists for North Korea. Based on which, it would be possible to review, first, the development of tourist destina-tions of South Korea through which South Koreans can visit Mt. Geumgang of North Korea and North Koreans can visit tourist destinations of South Korea. Second, it would be possible to review a plan for carrying out ex-changes for the mutual visits of separated families by linking the exchanges of separated families of North and South Koreas at Mt. Geumgang of North Korea with tourist destinations of South Korea. Third, by developing tourist destinations for the purposes of tourism only which North Korea might demand, it would be possible to review alternatives for North Korea s South Korean tourist destinations in the future. Fourth, based on the afore-said, the purpose of tourism and unification may be realized and tourist exchanges may be reviewed under the premise of free travel. Methods: This study seeks to analyze changes in the tourism related conditions according to the expected changes in the North-South Korean relations and changes in tourism due to the expected changes of the North-South Korean relations via the previous data. Furthermore, through the current status of human exchanges of North Korea, the start of the North-South Korean tourism, and the performance achievements of Mt. Geumgang tourism, this study seeks to examine and understand the changes in the North-South Korean relations according to the North-South Korean summit and the tourism related feng shui storytelling intended for the North-South Korean tourism. Results: Achieving a form of tourism through the North-South Korean exchanges is the top priority. Hence, in order to achieve the purpose of feng shui tourism in the future, it would be necessary to develop the tourist destinations from which politics of North and South Koreas are completely excluded. Towards this end, it is necessary to develop a tourist program by utilizing the tomb of Kim Tae-Seo located at Mt. Moak in Jeonbuk in which the North Korean leadership expressed deep interest ever since the North-South Summit of 2000. To this end, it will be necessary to develop a program which utilizes the storytelling of tourist feng shui utilizing the simple Korean culture which goes beyond the politics, while developing tourism. Conclusion: Tourism has clear points of contact for the unification, and it will be necessary to utilize the points of contact for the North-South Korean tourism through the mutual linkage of the North-South Korean relations moving forward to achieve the purpose of tourism and expect the unification on the Korean Peninsula.

IntroductionThe North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens from Japan by agents of the North Korean government happened during a period of six years from 1977 to 1983. Although only 16 (eight men and eight women) are officially recognized by the JapaThe nese government, there may have been as many as 70 to 80 Japanese abducted. Analysts believe that some victims were abducted to teach the Japanese language and culture at North Korean spy schools, while other victims were also abducted with the intent of stealing their identities.The abduction of Japanese citizens by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, can be distinguished from other foreign policy issues that Japan faces for the following two reasons. First, this is a rare-probably the only- major diplomatic issue in which Japan is a victim of an egregious act committed by an external entity. For the first time, Japan is conducting diplomacy in order to recover the original status and receive due compensation. As is usual for a novice, unfortunately, Japan has not scored well. The Japanese government says that the abduction issue is the highest priority among the issues between Japan and DPRK and has been putting forth a remarkable effort.1 Yet the goal Japan set might have been too ambitious and might have left too little room for negotiation.The second reason for the uniqueness of the abduction issue is the remarkable convergence of basic policy lines across the Japanese political spectrum. Very few members of the Japanese Diet are openly opposed to pressuring the DPRK on this issue. According to a survey by the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea,2 dubbed Sukuukai in Japanese, 82 percent of the Diet members supported the idea of additional economic sanctions in the event that the DPRK does not show the results of reinvestigation that will lead to the repatriation of all victims.3Public Outrage and Stalemate4The abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea took place in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. At the time, very little was known about the location or fate of the missing people. When a newspaper article reported in 1980 that the missing people might have been kidnapped by a foreign agent, it did not attract much attention from the politicians and was dismissed as mere speculation by the police. This started to change after two incidents. The first was the arrest, in 1985, of a North Korean agent who was carrying the passport of Tadaaki Hara, who disappeared from a beach in Miyazaki Prefecture in June 1980. Then, in 1987, an arrested North Korean agent named Kim Hyong-hee, who perpetrated the bombing of Korean Air flight 858 on November 29 of that year, told the police that she learned the Japanese language from an abducted Japanese person whose name was Yaeko Taguchi. Taguchi had disappeared from the same beach as Hara did, but in 1978. The circumstantial evidence seemed to suggest that North Korea was somehow involved in the missing persons incidents.In early 1988, following Kim Hyon Hee's confession, the abduction issue was raised in the Diet of Japan for the first time. In March, answering a question in the Diet, Seiroku Kajiyama of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced that missing persons incidents in the 1970s and the 1980s might have been the result of abductions by North Korea. However, Kajiyama's statement did not lead to substantial action by the foreign ministry. The ministry told the family members of the missing people, to their dismay, that without formal diplomatic relations with North Korea or concrete evidence of North Korea's responsibility, the Japanese government could do little about the issue.Following the end of the Cold War and improved relations between North and South Korea, Japan sought to engage with North Korea in a more friendly manner. In 1990, a Japanese delegation led by Shin Kanemaru, a heavyweight of the LDP, and Makoto Tanabe, a senior member of the Socialist Party, visited North Korea in order to facilitate the negotiations on diplomatic normalization. …

This paper raises the necessity and utility of environmental cooperation in the context of the climate change crisis caused by environmental pollution and the strained North-South relations influenced by the US-China rivalry. It presents a plan for the domestic legal revision needed to facilitate this. Particularly, in the case of North and South Korea, where land and sea are interconnected, a joint response to climate change is necessary, and such cooperation can be mutually beneficial. Additionally, environmental improvement projects in North Korea can enhance the quality of life of its residents, offering a humanitarian aspect and potentially not conflicting with international sanctions against North Korea. In this regard, efforts for environmental cooperation are necessary for both Koreas, and there is a considerable possibility that North Korea will respond to these efforts. According to reports submitted to the UN and others, environmental pollution in North Korea is at a serious level, and there is observed intent to seek international support for its resolution. This situation implies that the resolution of environmental issues between North and South Korea can at least be achieved within the framework of multilateral international cooperation. The South Korean government has proposed the “Green Detente” policy as part of its North Korea policy to address the problems arising from climate change in North and South Korea and East Asia. The Green Detente can be understood as a process that aims for unification through reconciliation and cooperation by enhancing mutual benefits through cooperation in the environmental sector, which is a non-political field. In a situation where political exchanges are difficult, environmental cooperation has the advantage of being less burdensome as it can be conducted through local governments, private sector, or so-called 1.5 track exchanges. However, when examining the current state of domestic legislation for promoting the Green Detente as part of this policy, several limitations and problems have been identified. Firstly, our laws do not anticipate the divided situation and are not formulated to be applicable to North Korean areas. Nor is there a special law for the promotion of Green Detente. Even if there were such a law, it would not be simple to pre-emptively legislate for various unpredictable situations. Therefore, the most useful approach currently available is to create a legislative environment for the implementation of the Green Detente policy by revising laws, particularly those governing North-South relations and laws addressing environmental pollution and disaster preparedness. A brief examination reveals that the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, which regulates all areas of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, needs revision due to unnecessary and complex regulatory elements concerning environmental exchange and cooperation. Individual environmental laws lack the foundation for research and study on North Korean areas and nearly lack provisions considering the possibility of cooperation with North Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to legislate including plans for cooperation, investigation, and research on North Korean areas in the provisions for establishing basic plans in individual environmental laws. Additionally, provisions related to international cooperation may be difficult to apply to bilateral cooperation issues between North and South Korea. The revision of domestic laws should be done in a way that respects the basic principles of unification under the constitution, does not harm North-South relations, prepares for unification, and complies with international standards on environmental issues.

In 2010, with the implementation of the May 24th measures, inter-Korean economic cooperation was suspended in all areas except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Then, in 2016, with the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, all inter-Korean economic cooperation came to a halt. The joint venture enterprises in inter-Korean economic cooperation were mainly concentrated in the Pyongyang region. However, there was a case of inter-Korean economic cooperation in the form of a joint venture enterprise outside the Kaesong Industrial Complex that could be accessed using the entry and exit procedures of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. South-North Equity Joint Venture Enterprise in Kaesong can utilize the industrial, transportation, and transit facilities of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and has the advantage of active participation by North Korea, which holds shares. In the Equity Joint Venture Act, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for setting land usage fees, ease the all-out agreement system, and ensure education for workers. In addition, it is necessary to fairly define subsequent procedures in cases where consultation is impossible. Under the North-South Economic Cooperation Act, it is necessary to simplify the North's project approval process and stipulate that the North should manage its property in good faith, at least to a minimum extent, in special circumstances. The law on the development of inter-Korean relations needs to clearly define the special relationship between North and South Korea and elevate the legal status of the inter-Korean agreements to the level of general treaties. The law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should clearly stipulate in writing the procedures for obtaining North Korean visit approvals and for importing and exporting goods, and should minimize the time required for these processes. The agreement on investment protection between North and South Korea should specify in detail the abnormal issues that impede economic cooperation and provide for step-by-step investment protection accordingly. Regarding the agreement on the resolution of commercial disputes between North and South Korea, the follow-up procedures of the agreement should be promptly carried out, and the establishment of a governing law that applies to both North and South Korea is necessary. The inter-Korean agreement went through the legislative approval process outlined in Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, thereby establishing its legal validity. However, due to North Korea's non-compliance, it has become practically ineffective. However, as North Korea has not explicitly rejected the validity of the agreement, it is not advisable to disregard the agreement and its provisions in preparation for future inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea has been attempting to improve its external economy through scientific and technological exchanges, economic development zones, and other means since the 2010s. However, the situation has worsened due to North Korea's nuclear tests leading to U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19. Due to COVID-19, there have been zero exchanges of people between North and South Korea for a period of two years starting from 2021. In the current tense situation of strained inter-Korean relations, inter-Korean economic cooperation should be carried out flexibly and adaptively, taking into account the interests of both North and South Korea and contributing to their reunification, in accordance with the dynamics of inter-Korean and international relations.

Why does North Korea want to possess nuclear capabilities? In order to find the answer to this question, we must have an accurate understanding of the history and structure of the North Korean regime. So far, we have only formed conjectures and predictions regarding North Korea based on our own perspectives; we now need to deal with and consider North Korea “as is” to reach viable solutions to the issues North Korea presents. This volume contains analyses of the most salient, critical issues pertinent to understanding the North Korean regime, penned by representative Korean scholars of North Korea. As such, the book examines the historical formation of North Korea, the identities of those power elite, and the relative stability (or instability, as the case may be) of the new regime under Kim Jong-un. Also an important aspect to consider is the possibility of socio-economic change in North Korea. Though North Korea has remained relatively static vis-à-vis its political and military systems, it is in the process of becoming rapidly marketized, having continued various attempts to modify its economic policy. In the social realm, said economic shift has elicited the polarization of the disparate classes and the expansion of individualism. Such social transformations, obscured by the easily visible political reality of North Korea, can provide solid grounds for determining the future of the North Korea regime. Moreover, it is imperative that we accurately understand the motivation behind North Korea’s intention to develop nuclear weapons—namely, the expansion of deterrence. We must recognize the reasons for the North Korean hostility toward the United States from the very beginning of the DPRK formation and the North Korean fixation on nuclear weapons development. Further, we need to understand the nature of relations between China and North Korea—relations on which the international community has focused since North Korea began its nuclear testing—as well as the history and structure of relations between North and South Korea. Only when we accurately understand North Korea can we reach solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue. The studies in this volume by Korean scholars will reveal the veiled background of the visible phenomena and thereby help the readers to correctly understand the North Korean behaviors hitherto misunderstood (or even those that were impossible to understand).