썅산(香山)혁명기념관의 역사서사 재구성과 시진핑 ‘개인숭배’의 상관성 분석

Revolution? What Revolution? Yongjin Zhang (bio) Wars and revolutions, Hannah Arendt once famously claimed, “determined the physiognomy of the twentieth century.” 1 For one thing, the two World Wars had devastating and destructive impacts on the historical development of the century. Think also of the systemic challenges to the international order presented by the Bolshevik Revolution and the Chinese Communist Revolution, which attempted to create and sustain different domestic political and economic orders founded on a rival socioeconomic system and ideology. Furthermore there was the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, the 1959 Cuban Revolution, and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and one could also point to anticolonial revolutions that delegitimized imperialism and made the sovereign order global. China had its own share of wars and revolutions in the twentieth century. The modern transformation of the country is characteristically marked by the 1911 Republican Revolution, which ended its dynastic history and changed the Chinese body politic. It is also marked by the deadly contest between the Nationalist and Communist revolutions in what are often called the “revolutionary civil wars,” leading to the Communist victory and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Mao Zedong and his comrades continued to wage revolution after 1949, culminating in the disastrous Cultural Revolution of 1966–76. As a revolutionary power in the postwar international system, China actively promoted revolution worldwide, exporting it as one thrust of the country’s foreign policy. It was Deng Xiaoping who launched the “second revolution” through opening and reform in 1978, which changed the country from a revolutionary power to a reformist state. It is therefore only natural that fundamental changes in China in the twentieth century are often understood in terms of successive revolutions—or continuous revolution, as Mao would have it. By the same token, revolution, either as a critical perspective or as a descriptive, analytical, and normative term, has become deeply entrenched and practically indispensable in the study of Chinese history and politics. [End Page 154] Wittingly or not, Elizabeth Economy’s The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State largely follows this analytical mode in an attempt to make sense of China’s contemporary transformation under the leadership of Xi Jinping. “Deng’s ‘second revolution’ had drawn to a close,” Economy asserts, and “Xi Jinping’s ‘third revolution’ was underway” (p. 10). She judiciously selects six areas of Xi’s top reform priorities for critical examination. Chapters 2 to 7 each provide a captivating account of the transformation of China’s political institutions and processes that led to the dramatic centralization of authority. These are symbolized by the declaration of Xi as the core of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, the intensified penetration of society by the party-state through the control of the internet and of the free flow of ideas and information, the reassertion of the party in the decision-making of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the expanded role of the SOEs in core sectors of the Chinese economy, the government’s drive to reinvent China as an innovative nation, the war on pollution, and finally China’s ambition under Xi to reassert itself as a great power in world politics through the exercise of its growing hard and soft power. Economy investigates these ongoing transformative changes in China not as a disinterested academic but as an acutely involved policy analyst concerned with understanding the “seeming inconsistencies and ambiguities of Chinese policy today” (p. x). Her study attempts “to assess the relative success or shortcomings of the Chinese leadership’s initiatives on their own merits” (p. xi). The analysis is punctuated by conversations with Chinese officials, interviews of think-tank analysts and civil-society activists, and discussions with Chinese scholars in Beijing, Shanghai, Dubai, and Washington, D.C. There are also encounters with Jack Ma at the Economic Club of New York and debates at New York University. Cutting through the maze of what she calls “fast-changing, contradictory and occasionally misleading information” (p. x) about the transformation of China that has arguably overloaded information circuits, Economy has carefully woven a rich tapestry that provides a big picture while also including telling and baroque details of China’s ongoing...

It All Hinges on China: Environmental Governance in the Twenty-First Century

The communist revolution of China was led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded in 1921 in the wake of the May Fourth movement. The CCP began as a very small Marxist‐inspired left‐wing intellectual club, with little political influence prior to its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) in 1924. The GMD were motivated to ally with the CCP in order to obtain support from the Soviet Union in their fight with the northern warlords. With the help of the CCP, the GMD was remodeled from a loose organization into a Leninist party, and the GMD also received financial and other support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the CCP also developed quickly by infiltrating the GMD‐controlled army and by expanding its organizations in the urban and rural areas of southern China. While the alliance between the GMD and CCP brought great success for both parties, tensions also grew as the parties pursued different agendas. After the initial military success against the warlords during the Northern Expedition, a growing number of the GMD's leaders and generals became very unhappy about the CCP's infiltration into the GMD‐controlled army as well as about the CCP's radical property redistribution policy, which was implemented in the territories recently occupied by the GMD's Northern Expedition army. As a result they no longer wanted to share power with the CCP. In early 1927, shortly after Northern Expedition troops occupied Shanghai, the GMD started to purge the CCP‐controlled organizations in the city and labeled the CCP an illegal organization. The purge soon spread, with hundreds of thousands of CCP members and their sympathizers arrested and killed. In response, the CCP staged several military uprisings in late 1927 in places where they had strong influence. While all these uprisings were easily suppressed by the GMD army, the surviving members of the CCP were able to retreat to mountain areas and conduct guerrilla warfare.

The communist revolution of China was led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded in 1921 in the wake of the May Fourth movement. The CCP began as a very small Marxist‐inspired left‐wing intellectual club, with little political influence prior to its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) in 1924. The GMD were motivated to ally with the CCP in order to obtain support from the Soviet Union in their fight with the northern warlords. With the help of the CCP, the GMD was remodeled from a loose organization into a Leninist party, and the GMD also received financial and other support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the CCP also developed quickly by infiltrating the GMD‐controlled army and by expanding its organizations in the urban and rural areas of southern China. While the alliance between the GMD and CCP brought great success for both parties, tensions also grew as the parties pursued different agendas. After the initial military success against the warlords during the Northern Expedition, a growing number of the GMD's leaders and generals became very unhappy about the CCP's infiltration into the GMD‐controlled army as well as about the CCP's radical property redistribution policy, which was implemented in the territories recently occupied by the GMD's Northern Expedition army. As a result they no longer wanted to share the power with the CCP. In early 1927, shortly after Northern Expedition troops occupied Shanghai, the GMD started to purge the CCP‐controlled organizations in the city and labeled the CCP an illegal organization. The purge soon spread, with hundreds of thousands of CCP members and their sympathizers arrested and killed. In response, the CCP staged several military uprisings in late 1927 in places where they had strong influence. While all these uprisings were easily suppressed by the GMD army, the surviving members of the CCP were able to retreat to mountain areas and conduct guerrilla warfare.

Haunted by Chaos: China's Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping

Reviewed by: Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army Peter O. Hefron (bio) Lanxin Xiang . Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army. Lanham, New York, and Oxford: University Press of America, 1998. xi, 223 pp. Hardcover $37.50, ISBN 0-7618-1129-x. Lanxin Xiang, Professor of International History at Geneva's Graduate Institute of International Studies, has written a well-researched work that is part biography of Chen Yi and part military history of the Chinese Communist Revolution. It traces Chen Yi's career from radical student to founder and commander of the New Fourth Army (NFA). It is also a military history of the NFA, dealing especially with its pivotal role in destroying the main power base of the Guomindang (GMD) in central and eastern China during the 1947-1949 period. One of the book's strengths is Xiang's use of his interviews with surviving members of the NFA as well as his utilization of newly published primary sources, mainly from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The history of the Eighth Route Army, created by the veterans of the Long March, is well known. Xiang provides us with an in-depth look at what happened to those scattered Chinese Communist Party (CCP) guerrilla units in Southeast China that the CCP Central Committee left behind at the start of the Long March. From these units and their commanders arose the New Fourth Army. He traces the evolution and unification of these units during their three years of isolation from Mao Zedong's Yan'an headquarters. Communications were reestablished in late 1937, parallel to the creation of the second CCP-GMD United Front. From the surviving thirteen thousand "Red Bandits," Mao in Yan'an, Chen Yi and his guerrilla cohorts in southern China, and the Guomindang fashioned the New Fourth Army from October to December 1937. Xiang gives a detailed analysis of the chief battles of the NFA as well as of the controversies between Mao and the NFA leadership over correct military and political strategy. The NFA soon became a microcosm for the factional rivalry between Mao's real and imagined enemies within the CCP, ranging from the pro Stalinist Comintern group to potential rightists among CCP military officers. The NFA ostensibly harbored both varieties. The NFA also served as the arena for strategic debates between Mao and the NFA's leadership, soon personified by Chen Yi and a number of his generals such as Su Yu, Ye Fei, and Huang Kechang. At issue were three matters: Should the CCP continue to rely on Mao's guerrilla warfare strategy or escalate permanently to conventional mobile warfare using regular CCP troop units? By 1947, mobile warfare was favored and successfully practiced by the NFA. To do otherwise, Chen felt, would extend the civil war by allowing the GMD to dominate the battlefield. [End Page 248] Should the NFA follow Mao's periodic desire to rebuild the CCP guerrilla bases south of the Yangzi River or follow Chen's strategy of taking the revolution to the GMD's strategic heartland north of the Yangzi River? Xiang discusses this seesaw debate in detail. Finally, should the CCP's chief goal for the second CCP-GMD United Front be to fight the Japanese invaders or to use it as cover for the CCP to expand its territory, troops, and population at the expense of the GMD? Unlike the other two issues, this latter debate was easily won by Mao. Soon most of the NFA leadership accepted Mao's view that the anti-Japanese war was secondary. CCP expansion, even at the risk of restarting the civil war, was necessary if Mao was to defeat the GMD government after the Western Allies defeated Japan. Xiang includes an analysis of Mao's pre-1949 purges of his CCP opponents, most notably the anti-Bolshevik purge of the early 1930s and the 1942 rectification of both Rightists and Cominternists. Mao's egocentric determination to become "China's Stalin" through periodic purges, regardless of their impact on the revolution, is a forerunner of post-1949 Maoist excesses. Inevitably these issues focus the author's attention on the credibility...

TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA 111 RED LITERATI: COMMUNIST EDUCATORS AT ANYUAN, 1921-25 ELIZABETH J. PERRY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY Despite an accumulation of excellent scholarship on the Chinese Communist revolution, we are still hard pressed to offer a compelling answer to a question that goes to the heart of explaining the revolution’s success: How did the urbane intellectuals who founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manage to cultivate a large and loyal following among such a distant stratum of the populace—illiterate and impoverished peasants and workers? Some scholars have pointed to the appeal of nationalism whereas others have emphasized the allure of class struggle as key to the Communists’ mobilizing effort,1 yet in either case it remains unclear just how a cadre of educated, cosmopolitan students and teachers conveyed their message across the enormous cultural gulf that separated them from the downtrodden masses. One might ask a similar question of many revolutions, of course, in light of the leadership role that intellectuals have typically played in nationalist and Communist movements around the world.2 It seems especially perplexing in the case of China, however, where Confucian precepts had long fostered a stark distinction between mental and manual labor. The superior status of the educated literati, celebrated in Mencius’ dictum that “those who labor with their brains rule over those who labor with their brawn,” contributed to a huge social and political distance between the “cultured” and “uncultured.” Moreover, although the iconoclastic New Culture Movement of the early twentieth century inspired many progressive Chinese intellectuals to repudiate Confucianism in favor first of anarchism and then of Marxism-Leninism, among ordinary workers and peasants these radical new ideas had made few inroads. How, then, did the highly educated young Communists manage to communicate foreign concepts of nationalism and Communism to their uneducated—and initially unreceptive—constituency? And how did such communication , in turn, translate into revolutionary action? For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I thank Nara Dillon, Christopher A. Reed, and two anonymous reviewers. 1 On nationalism, see the classic statement by Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); and the more recent study by S.A. Smith, Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai, 1895-1927 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). On class struggle, see Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). 2 John H. Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: Wiley, 1962); Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). April 2007 ELIZABETH J. PERRY 112 Stephen C. Averill, before his untimely death, was on the threshold of providing an answer to this question through his meticulous scholarship linking the educational reforms of the late Qing and early Republican eras to the Communist revolution. As Averill observes in his book on the early Communist movement in Jiangxi, “it was a revolution promoted primarily by educated young scions of local elite families, who worked through activities centered on schools, study societies and other education-related institutions to introduce a radical political and social agenda into local elite political culture.”3 In making this argument, Averill departs from previous scholarly analyses. Helen Chauncey, for example, characterized the early Communists as “cautious, sometimes stymied, always uncomfortable in their approach to local school communities.”4 Although Chauncey acknowledges that schools became important centers for mobilization during the final stages of the Communist revolution, she attributes this later development to the cumulative effects of misguided Nationalist education policies, rather than to any conscious effort on the part of the CCP: “a matter of historical fortune, not party foresight.”5 This paper, which examines Communist activities at the Anyuan coal mine, supports Averill’s contention that schools and other education-related institutions were a central element in CCP strategy from the very beginning of the movement. But the impact of such institutions was not confined to elite circles. Radical intellectuals from elite families—“Red Literati” as I call them—drew creatively upon their social standing, moral authority and personal ties with local power holders to garner...

The victory of a revolutionary struggle depends on the effectiveness of the strategies. Mao Zedong argued that the success of the Chinese communist revolution relied on the three grand strategies that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had adopted – party building, armed struggle, and the united front. Mao praised them as the CCP's three magic weapons. Yet, between 1921 and 1935, the CCP was most of the time under the strong influence of the Communist International (Comintern), and its strategy was rather incoherent, to say the least. It was only after 1935, and especially after the 1940s when Mao ascended to become the CCP's paramount leader, that these grand strategies became the guiding principles of the revolution.

The End of China’s Reform Era Carl Minzner (bio) keywords China, Xi Jinping, Governance, Political Reform [End Page 83] executive summary This essay examines recent developments suggesting that China’s post-1978 reform era has ended and assesses the economic, ideological, and political implications. main argument The late 1970s saw Chinese leaders steer their country out of the chaos and stagnation of the Maoist era, launching the policies of “reform and opening up.” In subsequent decades, domestic Chinese politics were marked by three core factors: (1) rapid economic growth, (2) ideological openness, and (3) relative political stability as the result of partially institutionalized norms, such as those governing the retirement and succession of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. However, all of these factors are ending. Foreign media coverage has focused on recent elite political developments, such as the CCP’s proclamation of a “new era” under Xi Jinping and the removal of constitutional term limits on his role as president. But these developments are the culmination of much deeper shifts dating back to the early 2000s—with even older roots. Recent events merely illustrate how these trends have steadily deepened over the last two years. policy implications • In the short term, policymakers should expect China to evolve in the direction of a harsher and more personalized authoritarian system. • In the medium to long term, China will likely experience a revival of the sources of domestic political instability that marked the pre-1978 era—elite political turmoil, escalating social conflict, and rising ethno-nationalist sentiment directed at minorities and foreigners alike. • Beijing’s interest in increasing its economic and diplomatic influence overseas will continue unabated, with Chinese-language media and ethnic Chinese communities outside China as the first targets. Foreign firms and entities operating within China should also expect an increasingly unfavorable ideological and political climate. • Democratic countries should respond to Chinese pressure by reaffirming their liberal democratic values rather than giving into the nativist sentiment currently sweeping many Western nations. [End Page 84] In the late 1970s, China’s rulers steered the country out of the political turmoil and economic stagnation of the Maoist era, launching the policies of “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang). During the decades-long reform era that followed, domestic politics were marked by three core factors: (1) rapid economic growth, (2) ideological openness, and (3) relative political stability as the result of partially institutionalized norms, such as those governing the retirement and succession of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. All of these conditions are ending. Foreign media coverage of China has focused on recent elite political developments, such as the CCP’s proclamation in fall 2017 that the nation has entered a “new era” (xin shidai) under Xi Jinping, the removal of constitutional term limits on his role as president in spring 2018, and other indications that China is steadily evolving in the direction of an extended period of one-man rule. But these developments are merely the culmination of a much deeper set of changes that extend back to the early 2000s, with roots that go back even further. Political, economic, and ideological developments over the past two years merely illustrate how these trends are steadily deepening. This essay examines these trends. Drawing from my recent book, the first section sketches out how the core political, economic, and ideological characteristics that had marked the reform era have eroded.1 The second section explores developments since 2016. The third section outlines the implications of these trends. the end of china’s reform era Economics Rapid growth has been the beating heart of China’s renaissance. First-time visitors inevitably remark on the efficient high-speed rail network, the unending proliferation of Starbucks coffeehouses, and the ever-expanding number of newly opened shopping centers (and online apps) offering the latest in consumer products. All are the products of China’s astounding reform-era economic boom. Starting in 1978, the nation averaged 10% GDP growth annually for three decades, one of the highest rates in world history. The results have been spectacular. In the late 1970s, China was poorer than Afghanistan, India, and Zaire. By 2016, not only [End Page 85] had the...

The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) abolished its total ban on religious activities in 1982. However, the distrust that the CCP feels for religions remains obvious today, and the religious restrictions in contemporary China remain tight. Conventional wisdom tells us that the official atheist ideology of Marxism-Leninism is the main reason behind the CCP’s distrust for, and restriction of, religion. However, taking a historical institutionalist perspective, this paper argues that the religious restrictions in contemporary China are in fact rooted in the fierce political struggles of the country’s two major revolutions in the first half of the twentieth century. Without the support of religious groups, the Nationalist Republicans would have found it difficult to survive and succeed in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty during the Chinese Republican Revolution in the first decade of the twentieth century. Likewise, without cooperating with a wide range of religious groups, the CCP would have struggled to defeat the Nationalist regime and the Japanese invaders in the Chinese Communist Revolution between 1920s and 1940s. Thanks to the collaborations and struggles with various religious groups during the two revolutions which lead to its eventual ascent to power, the CCP thoroughly understands the organisational strength and mobilising capability embedded within religious groups. The tight restrictions on religious affairs in contemporary China is therefore likely to stem from the CCP’s worry that prospective competitors could mobilise religious groups to challenge its rule through launching, supporting, or sponsoring collective actions.

The advancement of constitutional review in 2018 marks a significant constitutional development in China under Xi Jinping. This article examines cases since then and reveals the dual dynamics of Chinese constitutional review: promoting the rule of law and upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On one hand, constitutional review has emerged as an additional channel for protecting human rights, enhancing legislative consistency and improving government accountability. On the other hand, it is deeply politically embedded, as reflected in the determination of priority according to the CCP’s policies, the examination of legislation according to the CCP’s directives, and the enshrinement of Xi’s thoughts and Party’s leadership as fundamental principles of constitutional review. When tensions arise between the CCP’s policies and the constitution or laws, the former often prevails. This article suggests that these dual dynamics of Chinese constitutional review are best understood through the lens of Chinese rule of law, which features a duality: upholding the rule by the Party while safeguarding the authority and autonomy of law. It argues that neither dynamic should be overlooked or overstated. Views that reduce constitutional review to be a mere tool of the CCP’s rule neglect the autonomy of various actors in this process and undermine the rationality and value of constitutional review in regulating modern China. Yet, an independent constitutional review, as entrenched in the Western conception of the rule of law, is unlikely to take root in China owing to the imperative to uphold the CCP’s leadership.

One of the most distinctive aspects of modern Chinese politics is the role of Tse-tung's This study investigates the concrete political and ideological process which gave rise to Mao's thought within the Chinese Communist Party, with special reference to the years 1935-45. This decade, which overlaps the Yenan period in Chinese Communist historiography, opens with Mao Tse-tung's rise to power at the Tsunyi Conference, and closes with the formal incorporation of his thought into the new CCP constitution at the Party's Seventh Congress. In the course of the study, it became apparent that Mao Tse-tung played a strong personal role in fostering the cult of his own person and thought. However, he received the enthusiastic support of a small group of Party intellectuals who gathered around him, of whom the most important is Ch'en Po-ta. Pending further research, conclusions regarding Ch'en's role must remain tentative, hut the initial evidence does suggest his influence on certain aspects of Mao's thinking, and in the formulation of a historio-philosophical rationale for Mao's claim to ideological supremacy. The study falls into two main periods; 1935-40 were years of ideological creativity, when the basic ideas behind Sinified were worked out by Mao and Ch'en; 1940-45 were years of ideological console idation, when the two men worked to systematize and disseminate Mao's thought as the CCP's official guiding doctrine. The conclusion emerges that the cult of Mao and his thought was not merely a simple concomitant of Mao's rise to power during this period. Rather, the dual cult was consciously created and propagated within and without the CCP as a deliberate act of policy on the part of the ascendant Maoists, with Mao and Ch'en very much at the core of this policy. From time to time, developments within the CCP, in Chinese domestic politics, and in the international arena intervened to accelerate or retard the Maoists' deliberate campaign to foster the ascendancy of Mao's thought. However, by the time of the CCP's Seventh Congress in 1945, the victorious Maoists had succeeded in their joint drive for the ''primitive accumulation of political and ideological power. Mao's power was by no means absolute, but the Chinese Communist Party -- and shortly the entire nation -- had entered the era of Tse-tung's In sum, this study contributes to our understanding of the Chinese Communist movement in four areas. It develops previous discussions of the ideological history of the CCP, especially regarding the emergence of the concepts of the Sinification of Marxism and Tse-tung's In using these ideological concepts as points of reference, this thesis also offers a distinctive approach to the study of elite politics within the CCP during the Yenan period. At the same time, Mao Tse-tung's personal role in fostering the twin cult of himself and his thought is brought into sharper focus than in previous studies. Finally, our knowledge of the early career of Ch'en Po-ta is considerably enhanced, particularly regarding his role as Party ideologist and historian in the service of Mao Tse-tung.

Conclusion:Stronger and More Professional Courts—But Still Under Party Control Stanley Lubman (bio) Since Xi Jinping became president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been energetically promoting law reform, which has been on an uncertain path since the 1980s. The current structure and policies of the party-state present several formidable obstacles to the progress of law reform on that path: • The CCP’s determination to maintain its firm hold on Chinese society, as evidenced in its treatment of law as subservient to policy, politicized control of the courts, and repression of speech and action regarded as expressing dissent • The fragmented authoritarianism of the current political system, often manifested in local governments’ deviation from policies and laws issued from Beijing • The influence and impact of Western institutions, as reflected in demands for an enforceable constitution, expanded judicial power to limit the authority of government agencies, and greater transparency of these agencies The five roundtable essays focus principally on the reforms declared in the decision issued at the conclusion of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2014. As Kjeld Eric Brødsgaard points out in his essay, the Central Committee addressed law reform in the fourth meeting even though “party building” would have been next in the customary sequence. The proposed reforms articulate conceptions of the rule of law and the relationship between the party and the operation of the political-legal system (as the courts, procuratorates, and police are commonly referred to because of the closeness with which they operate). In considering these reforms, the roundtable essays raise an issue that has been crucial since the PRC was established in 1949—the uneasy tension between central control over the Chinese bureaucracy and the operation of local governments. Close attention is devoted to how yifa zhiguo, commonly translated as rule by law, is applied and interpreted in [End Page 38] the authoritarian governance of China today. In criminal cases, the courts cooperate with the police and procuracy rather than acting independently, and they are subject to the supreme authority of the party leaders whenever those officials view any issue as touching on party dominance. The essays share a common approach in discussing specific reforms in the operation of the courts, namely recognition that in practice implementation must be carried out within limits imposed by party rule. Decision-making within the courts is structured to support the superiority of party policies and concerns. A prime example is party sensitivity to actions and speeches that are deemed to threaten social stability. Among the concerns that overshadow more than just the work of the courts is strong opposition to the expression of Western values in discussions of law outside the courts, including educational institutions. A particularly important issue addressed by several proposed reforms is the extrajudicial influence of party and government officials on the operation of the courts: One reform would change the locus of responsibility for financing basic-level courts and choosing their judges from local governments to the next highest, provincial levels of government. Another step is a requirement that local court officials report in writing any extrajudicial or otherwise improper attempt to influence judicial outcomes. Discussion here of the essays in this roundtable is grouped under three basic themes: the concept of “rule of law” embedded in the proposed reforms, a summary of those reforms, and reflections on the near-term future of the reforms. Rule of Law—With Chinese Characteristics All five contributors to this roundtable recognize the force and impact of the party’s dedication to maintaining its supremacy and grasp on the Chinese economy and society. Donald Clarke states the essence of the reforms clearly: “the Fourth Plenum Decision contemplates no fundamental reform in the relationship between the legal system and the CCP.” Brødsgaard concludes that “upholding the leadership of the CCP is a necessary precondition for rule according to the law and constitution.” The authors also recognize the party’s anxiety about perceived threats to “social stability.” In this connection, Carl Minzner cites the recent promulgation of a draft law on foreign NGOs that places them...

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has used publicly displayed propaganda art as a means of maintaining power. During the early years of the PRC, propaganda posters played a large role in establishing a cult of personality around Mao Zedong. Today’s propaganda art seeks primarily to garner popular support for President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” campaign. The China Dream, popularized by Xi in 2012, is a nebulous concept that shares many of the materialistic components of the “American Dream,” but simultaneously—and more importantly—emphasizes the Chinese nation’s rejuvenation to a position of wealth and power. China Dream art deviates significantly from Mao era posters and ideology by heavily incorporating ancient Confucian concepts and images. The art focuses not on communist values, but on moralistic ones drawn from the teachings of Confucius that emphasize hierarchy and filial piety. This paper argues that China Dream art is being used not only to create a new source of legitimacy for the Communist Party, but also to establish a cult of personality around President Xi Jinping. As a result, China is transforming into a leader state where the relationship between Xi Jinping and the people is becoming a relationship between ruler and ruled.

Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), disagreement has existed concerning the extent to which Chinese Communism might be considered authentically Marxist. In general, most of the available literature tends to simply accept the Chinese Communist self-identification as Marxist. No binding consensus among independent Sinologists, however, is found and resistance has taken on a variety of forms throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—some partisan and some genuinely analytic. The academic literature produced during the entire period of CCP rule in China has been characterized by wide differences in the acceptance of its Marxist authenticity. It has always been tacitly or explicitly accepted that the Marxism of the CCP at its founding in 1920–1921 was in a form acceptable to the Bolshevik rulers of revolutionary Russia. Having been founded directly through the influence of the Third (or Leninist) International, the CCP had to conform to the Bolshevik interpretation of Marxism. Since Lenin had taken “creative” liberties with the original doctrine, some have maintained that the Marxism of the CCP had never been truly Marxist. To add further difficulty to any analysis of the Marxism of the CCP, it is generally understood that Mao Zedong, who gradually assumed the leadership of the CCP, was not particularly well versed in any variant of Marxism. Over the years and under the pressure of circumstances, Mao delivered varied formulations of his revolutionary ideology. How much those formulations accorded with any variant of Marxism became a matter of interpretation. Some scholars hold that by the time of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao had devised his own ideology. All of this speculation generated controversy within the CCP leadership. By the time of Mao’s demise in 1976, the doctrine of a “second revolution” animated Deng Xiaoping and his followers. It is still a matter of considerable controversy whether that post-Maoist doctrine, in any sense, is Marxist in content or aspiration.