Риск-ориентированное проектное управление модернизацией систем безопасности труда на опасных производственных объектах

Exploration of BIM Technology Diffusion organizational model based on the transaction cost theory

The ideology and pronouncements of the Australian Government in introducing 'competitive neutrality' to the public sector has improved efficiency and resource usage. In the health sector, the Human Services Department directed that non-clinical and clinical areas be market tested through benchmarking services against the private sector, with the possibility of outsourcing. These services included car parking, computing, laundry, engineering, cleaning, catering, medical imaging (radiology), pathology, pharmacy, allied health and general practice. Managers, when they choose between outsourcing, and internal servicing and production, would thus ideally base their decision on economic principles. Williamson's transaction cost theory studies the governance mechanisms that can be used to achieve economic efficiency and proposes that the optimal organisation structure is that which minimises transaction costs or the costs of exchange. Williamson proposes that four variables will affect such costs, namely: (i) frequency of exchange; (ii) asset specificity; (iii) environmental uncertainty; and (iv) threat of opportunism. This paper provides evidence from a rural public hospital and examines whether Williamson's transaction cost theory is applicable. Case study research operates within the interpretivism paradigm and is used in this research to uncover why the outsourcing decision was made. Such research aims to study real-life experiences by examining the way people think and act and, in contrast to positivism, allows the interviewer to participate to better understand the details and features of the experiences. In the present research, individual interviews were conducted with managers of the hospital and owners and staff of the vendor organisations using semi- and unstructured questions to ascertain the extent of, and processes used in, outsourcing specific functional areas, and areas that were not outsourced. Pathology, radiology, dental technician services and lawn mowing were outsourced while food services was retained internally. The outsourcing of radiology was due to the hospital being unable (or unwilling) to finance new equipment and the problematical relationship between the existing radiologists, and hospital management and staff. Outsourcing resulted in increased staff morale, upgraded capital equipment and improved services. The outsourcing of pathology and dental technical services aimed to increase labour flexibility, thereby decreasing costs. Additional drivers in pathology were the changing nature of the funding arrangements rendering it profitable for the private sector to move into the provision of pathology and the increasing power of the medical scientists' union. The outsourcing of lawn mowing was simply to reduce costs. Food services was not outsourced because there was a lack of evidence that costs could be reduced. In addition, the existing relationships with food services staff were regarded as important because they had previously made immense changes to work practices, reduced staff numbers and decreased costs. Transaction costs are important when analysing how managers make the outsourcing decision, but the evidence from this case is that not all transaction costs are included in the decision, and that such costs are more complex than can be included in the type of analysis often undertaken by decision-makers. Taking into account Williamson's variables, the research shows that the outsourcing of services did not comply solely with the levels of transaction frequency or the requirement of asset specificity. In addition, opportunistic behaviour was evident on the part of all parties and was used in some cases as a reason for outsourcing, and in others to sway the decision to the manager's predisposed choice. A variety of arrangements were used to reduce environmental uncertainty, such as the transfer of staff to the contractor and the use of long-term contracts. Indeed the case shows that relationships between the hospital, its staff and the vendor are an important consideration that may not always be factored into an analysis that relies solely on transaction costs.

Some twenty years ago Robert Eccles argued for the theoretical existence of the quasifirm, a semi-integrated form of production in the construction industry, following a field study of home building firms in the USA. The study was aimed at substantiating some aspects of Williamson's transaction cost theory. The present work has similar intents, and illustrates the results of two recent field studies of homebuilders and commercial contractors, and the specific features of their subcontracting practice. Given the difficulty of an effective measurement of transaction costs in construction, Williamson's concept of atmosphere is suggested to explain the different approaches observed in subcontracting.

Business to Business (B2B) relationships in E-commerce are becoming increasingly important. However, there is little guidance available for managers about how relationships should be formulated or managed. Further, requirements analysis for information technology support of B2B inter-organisational relationships (IORs) depends on the business model of the relationship, and needs a predictive basis. This paper describes a method for planning and managing IORs based on Williamson's transaction cost theory (1981), to guide managers when negotiating B2B alliances, and procurement of IT support for them. This method covers market analysis, relationship planning, transaction cost estimation and IT requirements analysis. Lessons learned in presenting the method to managers and using it in case studies are reviewed.

This research note uses Williamson's transaction cost theory to understand why organizations use certain search strategies to fill particular positions. The empirical analysis focuses on a large multistate banking institution's attempts to fill approximately 575 openings (ranging across roughly 130 job titles) originating between November 1987 and February 1988. In support of the transaction cost approach, reliance upon internal searches are promoted by asset specificity or task idiosyncrasies. However, the blending of internal and external search strategies best characterizes the recruitment process. Internal searches are augmented with specific external recruitment based on the conditions confronting the firm.

This study examines the complementary nature of Williamson's transaction cost theory and that of the resource-based view in the integration or externalisation of activities, with particular reference to services. Assessing comparative costs, idiosyncratic demands and core competences form the criteria for make or buy decisions, although the analysis of services endows idiosyncratic demands with particular relevance when internalisation of services does neither contribute cost advantages nor others related to the core competences of the firm. In addition to these make or buy questions, this study considers the front/back model in cases where the firm manages services internally.

The authors give a critical review and the analysis of possible implementation of Williamson's transaction cost theory. In the first part, they consider the characteristics of participants' behavior in transactions, notion of transaction, transactional costs and the warranty of contractual regulation. The main part of the work includes the dimensional analysis: uncertainty, role of fixed mobility factors and input specialties. Then, considering the so-called problem of “fundamental transformation” of input, frequency of transaction and coordination of transactional relationships follows. The concluding part of the work deals with the estimate of accomplishments, importance and possibility of transactional costs.

This book develops a general model of public policymaking, focusing on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. By using this model the authors are able to derive a series of empirical propositions about the conditions under which policies are likely to be volatile, rigid, or high quality. In addition, the authors combine the tools of game theory with Williamson's transaction cost theory, North's institutional arguments, and contract theory, to provide a general theory of public policymaking in a comparative political economy setting. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina, using statistical analyses on newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions, rules, incentives and outcomes. Drawing on this research the book explores the reasons for Argentina's seeming inability to design and implement high quality public policies over a sustained period of time.

Purpose – The primary aim of the article is to create a systemic innovation theory. Design/methodology/approach – In discussing the above, the article will draw on institutional theory, Miller's theory of living systems and systemic thinking. North's “action theory” and Asplund's “motivation theory” are also used to explain aspects of institutional innovations. Findings – A systemic innovation theory, based on 14 propositions. Research limitations/implications – Further research should investigate the connection between innovation and economic crises. Practical implications – Organizations, countries or regions, such as the EU, must make institutional changes that promote economic changes. Originality/value – First, the article provides a new understanding of processes which foster innovation. Second, it attempts to provide a brief elaboration of Williamson's transaction cost theory. Third, it provides a new classification of service innovation, making it possible to make an analytical distinction between tangible and intangible service innovations. This distinction makes it possible to integrate service innovation as a natural element in all organizations. Fourth, the article provides a conceptual framework (“coin the frame”) around what the author has termed Asplund's “motivation theory” and North's “action theory”.

Addressing governance challenges in the provision of animal health services: A review of the literature and empirical application transaction cost theory

This paper uses a simple make-or-buy model to summarize and illustrate some of the distinguishing aspects of Williamson's transaction cost theory. It is shown that each mode of governance is associated with a different degree of incentive intensity, which in turn is attributable to the difference in court access and in the control of accounts. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

This chapter sets out the conceptual framework to be employed throughout this book. Central to the framework are the two patterns, Arm's-length Contractual Relation (ACR) and Obligational Contractual Relation (OCR), which represent the ends of a multi-dimensional spectrum of possible trading relationships. First, the basic features of ACR and OCR are described. Second, major assumptions underlying the ACR—OCR patterns are made explicit. Third, socio-economic factors which may account for ACR—OCR variations are identified. Fourth, implications of ACR—OCR patterns for performance are examined. Lastly, the chapter discusses how the ACR—OCR framework relates to Williamson's transaction cost theory.

Drawing inspiration from Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory, the present note argues that the complexity of social systems has the potential to undermine their sustainability and thus to generate social dilemmas. The conceptual construct of the ‘complexity‐sustainability trade‐off’ is invoked to make the point that ensuring sustainability, if at all possible, requires controlling the proliferation of systemic complexity. To some extent, this control is feasible through structural couplings that correspond to the economic concept of the internalization of externalities. If this solution falls short of meeting the sustainability goals, systemic complexity can be alternatively controlled through the dampening of systemic imperatives, which translates, at the individual level, into the weakening of incentives. Williamson's transaction cost theory of for‐profit hierarchy and Hansmann's trustworthiness theory of nonprofit organizations present cases in point.

During recent years social scientists have come to reaffirm that understanding almost any facet of social life requires a simultaneous understanding of how economic institutions work and how they are influenced by values and norms. Sociology, and especially economic sociology, is well equipped to be of assistance in this endeavor. Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg bring together leading sociologists, economists, and political scientists in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, the first comprehensive view of this vital and growing field. This excellent volume is a compilation of some of the best writing in this field over the past decade, including basic works like Oliver Williamson's transaction cost theory of the firm, and [is] a helpful comparison of economic sociology to mainstream economics. —Francis Fukuyama, Foreign Affairs This is the first comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of the burgeoning field of economic sociology. The scholarship is consistently strong. . .. The book will be greeted warmly and read by serious scholars throughout the social sciences. —Robert K. Merton This is a bold, ambitious, almost daunting project. ... It will surely become the standard reference book for the field—the sort of text every scholar will have to know-, consult, and cite. —Viviana Zelizer

Bounded rationality, opportunism, the primacy of markets and the action of economizing are building blocks of Oliver Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). As in all intellectual exchanges, Williamson has used a range of argumentative devices to set up and negotiate his basic notions and assumptions with economists. Rhetorical analysis is applied here to study his argumentation in a certain institutional context within economics. Negotiations with the mainstream, with the competence view of the firm and within the New Institutional Economics, for instance, have had an impact on the construction of TCE and are given attention here. Difficult decisions have been made in order to forge ahead with TCE, including whether to uphold some notions (e.g. opportunism) at the cost of leaving others behind (e.g. economics of atmosphere). Rhetorical transactions like this have shaped TCE and its recognition in economics and related areas.