"Україна в огні" Олександра Довженка в контексті філософських уявлень щодо еволюції культури і цивілізації ХХ ст. (Освальд Шпенглер, Микола Хвильовий, Френсіс Фукуяма, Самуель Гантінгтон)

In the decade since the conclusion of the Cold War, International Relations scholars have anxiously sought to identify and explain the actors and forces that are shaping the emerging world order. Among the debates stimulated by the conclusion of the Cold War, two of the most dramatic focus on the contrasting visions of world order presented by Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ and Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ theses. Huntington’s 1993 essay1 has become one of the most widely discussed articles of contemporary International Relations.2 His analysis of the post-Cold War world is radical and shocking, suggesting an era in which world politics is dominated by conflicts between civilizations. His thesis contains dire warnings to the West that it must consolidate to meet the threats of disintegration from within and attack from without. Conversely, Fukuyama’s image of world politics is one of a world divided between societies still evolving through the processes of history, and those which have successfully evolved to a post historical state. In this context, the West is viewed as at the forefront of a broad civilizing process, providing the model of the rational state towards which the rest of humanity is evolving.

Fundamentalism's Future Francis Fukuyama (bio) The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State by Mark Juergensmeyer. University of California Press, 1993. 292 pp. Mark Juergensmeyer's The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State chronicles the recent rise of fundamentalist religious movements around the globe. He argues that religious nationalism has successfully defeated secular nationalism as the most dynamic and powerful "ideology of order" in the world that is emerging after the end of the Cold War. There has been a broad perception that secularism itself, whether it takes a democratic or communist/socialist form, has proven to be an empty and unsatisfying form of social organization. Those secular nationalist states established in the immediate aftermath of decolonization represented, in the eyes of the new religious nationalists, only a more subtle form of Western cultural imperialism. The author states: "What is striking is how unanimously religious politicians—be they Christians in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America; Muslims and Jews in the Middle East and Central Asia; or Sikhs, Hindus, and Buddhists in South and Southeast Asia—reject Western-style secular political ideologies, in part because they reject their claims of universality"(p. 144). Anticipating a theme recently developed by Samuel Huntington in the Summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, Juergensmeyer argues that while the ideological conflicts of the Cold War were essentially internecine disputes between rival systems born from Western culture, the conflicts of the future will be intercultural, following cleavages that are primarily religious. [End Page 125] The examples of religious nationalism cited by Juergensmeyer are mostly, though not exclusively, from the Third World. He begins with the relatively familiar political challenge presented by Islamic fundamentalism to secular regimes in lran, Pakistan, Egypt, Palestine, and Algeria. He notes that Americans were taken by surprise during the Khomeini revolution in Iran because the prevailing Western social science paradigm had been one of spreading secularization; they continue to underestimate the desire of non-Western peoples to go "backward" into History and recover lost religious identities. The same phenomenon is evident in South Asia, where the secular, nationalist, and socialist Indian state founded by Nehru has been under daily assault from a variety of militant Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim religious activists, and where militant Buddhism has clashed both with Tamil nationalism and with the secular state in Sri Lanka. Religious nationalism, far from spending itself by the late 1980s, got a fresh shot in the arm with the collapse of communism. This unleashed a variety of suppressed religious movements, not only Islamic ones in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, but Christian movements in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and other parts of Eastern Europe. Juergensmeyer for the most part presents a thoughtful and balanced analysis of these religious movements and their rather ominous implications for global politics. He notes, for example, that many religious nationalist movements are more incompatible with liberalism and the defense of individual human rights than they are with democracy. When divorced from liberalism, democracy can indeed be a useful tool for the spread of intolerant fundamentalism. The alarming title of his book, suggesting that the Cold War will be replaced by an equally apocalyptic clash of religious civilizations, is posed as a question rather than a definite prediction. While Juergensmeyer does not underestimate the threat that religious nationalism poses to liberalism and world order, neither does he adopt an attitude of simple-minded hostility toward religion itself. Noting the critiques that Robert Bellah and Alasdair Maclntyre have offered of the potentially atomizing consequences of Western liberal individualism, he explains that there is a potentially healthy aspect to religious revival. As in the case of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" hypothesis, Juergensmeyer's analysis applies most accurately to the Middle East and South Asia. It is much less helpful in understanding other parts of the world, and as a general characterization of world politics it is woefully inadequate. Outside of Sri Lanka, for example, Buddhism has not taken either a militant or politicized form in recent years (with the partial exception of the Sokka Gokkai sect in Japan). Buddhism's tolerant doctrines easily coexist with Confucianism, Taoism, Christianity, and Shintoism, and may...

In Australia, orthodox soil scientists dealing with land management and alternative practitioners who promote ‘regenerative agriculture’ have not been communicating and engaging effectively with each other. Over many years, scientists in the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), state departments and universities have made significant achievements in mapping soil distribution, describing soil behaviour and identifying key soil properties and processes that are fundamental to healthy soil function. However, many alternative practitioners are dismissive of these achievements and highly critical of orthodox soil science. Yet many of the tools of soil science are essential to conduct evidence-based research towards elucidating how and why the exceptional results claimed by some alternative practitioners are achieved. We stress the importance of effective engagement and communication among all parties to resolve this ‘clash of cultures’.

This chapter provides a critical assessment of the dominance of the Western civilization that detaches the causes of conflict from civilizational differences and addresses the concept 'Dignity of Difference', presented by Professor Jonathan Sacks in his 2002 book. It offers a support for the concept as a new theology, a construct of common understanding and tolerance, but also questions whether relying heavily on Dignity of Difference may underestimate the politics and economics of violent conflicts. The Dignity of Difference emphasizes the failure of the political science and economics to resolve conflict and appeals for more focus on religion. The chapter argues that in today's globalized world less people would belong to one identity or one community only. Identities are important, but they are not always pre-determined, they are not always final people hesitate between identities or embrace several identities. The Multi-identity individuals live in multi-identity communities.

A series of attempts have been made since the end of the Cold War to make sense of the much changed international system. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History’,1 Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’,2 Aron Wildavsky’s zones of conflict and zones of peace and Michael Doyle’s observations on liberal states’3 propensity not to engage in conflict with each other, are prime examples. Many of the ideas were driven by key articles, greeted as seminal, but like a young child with a new toy, they were soon discarded. Not unnaturally, theorising about the shape of the international system focused on the US role in the post-Cold War world. Two works in particular fuelled much of what became known as the declinist debate. First, Paul Kennedy’s book ‘The Rise and The Fall of The Great Powers’, speculated about whether the US would fall prey to modern variants of imperial overstretch, whereby ‘Great Powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on “security” and thereby divert potential resources from “investment” and compound their long-term dilemma’.4 In the same year that Kennedy’s book appeared, David Calleo’s equally provocative Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance5 was published. Calleo argued that post-Cold War NATO was ‘essentially an American protectorate for Europe. As such, it is increasingly unviable’. Calleo further contended that it was global shifts that introduced fundamentally changed distributions of resources and power and that ‘even if the fundamental common interests of the United States and Western Europe dictate a continuation of the Atlantic Alliance… the old hegemonic arrangements cannot continue without becoming self-destructive’.6

There has lately taken place a far-reaching resurgence or reconstruction of the religious dimension in the contemporary world. It is manifested among others in the rise of new religious, especially fundamentalist and communal-national movements, and in the crystallisation of new diasporas with a prominent religious identity. This reconstruction transcends the vision of the classical cultural and political program of modernity and of the ‘classical’ model of the modern nationstate. This resurgence of the religious dimension is very important for the evaluation of the many interpretations of the contemporary world, especially those that proclaim, from often opposing vantage points, the possibility that the classical modern project, as it has developed for the last two centuries, is exhausted. In one version the possibility of such exhaustion takes the form of the ‘end of history’ as proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama; the ideological premises of modernity with all the tensions and contradictions inherent in them are understood as almost irrelevant, enabling paradoxically the rise of multiple postmodern visions, and the new religious movements are on the whole seen as temporary ‘aberrations’. In another view of the exhaustion of the modern program or withdrawal from it, that of, to use Samuel Huntington’s terminology, the ‘clash of civilisations’, these new religious movements play indeed a very central role. Huntington understands the Western civilisational vision—the seeming epitome of modernity—as often confronted in hostile terms with other, especially the Muslim and to some extent the so-called Confucian. Within this civilisational conflict, traditional, fundamentalist, anti-modern, and anti-Western movements are predominant and

This article offers a close reading of two contemporary novels that question the received idea of terrorism as the desperate violence of disenfranchised groups. Glamorama and Super-Cannes symbolize the violence perpetrated by Western states and institutions by presenting us with terrorists who are corporate executives and supermodels, and who inflict their violence on ethnic minorities, or allow them to be wrongly blamed for it. The texts present an ironic riposte both to Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis and Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" theory by suggesting that they are not in fact contradictory, but that instead, the contemporary West depends for its structural integrity on an ongoing conflict with an excluded outsider. The novels demonstrate that the West's sense of security before 9/11 had been purchased through the perpetuation of violence throughout the globe. They expose the structural violence within Western society and the lies and evasions surrounding a highly contentious contemporary issue: the war on terror.

Immediately after the end of the conflict between east and west, Francis Fukuyama advocated the thesis that following the downfall of the fascist, National Socialist and communist systems of rule, the liberal democratic system of rule was the only one that could successfully claim universal validity. In 1993, Samuel Huntington presented the counter-thesis that western liberal democracy can only have a regional reach, and that it would have to dissociate itself from seven other, predominantly religious-philosophically defined civilisations and to assert itself culturally, politically and militarily in a dispute spanning several decades. Huntington’s depiction of international relations as a clash of civilisations was met with considerable support worldwide, as well as attracting vehement opposition by adherents of a certain type of cultural globalisation, in particular of universal values such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, social justice and ecological balance. Huntington regarded inner-state multiculturalism as being a risk to the west in particular, although at the same time, he supported interstate and wider regional multiculturalism.

Dominic Boyer (DB): More so than most of us, Ulf, you are truly an “anthropologist of the world.” And it so happens that these are very challenging times, but also in some ways very inspiring times, for the world. The Washington Consensus, for example, seems more fragile than ever before, and an anthropologist is set to lead the World Bank for the first time. Yet austerity reigns, and the eurozone is in turmoil. Latin America is blossoming with new social and political experiments. Yet the United States seems in the grip of a slow and possibly very ugly decline. I wanted to ask you to reflect on anthropology’s role in today’s world. Or, not to be so parochial, what the ethnographic and conceptual work of transnationally oriented human scientists (forgive the German conceit!) could contribute to the navigation of times like these. Is this a good time to resurrect the 1980s image of anthropology as cultural critique, for example?Ulf Hannerz (UH): I will certainly follow the activities of the World Bank with renewed interest (although the alternative, which would have been a Nigerian woman economist heading it, would have been appealing as well).I think “cultural critique” remains one of the uses of anthropology — and, of course, although it was revived in the 1980s, it goes way back, to Margaret Mead and Bronislaw Malinowski. But overall, I would want to see more experimentation with diverse styles and genres in anthropological writing — particularly in reaching out to audiences outside the discipline, in or outside academia. At present, anthropologists, not least in the United States, seem to be writing almost entirely for each other. It is striking that a number of historians seem to do so much better in writing for wider readerships — I am thinking of people like Timothy Garton Ash, Simon Schama, the late Tony Judt, or Niall Ferguson (whatever one may think of some of the latter’s political stances). But, then, it is also notable that these are all British immigrants, or commuters, to the American academic scene.Thank you for describing me as an “anthropologist of the world.” I really do think that anthropology as a truly worldwide discipline in its research interests has a particular public role. I just read Amin Maalouf’s Disordered World, a book on various troubles now facing humanity — Maalouf is a Lebanese writer, long in the Paris diaspora, so the book has an emphasis on the changing Arab world. Anyway, he sees coping with cultural differences as perhaps the major challenge, globally and locally, and suggests that if everyone were to become enduringly passionate about one culture other than his or her own, the result would be “a closely woven cultural web covering the whole planet” (Maalouf 2011: 161). Now that is obviously a utopian idea, but it struck me that anthropologists with their commitments to widespread fields could be seen as a kind of avant-garde here. But then they have to find ways of disseminating their understandings effectively, in an information landscape which is now very different from that of the classic anthropology of “other cultures.” On the one hand, knowledge (or misunderstandings) can now flow through so many parallel or competing channels; on the other hand, I am afraid the result of current media saturation is often more narcissism, rather than more cosmopolitanism. Will such efforts at informing the public about the world elsewhere take the form of cultural critique? Sometimes, no doubt. But I am reminded of Marshall Sahlins’s comment somewhere that we should not make it seem as if other people have constructed their lives for our purposes, in answer to the evils of Western society. This could turn into only a higher form of narcissism.DB: Ulf, let’s talk a bit more about reaching out to wider audiences through our writing. Two questions come immediately to mind given your career: the first is whether you feel there are particular experimental lessons to be learned from Scandinavian anthropology, where, perhaps especially in Norway and Sweden, anthropology has shown a remarkable capacity to participate in public debate. The second question is what, if anything, you think we can learn from news journalists today about communicating our forms of expertise to wider publics. One tends to hear lamentation that news media are not more interested in what we have to say or in how we say it. But, of course, this way of thinking amounts at some point to its own alibi.UH: I think our Norwegian colleagues have been particularly successful here, but to what extent there are “experimental lessons” I am not quite sure. In part I think they have simply tried harder. One of them had a regular newspaper column for quite some time, in the 1970s and 1980s or so, and then in the next generation there were several who took an interest in reaching a wider public and who may also have stimulated each other. This has been true not only of anthropologists; I think a number of other Norwegian social scientists have been noticeable as public commentators as well.Now, for one thing, one should note that even these anthropologists have in large part offered views on Norwegian affairs, not so much on matters relating to other countries or cultures (although immigration and minority issues have been an important theme). But I think one should also keep in mind that in terms of population size, the Scandinavian countries are all rather small. So I believe there is a kind of familiarity, accessibility, transparency that helps. Journalists have some sense of who is who in academia and vice versa. It is far from perfect, but scholars who want to cultivate media contacts have a better chance to do so.There is another factor which I think I should emphasize. These are countries with strong national languages, which are weak internationally. My friend Abram de Swaan, a Dutch sociologist, has described the “world language system” as one of three tiers: English, now far above anything else; then languages like French, Spanish, German, Arabic, Chinese, and a few others; then the third tier of languages which have few people using them as a second language. That obviously is where Scandinavian languages (as well as Dutch and a great many others) belong. This means that Scandinavian academics who want to participate in international academic life must write in a foreign language, most likely English, and some get very good at this. The other side of the coin may be that they can then become fairly invisible at home, among audiences who do not habitually read English and do not see those publications, in foreign journals or from foreign publishing houses, anyway. That may not worry these scholars — but if they care to reach home audiences, writing in the national language may become more of a conscious choice where one knows that one is very likely writing for another audience, outside the discipline, perhaps outside academic life altogether. I think there is a kind of informal division of labor here. Some people are more focused on their more or less global community of colleagues; others are more intent on contributing to public knowledge at home.But then I see a current complication. Academic institutions, and politicians of higher education, in Europe and various other regions, now seem much more obsessed with streamlined research assessment exercises, publication rankings — what is sometimes referred to as the academic “audit culture” — than I believe is yet the case in the more pluralistic American academic world. I think it is in large part a matter of these institutions being state institutions, so you can impose rules on them very effectively from the top. And the way these measurements work, you climb in the rankings with articles in what are considered the leading international journals, which will be mostly in English (and published or at least distributed by a handful of commercial publishing houses, but that is to a degree another matter). The ranking procedure obviously in large part has its origins in the natural sciences and medicine, so not much thought is given to the built-in logics of different disciplines, especially those in the humanities and social sciences. This means that books are undervalued, and so are writings in other languages, for other audiences. There is, for one thing, a contradiction here. At least our Scandinavian national academic systems tend officially to celebrate the “three tasks” of universities: research, teaching, but also reaching out with [their] knowledge to the public. Now the first of these may at least seem rather easily measurable — that is, at least, the assumption behind those auditing procedures. There is some preoccupation, too, with ways of evaluating teaching quality. In contrast, there seems to be very little systematic attention to that third task: contributing to public knowledge. Unless the agents of audit culture get serious about this, the reasonable response, from university presidents all the way down to young faculty struggling to get tenure, will be not to bother much with that scholarly public service. So that could actually decline, and public culture would be further impoverished. I know of universities in countries with severe societal problems — no names mentioned — where some more input into public debate from the human sciences would seem desirable, but when you point this out to a university’s leadership with its eyes on global ranking lists, you may not find good listeners.Forgive me for dwelling on this, but I think it is a tendency we must really be concerned with. Your second question: What, if anything, can we learn from journalists? Now there is certainly a lot of variety in journalism. Some of it is dreadful, some very good. Academics and journalists may have a kind of habitual aversion to one another; for anthropologists that aversion easily comes to focus on foreign correspondents. Forgive me again, but when I engaged in a research project on the work of foreign correspondents some years ago (mostly those writing for print media of higher quality), I quite often found that they were doing very good work, considering the practical circumstances. And they could know much more than they had a chance to show. Especially in their feature stories, I think they were sometimes quite impressive in getting mini-ethnographies into one thousand words or so, in ways that could attract readers. So if we want to reach wider audiences ourselves with some of our work, I think we may do well to read at least some foreign correspondents, and some other investigative reporters, with some care. Not least would I think we should try to develop a sense of the “big picture,” if we can credibly find one. Ethnographers still tend to handle miniatures well, but techniques of zooming may be a bit neglected.DB: I’d like to come back to the issue of audit culture in a moment. But while we’re on the subject of publics and publicity (again in the German sense of Öffentlichkeit), do you see conditions changing, or new opportunities opening, with new media and social media? For example, there are now probably hundreds of anthropologists engaged in blogging of some form, and this format could be one way of offering the thousand-word mini-ethnographies that you just mentioned. On the other hand, blogs, like other new and social media, tend to operate through networks rather than address broad (anonymous) publics in the traditional sense. Another example: I enjoy Keith Hart’s Facebook posts, and he seems to take this work very seriously. But again, he may be posting only to an immediate audience of a few hundred people, many of whom already belong to his professional networks. But that’s rather symptomatic of our media environment today, no? The broadcast publicity that you and I grew up with is being hollowed out by these new meshes of lateral connectivity. Do we need to rethink our modes of public outreach accordingly? Or should the objective still be to write more oped pieces for newspapers or to find ways to get ourselves on TV?UH: Perhaps we should be doing all these things — perhaps the one format I am really doubtful about is the kind of TV talk show where the entire idea seems to be to get people to shout at each other. But I do not think I am really technologically up-to-date on all new possibilities.Keith is an old friend of mine — we first ran into each other in the Cayman Islands over forty years ago and have been in touch ever since. I think he has continued to be one of the original minds, the gadflies, of our field. But I believe it is true that his ongoing electronic networking effort is another instance of anthropologists talking mostly to each other. And I am afraid much blogging, in and out of anthropology, is more a matter of self-expression than of communication.Now I am not sure why the Mumbai Theatre Guide and the Circassian World Newsletter appear regularly in my e-mail in-box. I never asked for them, and I certainly do not always, or even often, open these messages, but at least they are there, without my having to make the effort to seek them out. I think if we are really interested in contributing to public knowledge, we cannot sit and wait for audiences to come to us. I would see more potential in collaborative enterprises, regularly feeding knowledge and opinion about particular themes, rather than some undifferentiated “public anthropology,” to audiences who really define their interests in other ways than a curiosity about our discipline as such.I see a need for a greater organizing effort here. In my most recent English-language book, Anthropology’s World (2010), I devote a chapter to pointing to some “usable past” that we could still do well to think about again — contemporary anthropology seems to me too much inclined to amnesia. And there I devote some passages to the efforts of the “modernologist” Kon Wajiro in Japan and the Mass-Observation movement in Great Britain in the 1920s and 1930s. Both of these basically recruited teams of amateur observers to do ethnographic observations in varied contexts, on current issues. I would not suggest we would want to return precisely to this, but the fact that there are now professional anthropologists everywhere might make a kind of collaborative “world on knowledge, continued and which news could In the Arab I found in my e-mail a flow of by the media anthropology of the of Some of them were from people who had been there, on and other Especially if we could develop a of probably on anthropologists rather than we might find new interested I like this world idea very much and with you that there is an important for anthropology parallel to the work of but also to networks of to the of as well, but just we do that that we cannot also do These are different modes of writing for different But to on the of a collaborative world would and I this be a project for our professional like and In I’d be interested to know how as a of and in feel that professional can contribute to the of the field. they be doing more than they as with so many this is not an but a if we to do slow and I am sure and as major can a part in this of world But I think it is very important to get and Latin American colleagues as My friend a me of a new that has a part in an without at with a in Perhaps that could a part in and public ethnographic as in Anthropology’s World that of in the world not seem to be as long as opportunities for and very and Perhaps this back to the less than conditions which academic and anthropology is in many of the world. can one for the kind of global you have in mind in a world still by That is a perhaps that new of the World Bank can do to capacity in more in those social sciences which are most to the of his I do hear of scholars in the more of the world research which would also the with colleagues in their fields in countries where there is little or no Yet there is the in such that the research is set by the more and so it could to it another variety of And in the current I that much of this kind is might also that in some of those countries that are now in the some of the new can to a broad for research institutions and institutions public knowledge. That could at least scholarly interests and It is for one thing, that several of the countries already have strong anthropological it would be good if these could also to be a little less with at to contribute more to the woven cultural about which I Amin Maalouf — that global of of certainly there is also a question of what we can do perhaps on a more on this side of more utopian This things like our — which journals do we where do our books come — and using for example, to scholars and to in such a way that they do not Do you also the worry that the of anthropology are being by the of what and others have “audit culture” in universities the In your how have public the way anthropology is I would not to have a good of how all that actually out. culture has but the forms may I that in the when my own was the first assessment and I was in that at the it all with a of of with the of the national universities and I her that I had thought it had all out rather better than I had to the of British academic about their And and first we was not to do it the British So there have been differences and over time. I would not be sure about how actually work their way through in different national and other I that in some the auditing is are and — and then that the has public into old public that to get to the on anthropology, I do not believe it is a good first its for the of time for the of a of discipline, which is often part of the audit culture not well with a kind of professional which to in another among those a new language, and what have I think this is one factor — there are certainly others — which now in the of more at Some years when I was to a at a British I found that young (and found that was than I had been when I my — I have not been so to It was a very good and had it well the but had her much the I before, I still think audit culture has struck more and in some other than it has in the United But then, some of the in higher do not seem very well about the of American academic although they find that American universities tend to on those ranking which they take very and must be as for one thing, they often believe that those times for come from on the other hand, I ask my American in major if their actually do their and their in they all seem to their also one American when we were at the in colleagues there that if their universities out with only a few these young scholars would be to for academic in their own these would to in with better what about It is sometimes that at least you have tenure, or is its you can to do the research you your research interests — perhaps to other for research than where you have been But things like research assessment may impose on academic work at such as I hear of to get things by or even when they might have from being a little more time. I that such as up on a new on another language, and other such would be by the of auditing certainly have no with the that we must be for the work we whether in teaching, research, or to public knowledge. It is too, if people at academic get better about who what, how and how well, on the am I in of But assessment need to be better to the of and its there is now a fairly widespread of that at least in the human although it is not so how will be to this has been a conceptual or interest of for some time as well as a of and At the of this too is there a to be as to how Hannerz the anthropological and are the and practical issues of to you My with really rather In the when I a talk at on my interest in who was in the audience, asked if I had thought about cosmopolitanism. I had to that I had not out that he But that and I that I So a little for a rather academic the on the and and in the World in in I my in a which was really a of that its way into one and the first of revived interest in in several disciplines, it one of my most I want to that of the to show that it was for a engaged with cultural but especially it was in what was still the was a among the in the and he was by with in the that of interest in and with more of an emphasis on the and of it in a of about what the world could do I am afraid in the and that Anyway, so when I back to a question to be how the more of the that I had been with to the more political I a talk on this to a cultural in my colleagues there there was no in that really So is this just a of of Western languages, to the I think they at times, quite and there can even be a them, but I would also think they are often that to be quite am I to do I have a interest in another the of global that with people like and on the academic and and on the and which has continued to ever since. This is an interest not just in these as to be as but also in their in a global public — mostly American in but into many languages, in book through those and of of world is for the German of book of and the of World its rather as — I think that suggests about why an anthropologist might be by the kind of you find in many of these as another current which I have been particularly in a with in I am the anthropology of the Scandinavian and had a in a which is to my home but also to the so colleagues could in from like and the United Arab to participate — we do not want this to become too are certainly not to some of but there are At I think one may find a of in networks what I about Norway and some in But, there may be some less as that may be mostly over on a But I think you can see that too, into my with the way the world comes in academia and elsewhere — and the part anthropology can have in It would be if the world was a more but we are not there the of and of those global and the debate over them, It seems to me as there is an these On the one hand, you are at the work of and, on the other hand, the of in the world this of large and perhaps say about the state of anthropology’s own and one of anthropology’s first of the of would you comment on the of as an for anthropology is it still where less I that in an I for a book on and in the late I that the time was when as such might not be a research interest it may for would be as a part of the of a variety of of But it was never really a of I have global some number of times, to a more on a that has But from I have often the to to that national — which certainly still not that they are truly then, has been a way of out of the of which I think is still quite strong in many disciplines, although perhaps less so in I think anthropology out of its own to its ethnographic it follow they took is true that I have had a interest in things and in I took an interest in in more or less classic for into cultural and I tend to follow writings on issues in social But our are not really in that sense. with is still to or the United States or are concerned with in a but then we also want to what for and many other may have been to a national anthropology has little at this and with that of global and the too many have to be Perhaps the effort to do an anthropology of is still that of the national of the But that was in large part a World with using ethnographic (and to or more or less So then become and in large fairly this was about and to an extent should we do about I am not sure it was ever that much of an in sense. It may too many things — and at the time it is that in some it is so only to But I think we should the of having some number of words which in a and way to of issues. The global will probably among And so will culture and and no a great many of them will in public and if we want to be in with wider publics and their as commentators or for that matter as to some for one their may not be a I think that back to where we this

Reviewed by: The Twenty-first Century Confronts Its Gods: Globalization, Technology, and War Robert Campbell (bio) David J. Hawkin , editor. The Twenty-first Century Confronts Its Gods: Globalization, Technology, and WarState University of New York Press. viii, 222. US $21.95 This edited volume is dedicated to Harold Coward, who was founder of the Centre for Studies of Religion and Society at the University of Victoria, and its director from 1992 until his retirement in 2002. The majority of contributors teach at Canadian universities, and their essays reflect Coward's notion that religion should be approached in an interdisciplinary way. The introduction provides chapter summaries, as well as a discussion of the fundamental principle informing the essays presented here, that we must peel away much of the rhetoric of modern Western society and see things as they really are. Thus, for example, we should question whether world events really support Francis Fukuyama's contention of the 'end of history' and the triumph of Western democratic ideals. Similarly, we should explore more critically Samuel Huntington's notion of the 'clash of civilizations' and seek to understand the consequences of his position when we view it more particularly as a rationale for the national security concerns of the United States. The authors in this volume take very seriously Huntington's more general observation that religion is central to understanding the twenty-first century. However, their contributions emerge out of the observation that when we view things as they really are we are confronted with the paradox of unprecedented economic integration and cultural homogenization mixed with unrelenting cultural and religious factionalism. The chapters in part 1 explore the assumptions that inform modern Western technological society, and that are now being propagated globally. David Hawkin explores the origins of modern technological society and suggests that our belief in the value of the natural world has been replaced by the divinization of human life and the quest for goods. Conrad Brunk argues that modern notions of risk assessment that are integral to global capitalism are based on the liberal belief in individual autonomy and equality, a view that might not be shared by all communities and societies. Rosemary Ommer uses the case of the cod fisheries in Atlantic Canada to illustrate her contention that free-market economics cannot deliver global prosperity and human well-being. Jay Newman defends new media technologies, especially television, suggesting that charges of idolatry brought against televangelism, for example, are more properly conceived of as bibliolatry, because it is the message and not the medium that is the [End Page 463] problem. David Loy suggests that much of the conflict in the world today is caused by a clash of values between traditional religions and the secular religion of modern Western culture that drives globalization. The chapters in part 2 deal with war within the context of the world's major religions. Timothy Gorringe discusses the definition of terrorism and concludes that claims of religiously motivated terrorism are not justified. Andrew Rippin discusses the problem of Muslim identity, emphasizing the historical consequences of the tension between political and religious leadership, suggesting that many Muslims see the values associated with modernity as a threat to their religion and their way of life. Eliezer Segal uses the story of Phineas in Numbers 25 to explain how Judaism seeks to limit religious violence, by emphasizing free and rational discussion over against passion and subjectivity, when it comes to conflict resolution. Ronald Neufeldt examines the relationship between state and religious identity, using the case of Hinduism, and makes the point that there is no monolithic position on violence within religious traditions. Robert Florida explains that even though Buddhism advocates pacifism as something to be nurtured on an individual level, Buddhist states have often had to defend themselves, or, as has been the case in Tibet, actively engage in violence against oppression. Michael Hadley suggests that redemptive violence is the most dominant religion in modern society, and that much of the rhetoric that we observe coming out of the United States, particularly, is highly soteriological and based on the idea of peace through war. For the most part, this is a coherent and interesting collection...

FOR PROPHET AND TSAR: ISLAM AND EMPIRE IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA, Robert D. Crews, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006, 463 pages, $29.95. Stanford historian Robert D. Crews examines the relationship between the Russian empire and its Muslim constituents from the reign of Catherine the Great to the Revolution of 1917. In particular, Crews advances two intertwined propositions. The first is that administering the population by dividing it into communities of faith, a governing strategy referred to as confessionalization that Crews attributes to Catherine, did much to maintain calm and order within the empire. second, he asserts that this approach allowed the state to govern with less violence and with a greater degree of consensus than historians have previously imagined. In effect, the author contends that a kind of symbiosis evolved between the state and Islam. Crews develops these assertions over a daunting historical expanse of time (two centuries) and territory (the Caucasus to Central Asia). Basing his extensive research on court, police, and other official records, he effectively dispels perceptions that the state was simply an instrument for the repression of Islamic cultures or that those cultures, in turn, were seething with animosity toward the Russian Empire. By implication, a clash of civilizations was neither a permanent nor inevitable feature of Russo-Muslim relations. Rather, the Tsar's regime sought to forge a relationship that in significant ways paralleled the one it enjoyed with the Orthodox Church. In constructing this relationship, the state found opportunity in the demographic diversity and dispersal of the Islamic communities it encountered. Because Islam in Russia and Central Asia did not have an elaborately developed hierarchical organization for managing the populace, the state stepped in to help establish one. A sterling example was the Orenburg Ecclesiastical Assembly, which was roughly analogous to the Orthodox Holy Synod, whose membership was approved by the state. Established by Peter the Great, the Holy Synod became an ideological pillar of the regime, binding spiritual authority to temporal in the person of the Tsar in a manner that accorded nicely with emerging Enlightenment political theory in the West. In turn, the assembly regulated Muslim affairs in a manner that was at least tolerable both to the Tsar and the community of faith it served. In the resultant concordance, aie call of Muslims to worship in the empire normally included a prayer for the preservation of the Romanov dynasty. The Islamic hierarchy benefited substantially, as state support afforded governmentapproved senior clerics a level of legally enforceable authority they had not previously possessed. Ultimately, one of Crews' key findings is his rejection of the traditional explanation of Russian historians that imperial arrangements in the administration of its Muslim population were in large measure a reflection of undergovernment, a simple lack of administrative reach into distant portions of the empire that in turn necessitated limited reliance on native institutions. …

The theories of the information society and the idea of the modern digital state need an interdisciplinary approach. Practical realization of the concept of the digital state issues a challenge to public administration. It might be observed that public entities, while they work on electronic solutions, do not focus adequate attention on their cooperation. In Poland, the scope of digitalization and electronic services provided by public administration has extended. The digital transformation of public institutions is of high importance in the context the human rights. Cybersecurity and some contemporary threats related to the public sphere (cybercrime, cyberterrorism, cyberwar, fake news) trigger the changes in legal systems and public institutions. They also affect people, their cognitive abilities and identity. It is significant that the predictions concerning the information society and the digital state in the context of social changes have been present in the futurological thought. They include the thoughts of Alvin Toffler, Samuel P. Huntington, and Francis Fukuyama. The authors deal with the civilization changes, transformation related to dissemination of modern ICT technology, clash of cultures and their influence on societies and states.

Going through a protracted period of transition since the end of the Cold War, the world order in the making is neither what was nor what it is yet to become. It is in “the middle of the future.”To get our bearings in this uncertain transition, we explore the two grand post‐Cold War narratives—“The End of History” as posited by Francis Fukuyama and “The Clash of Civilizations” posited by the late Samuel Huntington. Mikhail Gorbachev looks back at his policies that brought the old order to collapse. The British philosopher John Gray critiques the supposed “universality” of liberalism and, with Homi Bhabha, sees a world of hybrid identities and localized cultures. The Singaporean theorist Kishore Mahbubani peels away the “veneer” of Western dominance. Amartya Sen, the economist and Nobel laureate, assesses whether democratic India or autocratic China is better at building “human capacity” in their societies.

In the recent past the two moments that have elicited the most periodizing impulses are 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin wall, and 9/11, the date of the destruction of the Twin Towers in 2001. To these two dates might be added a moment that is still being processed: the election of Obama in November 2008. The year 1989, the moment marking the end of the Cold War, has generated well-known narratives such as Francis Fukuyama's “end of history” and Samuel Huntington's “clash of civilizations,” as well as numerous treatises on globalization, including Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's Empire. September 11 has been seen as a rupture inaugurating the War on Terror and paving the way for a new U.S. imperialism. Commentators such as David Harvey, Michael Mann, and Chalmers Johnson have variously characterized a post-September 11 imperialism based on unilateralism and militarism.1 Many historians and cultural critics have also seen continuities between the Cold War and the War on Terror,2 while the culture and politics of 9/11 have been the subject of a number of works, including Stanley Hauerwas and Frank Lentricchia's collection Dissent from the Homeland: Essays after September 11 (2003) and Mary Dudziak et al.'s September 11 in History (2003). Most recently, U.S. culture between the end of the Cold War and the inception of the War on Terror has been the subject of Phillip Wegner's Life Between Two Deaths, 1989–2001.

Going through a protracted period of transition since the end of the Cold War, the world order in the making is neither what was nor what it is yet to become. It is in “the middle of the future.”To get our bearings in this uncertain transition, we explore the two grand post‐Cold War narratives—“The End of History” as posited by Francis Fukuyama and “The Clash of Civilizations” posited by the late Samuel Huntington. Mikhail Gorbachev looks back at his policies that brought the old order to collapse. The British philosopher John Gray critiques the supposed “universality” of liberalism and, with Homi Bhabha, sees a world of hybrid identities and localized cultures. The Singaporean theorist Kishore Mahbubani peels away the “veneer” of Western dominance. Amartya Sen, the economist and Nobel laureate, assesses whether democratic India or autocratic China is better at building “human capacity” in their societies.