Формирование устойчивой системы экономической безопасности банка в условиях санкционного противодействия

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of functions not raditional to a central bank. In addition to the daily conduct of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector. It is currently overssing the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and is the main owner of Russia's largest commercial bank, Sberbank. As this additional functions may conflict with the CBR policy objectives, I review how the current design of the CBR deviates from the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central bank prescribed in the literature. I then empirically investigate the need for a supervisory body within the CBR. Using a simple Taylor rule framework I find that the CBR does not use its hands-on supervisory information to maintain financial stability, but rather to accomodate state-owned banks' balances.

The subject of the researchis the availability of mortgage as a credit resource for investment funding. The relevance of the problem is due to the development of the mortgage credit lending in the country. The policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and the Russian Government aimed at combating inflation and planned reduction of the key rate created favorable conditions for establishing acceptable bank rates on mortgage loans, which significantly raised the mortgage demand over the past few years. The research shows that Russian commercial banks have reduced mortgage rates and are offering refunding of previously issued mortgage loans, which demonstrates the confidence of the banking sector in the government and economic stability at the macro level. At the same time, the easy access to home mortgage lending can lead to a “financial bubble” problem on the Russian banking market and, moreover, to deterioration of the borrowers’ solvency, and, therefore, loan default.The purpose of the researchwas to examine the current affordability of mortgage as a source of credit resources for investment funding and develop recommendations for improving this process. The paperconcludesthat the government policy of economic and financial stabilization through inflation combating measures and maintaining the key rate by the CBR at the level acceptable for economic growth should be continued. At the same time, the transition from the participation finance to the project-tied system of housing construction financing can possibly increase the loan interest burden on developers and affect the price per square meter for the final buyer. The main factors contributing to the reduction of mortgage rates are the planned reduction of the key rate by the CBR and low inflation rates, the program of the Government subsidies to the mortgage market as well as the increased supply of low-income housing by developers.

Digital currencies of Central Banks are at the focus of central banks in most countries of the world. Their emergence is due to the qualitative transformation of the payment infrastructure as a result of the active penetration of digital technologies. The emergence of alternative payment instruments, such as digital assets and cryptocurrencies, has led to the need to change the financial paradigm of states. Central bank digital currencies represent a new third form of money. The Central Bank of Russia is also among the mega-regulators actively developing digital currency. In a report for public consultation issued by the Central Bank of Russia it is noted that the regulator defines the digital ruble as an additional form of national currency issued in digital form. It is assumed that all three forms of the Russian ruble (cash, non-cash and digital) will be absolutely equivalent. Meanwhile, the models proposed by the Central Bank of Russia for the introduction of the digital ruble are associated with significant risks. A special place among them is the creation of effective financial control mechanisms. The paper is based on the analysis of analytical reports, articles and explanations of leading central banks on the problem of introducing digital currencies of central banks. The author defines effective methods that can neutralize these risks and ensure the creation of an effective infrastructure for the digital ruble.

Founded on July 13, 1990, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) traces its history back to the State Bank of the Russian Empire. The CBR enjoys special status under Article 75 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation . The CBR is not a body of state power; rather, it is a special public and legal institution with the exclusive right to issue currency.

Subject Russia's strategy of building up gold reserves. Significance The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) surpassed its Chinese equivalent in January to become the world's fifth-largest holder of gold reserves. Gold purchases have accelerated, as the CBR diversifies its holdings away from assets such as dollars that are more volatile or whose liquidity is vulnerable to US sanctions. This is part of a broader objective of increasing Russia's international reserves in the interests of economic resilience. Impacts CBR gold purchases do not affect the ruble's exchange rate, limiting the impact of reserve building on the real economy. Higher gold reserves would facilitate possible future non-dollar-denominated trading arrangements. Increased CBR purchases provide financial support for the domestic mining industry. Reserves are a non-productive use of assets that could have otherwise been invested to stimulate the economy.

Subject Sberbank transfer. Significance The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) wants to postpone the transfer date for the money it receives from selling giant lender Sberbank from June to December. The finance ministry's purchase of a majority stake in Sberbank from the CBR amounts to a transfer from one state entity to another. Impacts The sale extricates the CBR from being both regulator and owner of Russia's largest lender. The Sberbank case illustrates the early disruptions that COVID-19 may cause, although Russia has few reported cases. Sberbank’s corporate strategy is likely to run its course unaltered through 2020.

Facing significant changes in exchange rate (35 → 72 → 49 RUR per 1 USD) and interest rate (8 → 17 → 12.5) over a half year and private banks bankruptcies in previous crises Russian middle class, who are experienced in savings and risk taking, create sophisticated methods of depositing money. In December 2014, some Russian big private banks pessimistically forecasted significant inflation, peoples’ aversion from bank deposits and high interest rate over several years. Many professional depositors (experienced retail savers) forecasted more optimistically, expected the repetition of an economic cycle of 2008-11, when high inflation and interest rate lasted over a half year and then declined quickly to the pre-crisis level. In panic every professional depositor signed tens of deposit contracts with minimal required balances and “fixed” high interest rates for 2-3 years, which would make commercial banks to realize significant interest rate risks. The research shows that professional depositors share is 24% of total household deposits, plus 11% of deposits of ordinary savers contributed to long contracts during crisis-high interest rates. When financial stability comes and market interest rate falls, banks will have to pay high interest on this 1/3 deposits and get negative gross margin about minus 1.5%. Banks have to follow the deposit contracts and can not decline the interest rate, when vast majority of credits have the option to decline the interest rate as market one falls. Avoiding this interest rate risk realization, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) should impose lower interest rates ceiling on saving and flexi fixed deposits (CBR regulates only the maximum interest rates on classic deposits) and smooth the interest rate gap toward on demand deposits. Also CBR should use conditional commitments more active, tells to the market that interest rate will de kept high over a short period of time, and allow commercial banks to raise deposit interest rates over the same short time only. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n4p107

For the study of the institutionalization of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia, an institutional-evolutionary approach was used, based on the ideas of Thorstein B. Veblen and Joseph A. Schumpeter, as well as John R. Commons. The object of the analysis was the institutional structures of money circulation, which are the most significant from the public interest point of view. The paper compares the results of the institutionalisation of money circulation in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of transitional periods. In transitional periods there was a rejection, filtration, and correction of institutional forms of money circulation in terms of their compliance with public goals to develop the country's socio-economic system. The following features of the institutional design of the Soviet model are identified: first, the presence of a single-link, a hierarchical, centralized banking system with the concentration of the entire payment turnover system in the State Bank of the USSR; second, the existence of a "three-circuit system" of money turnover with cash for servicing the turnover of consumer goods, non-cash money for industrial consumption (investment) and convertible rubles for international export-import payments; third, the division of money turnover was supported by the creation of special banking institutions for servicing each of them, controlled by the State Bank of the USSR - the "State Labour Savings Banks", "Stroybank" and "Vneshtorgbank", respectively; fourth, the institutions of money circulation were an internal element of the system of the planned national economy of the USSR and were organically integrated into it. The institutionalisation of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia is characterized by the presence of new (albeit previously represented in the history of our country) institutions and has the following features: first, a two-tier banking system, the upper level of which is represented by the Central Bank of Russia, and the lower level is represented by banks and non-banking credit institutions; second, organizations of various forms of ownership operate in the sphere of money circulation, while state forms of ownership are playing an increasingly significant role; third, there is a stock exchange where stocks, bonds, currencies and other instruments of the money market are traded. The official exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Russia is based on stock quotes; fourth, the Federal Treasury operates to mediate the movement of budgetary funds. An additional element of control over their use is the introduction of "treasury accounts", to which budget funds are transferred and from where they are used for the implementation of state development programs. As a result, one can see that the process of institutional renewal of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia is associated with the return to a number of institutions characteristic of pre-revolutionary and Soviet history. Therefore we can talk about a new "old" institutionalisation of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia. The main vector of changes in recent years is associated with the increasing recognition of the social significance of this sphere, serving the public interest. A forecast has been made that state control over the processes of money circulation in modern Russia is likely to increase.

Substantial outflow of retail deposits from the banking sector in Q1 2014 forced banks to increase their liability to the regulators – the Central Bank of Russia and the Ministry of Finance – reaching record values. The quality of the retail credit portfolio keeps deteriorating while the banking business facing decline in profitability.

efficient financial institutions and markets could increase economic growth, and mutually, the financial sector should also reflect the economic indicators changes in real sector. In this study, impact of the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector with an emphasis on value-added of financial and monetary institutions services on the capital market is examined. For this purpose, “TEPIX” and “financial index” as capital markets representative indices (the dependent variable) and Bayesian ARDL (BARDL) method based on Doan, Litterman and Sims prior and Buss (2010) is used in period of 1991-2018. The results show that monetary and financial institutions services in the short term could affect stock price index (“TEPIX” and “financial index”), therefore The short-term relationship between the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector of economy and the financial sector (Stock Exchange market) is established but the statistical significance of this relationship in the long run is not approved and no feedback in stock price indices based on the changes in the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector is observed. These results on one hand indicate a significant impact of monetary variables and tools such as liquidity and price inflation on the stock market, and on the other hand is a sign of weakness in the relationship between the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector and the stock market. Therefore, it is suggested that in critical situations (with short-term targets), monetary and price tools used to adjust stock market but in contrast, by correction of structural flaws of Stock Exchange market, the context of short term and long-term impact of the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector on stock indices will be provided.efficient financial institutions and markets could increase economic growth, and mutually, the financial sector should also reflect the economic indicators changes in real sector. In this study, impact of the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector with an emphasis on value-added of financial and monetary institutions services on the capital market is examined. For this purpose, “TEPIX” and “financial index” as capital markets representative indices (the dependent variable) and Bayesian ARDL (BARDL) method based on Doan, Litterman and Sims prior and Buss (2010) is used in period of 1991-2018. The results show that monetary and financial institutions services in the short term could affect stock price index (“TEPIX” and “financial index”), therefore The short-term relationship between the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector of economy and the financial sector (Stock Exchange market) is established but the statistical significance of this relationship in the long run is not approved and no feedback in stock price indices based on the changes in the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector is observed. These results on one hand indicate a significant impact of monetary variables and tools such as liquidity and price inflation on the stock market, and on the other hand is a sign of weakness in the relationship between the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector and the stock market. Therefore, it is suggested that in critical situations (with short-term targets), monetary and price tools used to adjust stock market but in contrast, by correction of structural flaws of Stock Exchange market, the context of short term and long-term impact of the banking, insurance and financial intermediation sector on stock indices will be provided.

Financial monitoring is aimed at identifying suspicious transactions related to money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Tax evasion falls within the scope of monitoring as a predicate crime to money laundering. Furthermore, international recommendations emphasize the necessity of combining the efforts of competent authorities, including tax authorities, and sharing tax information. At the same time, international recommendations are implemented in different countries taking into account the institutional characteristics of the anti-money laundering system. This article examines the institutional foundations of financial monitoring and tax administration in the Russian Federation. The subject of the research encompasses the theoretical and applied aspects of countering tax evasion as a threat to the legalization of income obtained through criminal means. The study was conducted using general scientific methods and economic analysis. An analysis of the dynamics and structure of suspicious transactions for the transfer of income abroad from 2015 to 2024 was carried out based on data from the Central Bank of Russia. The tasks of financial intelligence units and tax authorities were compared. The informational basis consists of international recommendations, laws, and legal acts of the Russian Federation, as well as methodological recommendations from the Central Bank of Russia. The article presents a brief overview of international recommendations and Russian legislation concerning monitoring in the tax sphere. Special attention is paid to the problems of identifying beneficial owners. Suggestions for improving the process of identification have been developed for organizations, entities of primary monitoring, and government agencies. The insufficient level of interaction among competent authorities demonstrates the identified inconsistency in the criteria used to assess tax factors during transaction monitoring and the criteria for evaluating tax risks. The role of financial monitoring is manifested in a significant reduction in the volume of transactions for transferring income abroad, which are traditionally used for tax evasion. Elements of scientific novelty include the author's conclusions about the tasks of financial monitoring, the resolution of which contributes to counteracting tax evasion. In addressing and resolving these tasks, it is important to more specifically delineate the powers among competent authorities to eliminate the duplication of functions. A key factor in enhancing the role of financial monitoring in the fight against tax evasion is the expansion of inter-agency cooperation and international collaboration among competent authorities.

Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns

Supervisors sometimes have to manage both the micro- and macro- prudential dimensions of bank stability. These may either conflict or complement each other. We analyze prudential supervision by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We find evidence of micro-prudential concerns, measured as the rule-based enforcement of bank standards. Macro-prudential concerns are also documented: Banks in concentrated bank markets, large banks, money center banks and large deposit banks are less likely to face license withdrawal. Further, the CBR is reluctant to withdraw licenses when there are “too many banks to fail”. Finally, macro-prudential concerns induce regulatory forbearance, revealing conflicts with micro-prudential objectives.

Currently, some countries are testing Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC). In February 2022 the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) launched its own pilot project of the digital Rouble. According to the CBR’s concept the digital Rouble’s platform (DRP) may be the first step to improvement of trans-border payments/settlements including its potential integration with CBDC platforms of other countries. The author analyses the CBR’s concept and financial statistics to answer the question: can the digital Rouble increase usage of the Russian currency worldwide? Currently the Rouble is mainly used in trade settlements of Russia with Belarus (the share of the Rouble is 81 per cent) and Kazakhstan (62 per cent). In 2014 financial sanctions were imposed on Russia and the US Dollar transactions became unavailable for certain businesses. Since that moment the Russian Government made a lot of efforts to increase usage of the Rouble in foreign trade settlements, but the success was marginal. In general, the share of Rouble has increased, but it has seriously grown only in settlements for Russian exports to India – from 1.1 per cent in 2013 to 57.8 per cent in 2021. Despite Russia has an open financial account there is a number of obstacles for wider usage of the Rouble worldwide and they are as follows: Russia exports mainly raw materials, whose prices are denominated in the US Dollars; though last years the Russian government mainly borrowed in Roubles still at any convenient case it also borrows in other currencies; Russia has a big sovereign fund (over 10 per cent of its GDP), which is invested in non-Rouble papers; it is not rare happened that the state officials in public speeches advocate depreciation of the Rouble. Cumulatively the above mentioned issues lessen confidence in the Rouble and consequently decrease demand for it and its liquidity. Will the digital Rouble be immune to all of this? The author analysed its features and did not find anything that might help to overcome the abovementioned obstacles. There is also no evidence that the Russian Government may change its policy regarding the sovereign fund and other obstacles. Also, another serious threat for the digital Rouble may come from a new concept of the Russian Ministry of Finance, which advocates very soon inclusion of the cryptocurrency industry (CI) into the Russian financial system. Various countries, upon widening their experiments with the CBDC, begin to realise that the CI is a real threat to the CBDC. China is the first who has understood that there is a choice: either the CBDC or the CI, but not both. The CI already functions worldwide on a range of highly sophisticated and secure digital platforms. They cannot be really regulated by any country, though some governments have illusion that they can do this. The CBDC platforms will provide only in-country transactions at initial stage and connection between various CBDC platforms is a question yet. The CI platforms already operate globally and also give their users big anonymity, while this feature is something that the CBDC projects intend to exclude. Additional problem for Russia is that, given the low level of the Rouble internationalisation, in case the cryptocurrency industry would be legalised here, so this gives to local users much more interesting and developed instrument that yet to became feasible local digital currency. That’s why the author doubts that the digital Rouble will substantially increase the international role of the Russian currency in the near future.

Supervisors sometimes have to manage both the micro- and macro-prudential dimensions of bank stability. These may either conflict or complement each other. We analyze prudential supervision by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We find evidence of micro-prudential concerns, measured as the rule-based enforcement of bank standards. Macro-prudential concerns are also documented: Banks in concentrated bank markets, large banks, money center banks and large deposit banks are less likely to face license withdrawal. Further, the CBR is reluctant to withdraw licenses when there are too many banks to fail. Finally, macro-prudential concerns induce regulatory forbearance, revealing conflicts with micro-prudential objectives.